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Abstract
M cC onnell, N athan S. M .A., M ay 2004 H istory
Alternative or Traditional? A History o f Solar and W ind Energy
Advisor/Director; Dan Flores
As the title suggests, “ Alternative or T raditional?” investigates tw o energy resources
regarded by contem porary society as belonging to the future. D uring the energy crises o f
the 1970s, many energy experts and policym akers expressed interest in solar and wind
technologies, some in the United States even prom ised that the nation w ould inevitably
turn to these resources. W e still may. My interest in what w e now refer to as alternative
energy began with a successful revenue bond initiative that occurred in N ovem ber 2001.
The VoteSolar Initiative helped form ulate Proposition B and put the m easure on the
ballot in San Francisco. Designed to raise on e hundred million dollars to fund solar,
wind, and energy conservation im provem ents on city-owned buildings, the initiative
passed easily. From a modern perspective, it seemed as though the prom ise o f renew able
energy technologies had finally met with success. As I groped around for a thesis topic
that would hold my interest, I decided to investigate the tw o resources that m ost appealed
to voters, solar and wind energy. I was surprised by the findings. Solar and w ind energy
have a long and inadequately publicized history with humanity. This thesis attem pts to
alleviate this dearth o f knowledge by encapsulating passive solar, active solar, and wind
energy within the context o f major social energy transitions. In the first chapter, I set out
the energy transition stories o f ancient China, early m odem Britain, and the industrial
United States. The next three chapters trace the long history o f passive solar, active solar,
and wind energy technologies, and the final chapter analyzes recent trends in the US.
Tw o major argum ents hold the work together. Solar and wind energy have long held the
interest o f human societies, and the world will som eday run out o f fossil fuels. As the US
has the ability to alter its energy policy, solar and wind energy remain plausible choices
for the future.
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Introduction

(H)istorians must turn away from John Muir and
Aide Leopold and look more closely at E. F. Schumacher,
Amory Lovins, Murray Bookchin, Stewart Brand, and the
generation o f environmentalists who struggled to craft an
environmental philosophy that recognized humans “were
gods, and might as well get good at it.”’

This thesis began has its genesis in challenge. Groping around for a
suitable line o f inquiry early in m y second sem ester o f graduate work, I had still
not found a topic. Several areas piqued m y interest, yet I could not find a subject
that prom ised to hold m y attention enough to produce an acceptable work,
especially m y first as a historian. I needed a challenge, and, thankfully, I had an
advisor who implicitly understood the nature o f graduate school, which is to find
areas o f interest that can hold a p erson’s attention well after graduate w ork is
finished. Better still, m y advisor assigned an article that struck m e as particularly
interesting. Andrew K irk’s “A ppropriating Technology” argues that m odem
environmentalism has its roots in a philosophy less fam iliar w ith the A m erican
naturalist ethos espoused by John M uir and Aldo Leopold and more in com m on
with appropriate technology advocates like Am ory Lovins and E. F. Schumacher.^
Kirk im plicitly challenges environm ental historians to bridge the gap
between the overwrought antim odem ist hero worship and the silence that plagues
m odem countercultural techies. I accept K irk’s call, if in m y own way. This

’ Kirk, “Appropriating Technology,” 376.
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thesis explores global energy transitions, solar and wind technological
development, and the m odern union o f technology and policy in the U nited States.
W hile other historians have analyzed resource consum ption and environm ental
change generally, none has explained the longue duree view o f energy transitions
and alternative energy technologies w ithin the context o f m odern environm ental
politics. This thesis explores the changing nature o f solar and wind energy
technology from their beginnings to applications in the early tw enty-first century.
W hile the resources them selves have not changed in the tw o m illennia covered
here, the ways that hum ans have harnessed the energy sources has adapted
considerably, and this m etam orphosis cam e largely due to shifting governm ental
policies.
I f any society ever adopts solar and wind energy as prim ary sources, it
m ust first experience an energy transition. Abandoning fam iliar resources can be
a difficult task, yet countless societies have adapted their energy consum ption
patterns. This thesis begins with an overview o f three energy transition
experiences that implicitly suggests the enduring character o f solar and w ind
energy. Ancient China, early m odern G reat Britain, and the industrial U nited
States all m ade dramatic shifts in their energy resources. The changes all include
three common characteristics. First each society had an econom ic system in place
that allowed a change to occur w ithout upsetting governm ent’s role as provider
and protector. Next all three nations had the ability to adapt their technological
expertise to the demands o f new energy resources. Finally, each country had

^ Kirk, “Appropriating Tecluiology,” 376.
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political institutions in place that could balance the need for new energy sources
with the demands o f social stability.
The following three chapters explore specific alternative energy
technologies. Passive solar technology refers to the ways that hum anity uses the
sun’s energy for dom estic heating and cooing. Beginning with architectural
designs, humanity has devised a plethora o f ways to harness sunlight. W ithin a
modern context, passive solar technology’s chief benefit is energy conservation.
Next I explain how hum anity struck upon the idea o f converting sunshine into
electricity. Photovoltaics represent a pinnacle for solar energy developm ent and
an alluring technology in the m odern era. Finally, I analyze w ind energy.
Societies across the globe have long held wind in high regard due to its constant
nature, but wind technology has changed dram atically since its earliest
applications. Today, wind energy has the ability to contribute significantly to
m odern energy production.
I conclude this thesis by analyzing the union betw een solar and w ind
technology and modern environm ental politics. A fter a brief overview o f
American energy policy since the 1970s, I exam ine the causes o f the 2000-2001
California electricity crisis. One im portant effect o f the shortages cam e in San
Francisco during the N ovem ber 2001 election, when the nonprofit group,
VoteSolar, crafted a revenue bond for public scrutiny. By portraying solar and
wind energy as antidotes to the constant problem s that faced Bay Area residents,
VoteSolar and other advocacy groups convinced nearly three-quarters o f San
Francisco voters to approve a $100 m illion project that would retrofit city-ow ned
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buildings with passive solar energy saving measures, purchase electricity
generated by wind turbines, and, m ost significantly, install photovoltaic solar
panels on city-owned rooftops.
V oteSolar’s efforts have had a positive impact on national energy policy.
Several states have adopted rigorous renew able energy portfolio standards (R PS)
and other localities have prom ised to install solar- and w ind-friendly m easures. I
conclude my thesis by considering w hether the prom ises m ade by the U nited
States governm ent after the 1973 O PE C oil em bargo finally have merit. D uring
the seventies, particularly during th e C arter Administration, the federal
governm ent undertook m ajor efforts to dem onstrate solar and wind energy
technologies to citizens across the nation, yet by the end o f R eagan’s first term in
office, it was clear to m ost alternative energy advocates that pro-solar policies had
no friends in the W hite House. The solar and wind industries m anaged to adapt,
much as the technologies changed throughout their histories, so that by the early
tw enty-first century, people could realistically depend on the sun and wind for
power.
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Chapter 1

From Ox M ountain to OPEC: E n ergy Transitions in World H istory
Energy Policy Redux
It took nature over 500 million years to
store in the ground these stockpiles o f
‘fossil fuels’ which civilization is now
consuming in a flash o f geologic time.
President’s Materials Policy Commission, 1952

For Am ericans living through it, the 1973 oil embargo was a monumental
occasion. The Arabian contingent o f the Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC)
m ade good on its prom ise to cut petroleum production, an act with serious consequences
for the United States. Long lines at gas stations, exorbitant hom e heating costs, and an
uneasy dependence on foreign resources all forced A m ericans to consider the sources o f
their energy. The consequences o f unchecked energy consum ption had already caused
the US to pass a num ber o f environm entally protective regulations.’ The 1970s also saw
citizen movements like E.F. Schum acher’s “appropriate technology” and A m ory L ovins’
“soft energy path” that alerted people to the possibilities o f alternatives.^ In the 1970s,
the U nited States seem ed on the verge o f changing how it got its energy.
As with other m ovem ents in the U nited States, the pressure to shift energy policy
had historical precedent. Policy scholars had concerns about energy supply since the
im m ediate post-W orld W ar II era, when tight resources threatened economic growth.

' Three prominent ones, the National Environmental Policy Act o f 1969 (NEPA), 42 USC 4321 et seq., the
Clean Air Act o f 1970 (CAA), 42 USC 7401 et seq., and the Clean Water Act o f 1972 (CWA), 33 USC
1251 et seq., all became law well before the OPEC embargo o f 1973.
^ See Andrew Kirk, “Appropriating Technology: The Whole Earth Catalog and Counterculture
Environmental Politics,” Environmental History (6:3, July 2001), 374-94.
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itself closely linked to expanding energy use. In late 1951, with the pressures o f the
Korean conflict stressing dom estic energy supplies. President H arry S. Trum an
com m issioned an executive study to propose a com prehensive overhaul o f national
energy policy. The President’s M aterials P olicy Com mission, better known as the Paley
Com m ission after chairman W illiam S. Paley, considered the hodge-podge, pragm atic
policies o f the past, analyzed policy options, and suggested alternatives. Foreshadow ing
the problems that would arise som e tw enty years later, the report portended that “the tim e
will com e...and perhaps well beyond 1975, when civilization’s energy needs will outrun
nature’s declining store o f fossil fuels available for econom ic use.” R ather than w ait for
depletion, the report recom mended that the governm ent find ways “to harness
econom ically such unconventional resources as solar and atom ic energy
Flash forward twenty years to the N ixon adm inistration. The United States had
grow n woefully dependent on foreign, particularly M iddle Eastern, sources o f oil for use
in everything from gas-guzzling “m uscle” cars to electricity-producing pow er plants.
Even before the devastating OPEC oil em bargo in autum n o f 1973, President N ixon
addressed some problems o f depending on the global market. In late June o f that year,
N ixon announced “Project Independence,” w hich called on the United States to “m eet
A m erica’s own energy needs from A m erica’s own energy resources” by the end o f the
decade.'* Perhaps unwittingly, N ixon echoed the sentim ents o f the Paley Com m ission,
w hich warned that “the Free W o rld ...cannot be allowed to becom e over dependent (sic)

^ President s Materials Policy Commission, volume 1, Resources fo r Freedom: Foundations f o r Growth
an d Security ONaslûttg^oa DC: Government Printing Office, 1952), 104, 106, quoted in Craufurd D.
Goodwin, ed„ Energy Policy in Perspective: Today's Problems, Yesterday's Solutions (Wasliington, DC:
The Brookings Institution, 1981), 53-4.
" Executive Energy Documents, printed at Uie request o f Henry M. Jackson, Chair, Comimttee on Energy
and Natural Resources (Washington, DC: US Govermnent Printing Office, July 1978), 86.
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on Middle East oil. ..

In other words, insightful policy w onks foresaw trouble ahead,

yet American leaders failed to take action.
Like the US in the 1970s, m any societies have had difficulty adjusting to resource
scarcity. In term s o f hum an energy use, a pattern em erges in w hich a society finds a
valuable resource, uses it until it is gone, then struggles to find suitable replacem ents.
This chapter analyzes tw o such situations, in ancient China and in early m odern G reat
Britain. In certain rare occasions, societies have changed their energy resources before
having depleted previously valuable ones. I cover one such occasion here, the industrial
United States. Rather than run out o f resources, as happened in China and B ritain, the
industrial United States embraced the paradigm shift because o f the nation’s abundance.
These three historical instances reveal the factors that influence major societies’ energy
resource transitions. W hile other historians have studied particular resource consum ption
and change generally, none has considered the historical role o f energy transitions within
the context o f solar and wind energy resources.
Ancient China, early m odem G reat Britain, and industrial Am erica all exhibited
three indispensable characteristics. First, all the nations had an econom ic system that
could adapt to a new energy resource. N ext, each society dem onstrated technological
adroitness; and finally, all o f them had the political institutions in place that m ade change
possible. F or nations that have undergone energy transitions, or major changes in the
resource(s) upon which a society prim arily depends, those societies m ust possess some
combination o f econom ic openness, technological expertise, and political responsiveness.
The emergence o f the Paley Com m ission in the 1950s, and later Project
Independence in the early 1970s, indicate that policym akers can anticipate the need to

^ Goodwin, quoting Resources f o r Freedom, in Energy Policy, 55.
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change energy resources. Each also indicates that the US will continue to change its
pattern o f energy production and consum ption. A m erica’s dependence on fossil fuels,
particularly petroleum, has placed the nation in a precarious situation, particularly in the
context o f historical energy transitions. The 1970s represent a tim e in w hich th e United
States confronted energy shortages nationw ide for the first time. I include the period
during and after the 1973 OPEC oil em bargo to illustrate a prem ise central to my thesis:
in the early tw enty-first century, the U nited States appears on the brink o f changing the
energy resources it uses.
The American reaction to the 1970s energy crisis indicates w hat direction the
country m ight take when (and if) the need to choose a new energy path arises. A lthough
I discuss the technological and resource possibilities in greater detail in subsequent
chapters, the US response to the crisis years o f the seventies provides necessary
background for discussion o f more recent developm ents, w hich indicate that Am erican
econom ics, technology, and policy can support a m ajor shift in the nation’s energy
resources. W hichever direction the US ultim ately chooses, the exam ples from ancient
China, early modern Britain, and the industrializing United States all m ake clear that
Am erican society will change dram atically from its experience with energy transition.^

Ancient China
Tliere was a time when tlie trees were luxuriant on Ox
Mountain. As it is on tJie outskirts o f a great metropolis,
tlie trees are constantly lopped by axes. Is it any wonder
tliat tliey are no longer fine?. . . A man's letting go o f liis
true heart is like the case o f tlie trees and the axes.
When tlie trees are lopped day after day, is it any wonder
tliat tliey are no longer fine?

®I recognize tlie possibility tliat tecluiolo©^ may allow us to continue burning fossil fuels at current levels,
but I set tliis potential reality aside for the moment.
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M encius, fourtli century BC

C hina’s energy situation did not m uch im prove between the tim e M encius opined
at the diminishing forests o f Ox M ountain and the nation’s first political unification a
century later. Tim ber played an im portant role in the developm ent o f Chinese
civilization, and the depletion o f the resource forced the nation to adapt. N ature offered
several potential options, but the tw o with the m ost to offer w ere coal and water.
W eighing the merits o f each resource, Chinese leadership opted to encourage w hat
historian Karl W ittfogel described as a “hydraulic society,” one based on irrigation and
farming.^
At the tim e o f C hina’s first political unification, in 221 BCE, policym akers ruled
over the most technologically advanced nation on the planet. M ost societies depended on
tim ber for fuel in the years before the com m on era, yet Chinese engineers developed iron
and steel tools centuries before others did. Such expertise gave Chinese farm ers an
advantage over their contem poraries in other parts o f the world, and after political
leadership became a relative constant in the early com m on era, a pattern em erged in
China that others would repeat later: tools forged with the high tem peratures o f charcoal,
a w ood product, helped farm ers clear fields o f trees; the act also produced fuel for
m etalworkers to ply their trade. In tandem, the process created an unsustainable pattern
that would eventually force Chinese leaders to adapt to new energy sources.
The struggle to turn forests into farm land show s but one side o f the m ulti
dimensional relationship between C hina’s people and natural resources. R esource
depletion proved a constant problem in E ast Asia, and throughout its early developm ent.
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China coped with shortages by applying technological solutions. B y turning to an
abundant natural resource, coal, C hina’s northern region helped stem the tide o f
deforestation, while laying the groundw ork for future technological developm ents.
Ultimately, Chinese policies dealt w ith an agricultural econom y that steered the nation
away from industrial innovation.
Political stability gave China an essential advantage in the nation’s ability to
develop technology and to adapt to resource scarcity. C hina’s political story begins with
the nation’s first unification in the third century, BC. In 221 BC, Qin Shi H uangdi
managed to consolidate the vast lands o f eastern Asia into a single political entity.
C hina’s founding marks the beginning o f a successful and enduring national tradition,
and the advent o f a relatively stable political structure allowed technological advances
that influenced much o f the world. A lthough C hinese m etalw orkers preferred to use
charcoal to power their furnaces, coal becam e an im portant fuel, particularly in the
tim ber-starved northern provinces. C oal’s higher tem peratures allowed sm elting
techniques that could produce sturdier farm ing im plem ents and stronger w eaponry. Q in’s
achievem ent created a centralized bureaucracy that attem pted to m erge the needs o f a
grow ing population with C hina’s already legendary technological reputation, and despite
num erous political crises, the Chinese governm ent continued to encourage innovation
into the fourteenth century AD.
Agriculture lay at the heart o f C hinese unification. A m assive increase in
population meant that farmers endured increasing pressure to expand into forested areas.
Agricultural and domestic needs form ed the root causes o f massive deforestation inflicted

’ Donald Worster, Rivers o f Empire: Water. Aridity, an d the Growth o f the American West (New York;
Pantlieon Books, 1985), 27-8.
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on the Chinese landscape. Tim ber proved a functional barrier to expansion because after
clearing tress to develop farmland, w ood provided structural support for hom es, fuel to
heat them, and the charcoal to sm elter farm ing im plem ents. W ood thus m arked a barrier
and a catalyst for change, and the resource helped m eet the needs o f an expanding
population. Arthur Cotterell estim ates that C hinese population reached fifty-eight m illion
by 23 AD.* Clive Ponting figures that C hina’s population rem ained stable, around fifty
million, by 200 AD, while E uropean num bers stood at around thirty-five million.® The
rising population meant that tim ber becam e increasingly valuable, w hich provided the
backdrop for technological innovation.
In China, the swelling population encroached on forested landscapes. W hile
tim ber and its by-product, charcoal, rem ained highly prized for metal workers, coal
provided m etallurgists with the opportunity to create vastly im proved products. JeanClaude Debeir estimates that the lack o f w ood in the loess, or steppe, regions o f northern
China helped spur the early use o f coal th ere.’® Forges produced cast iron tools by 500
BC, and Chinese m etalworkers produced steel through various practices. V alclav Smils
identifies tw o ways in which early steel m akers could ply their trade; by carburizing
wrought iron or decarburating cast iron ” T he fusing process m astered by Chinese
m etallurgists bears a striking resem blance to the Siemens-M artin technique, a steel-

®Artliur Cotterell, China: A Cultural H istory, (New York: Meridian, 1988), 112,
^ Clive Ponting, A Green H istory o f the World: The Environm ent and the Collapse o f G reat C ivilizations
(N ew York: Penguin Books, 1991), 92.
*** Jean-CIaude Debeir, Jean-Paul Deleage, and Daniel Heinery, In the Servitude o f Power: E nergy and
Civilization Through the A ges (London: Zed Books, 1991), 55.
" Valclav Smils, fw ergy/n
(Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1994), 151-2.
Carburizing means prolonged heating o f wrought iron so that carbon gradually diffuses inwardly;
decarburization requires the smelter to stir molten cast iron to expel carbon. See also, Debeir, et al. In the
Servitude o f Power, 55.
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m aking m ethod introduced in the U.S. in 1868, although no direct link exists betw een

them.*^
The Chinese people developed a system for creating technologies th at m ost found
difficult to change. M etalw orking innovations led to better farm ing im plem ents, w hich
helped accelerate deforestation. Chinese agriculture spread thanks to sturdier, m ore
efficient tools fired in coal furnaces. The m oldboard plow, m ade with coal’s high heat,
greatly reduced the amount o f energy required from a farm er w ho previously tilled the
soil with hand implements. Yet even with the grow th o f fossil-born technology, C hinese
society expressed a reluctance to change. W hile anthracite coal allowed engineers to
create cast iron, and to a far less extent steel production, Chinese m etalw orkers preferred
to w ork with charcoal-powered furnaces. Jean-CIaude D ebeir assigns three factors to the
transition from a wood-based to a coal-fueled one: fuel requirem ents o f the burgeoning
population; metalworking products for farm ers and soldiers; and the m assive
deforestation o f Chinese timberlands.*^ The shift from trees to fossils in E ast Asia bears
a resem blance to transitions that occur in other places w here energy sources change.
C hina’s shift from w ood to coal w as neither com plete nor perm anent. Chinese
sm elting continued to rely on coal, but m echanical applications never fully caught on.
Although metal workers used w ater m ills to drive hamm ers and bellows, an advance
m ade in China by the first century AD, hydraulic m achines having m etalw orking value
tended to lose out to the use o f w ater for agricultural concerns. Continued population
grow th meant that political leaders had to m ake a decision regarding the direction o f
Chinese innovation. Agricultural production rem ained at the heart o f policy, and the

Martin V. M elosi, Coping with Abundance: E nergy and Environment in Industrial Am erica, (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 31.
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mechanical developm ents centering on w aterw heels lost out to irrigation concerns. Just
as centralized bureaucracy aided in the specialization o f coal in the northern provinces,
made m ost apparent by the Grand C anal’s construction, the national governm ent called
for concentrated efforts toward rice cultivation. The water-pow ered mills th at cropped up
throughout Europe in the early M iddle A ges stem m ed from the need to grind w heat for
bread, but East Asians relied on rice, w hose processing doesn’t require milling. The
political decision to dism antle w ater mills seem ed em inently practical considering the
effective applications m etalworkers m ade w ith coal. By the eighth century, C hinese
authorities banned waterwheel construction, and in 778 AD the governm ent dism antled
eighty mills.*”* W hile tim ber depletion allow ed certain technological innovations, a
continued reliance on an agricultural econom y helped prevent a complete energy resource
transition.
The shift in Chinese energy use lies in its overall effects. Smelting operations
continued to use coal well into the m odern era; at the same time agricultural dem ands
stunted a shift to a full-blown fossil-pow ered society. Rice grew easily in Chinese fields,
and developments in w et farming based in th e south spread northward. W aterw ays that
had the potential to spur m echanized advances becam e more im portant as irrigation and
transportation avenues. Chinese dependence on and overconsum ption o f w ood m eant
recurring tim ber shortages; coal becam e indispensable as a source for domestic, for
heating and cooking, and manufacturing, for sm elting applications. Chinese energy
transition w as more merger than linear; instead o f m oving from wood to coal, C hina’s
resources formed a partnership. This cooperative effort was not unique, but its utility

' ^ Debeir, In the Servitude o f Power, 51 -6.
'" Ib id , 58.
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helps explain why no industrial revolution occurred in China. C lim ate and geography
also played m ajor roles; the need to use naturally flow ing w ater for irrigation in a sem iarid landscape subverted potential developm ent o f hydraulic m achinery

Such w as not

the problem in Great Britain.

Early Modern Great Britain
Even now tlie devastation is begun.
And lialf tlie business o f destruction done;
Even now, inetliinks, as pondering here I stand,
I see tlie rural Virtues leave tlie land.
Oliver Goldsmith, “Tlie Deserted Village,” 1766

The “Virtues” that English poet O liver G oldsm ith refers to in “The D eserted
Village” clearly represent the values lost during the shift from an agrarian econom y to an
industrial one. From the Glorious R evolution in 1688 until N apoleon’s defeat at
W aterloo in 1815, British society transform ed from an agrarian nation into one based on
the open market. This early m odern period included G oldsm ith’s em pty village, itself a
byproduct o f B ritain’s industrialization. T he agricultural system that had helped B ritain
endure the calam itous M iddle Ages included the comm ons, land held by farm ing tenants
in common ownership that was used prim arily for raising crops. Parliam ent’s efforts to
“close,” o r privatize, the publicly-owned fields signals the need for w orkers in crow ded,
dirty factory towns that became vital to G reat B ritain’s em ergence as a leader in the
global m arket econom y o f the nineteenth century.
The technology that spurred the Industrial Revolution, the shift from a muscleand water-based energy sources to a system based on steam pow er and fossil fuels,
stemm ed from factors also seen in ancient China. In both China and Britain, technology
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had an impact on resource depletion. B ritish engineers m astered the steam engine, w hich
pushed the demand for tim ber fuel beyond sustainable levels. Econom ically, G reat
Britain had to deal with the problem s o f an agricultural system that functioned w ithin a
growing capitalistic economy. Y et unlike their A sian predecessors w hose geography
forced the governm ent to construct massive public w orks for agricultural reasons,
B ritain's fertile land allowed leaders to encourage the nation’s traditional affinity fo r the
open market. D espite the different paths th at each nation chose, the same three factors technology, econom ics, and policy - all had a profound influence on resolving the
direction o f energy transition.
Agriculture was the driving force behind B ritain’s technological innovation.
Even before the early m odern era, m achines dotted the B ritish landscape. As w ith their
continental counterparts, British farm ers raised grains that required processing beyond
harvesting. To produce an edible form o f w heat, for example, farm workers needed to
grind the grain into a pow der form (flour), a tim e-consum ing task. European farm ers had
long known the advantages o f using m illing technology, which used m uscle o r w ater, and
in a few rare occasions, wind energy, as a fiiel.*^ Such m achines increased in com plexity
with time, and people eventually adapted m echanical concepts to other sectors o f society.
Although British m achines had a role in displacing farm er peasants, technology also
provided an outlet: by the eighteenth century, several industries (m ost prom inently
textiles and transportation) adapted m echanical energy into an efficient, powerful steampow ered idea that could be run by people.*^

Smils, Energy in World History, 66-9.
Ibid.. 161.
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Agriculture influenced B ritish technology by encouraging farm ers to create better
implements, as well. By the eighteenth century, m etalw orkers produced iron tools that
could clear forests and others that could plow fields. M etallurgists faced a barrier to
developing iron implements, though, and th e problem centered on the high tem peratures
needed to work with iron. Charcoal w as a reliable fuel, but the dem and for tim ber
eventually overtook B ritain’s supply. B lacksm iths learned that coal produced enough
heat to w ork with iron, and forges across B ritain began w orking with the fossil fuel to
create sturdy implements.
In itself, using coal as a fuel was not significant. As noted above, ancient Chinese
w orkers used coal centuries prior to British blacksm iths. Yet the demand for coal
triggered tw o developments im portant to B ritain ’s technological developm ent. First,
m etallurgists began to experiment w ith m etals at coal’s high tem peratures, which resulted
in sturdier products.*^ M ore importantly, coal offered an alternative to the rapidly
dim inishing tim ber that resulted from the rapid population grow th after the Black Death.
W hile Britain suffered plagues as late as 1665, when a major outbreak occurred in
London, the nation’s population began to grow after 1500.** As the num ber o f people
increased, so did the pressure on natural resources, and the demand on tim ber and food
spurred geographic expansion. Forests succum bed to farmland, and eventually Britain
experienced severe w ood shortages. Coal-based technology relieved som e o f the
pressure on tim ber demand by offering a reliable, and in som e cases superior, alternative
to charcoal. Another solution was the literal expansion o f Great B ritain’s econom ic
system.

P.J. Marshall, ed.. The Oxford H istory o f the British Empire, Volume II: The Eighteenth Century (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1998), 59.
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B ritain’s agricultural system set the foundation for unprecedented econom ic
expansion. By the eighteenth century, fertile fields and advanced technology reduced the
need for farm labor, and a rising textile industry soon em erged to absorb those w orkers
that once occupied the commons.*^ M anufacturing grew in econom ic im portance
throughout the early m odern period, and by the nineteenth century, steam -pow ered
factories concentrated in several B ritish cities.
M erchants seized the advantage by developing a com plex system o f com m erce
and credit that led to empire. After the governm ent halted its strict oversight o f private
enterprise, publicly-backed corporations reorganized into m ore venturesom e private
associations. British historian Patrick O ’B rien argues that the British m erchant class
becam e the driving force o f the nation’s econom y.

Daring ventures and huge returns on

investm ents created wealth unparalleled in E urope, as British m erchants built the
complicated system o f credit that formed the roots o f modern lending rules and
institutions. Credit also played a vital role fo r private business and public activities alike.
British arm ies saw action throughout the eighteenth century, most o f it financed with
public debt.^* M ercantile confidence in lending stayed high due to the governm ent’s
faithful repayments, even though they cam e at taxpayer expense.
Throughout B ritain’s m eteoric rise to global empire, governm ent policy alternated
betw een laissez-faire and protectionist principles. As the political system grew m ore
open to the rising m erchant class in the eighteenth century, regulations on internal
production remained lax. Labor rem ained cheap thanks to a system that offered few

20

Ponting, >1 Green H istory, 92, 229.
Marsliall, The Oxford H istory o f the British Em pire, 56.
Ibid., 60.
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protections for those at the bottom o f the econom ic pyramid. Parliam ent’s hands-off
approach also applied to the commons. B etw een 1750 and 1810, tw enty percent o f the
total acreage in England and W ales fell under private enclosure acts, wherein individuals
took legal actions to exert ownership rights.

H istorian Paul Langford argues that the

“flexible farm ing” inherent in private ow nership dispensed w ith the need to use arable
land for subsistence, opening it for profitable c r o p s . A l t h o u g h the enclosure m ovem ent
affected m uch o f British society, the process existed solely in the private realm.
The m ost im portant public act o f the early m odern era reflected the will o f a
powerful m erchant class. In 1660, Parliam ent passed the first o f several N avigation Acts
that strictly controlled trade among the colonies to the benefit o f existing businesses and
nascent ventures. Not only did the law require all colonial trade from Europe to pass
through Britain, which kept capital inside the nation w hile effectively taxing im ports, all
such transportation had to use British or colonial s h i p s . S u c h policies allowed B ritish
m erchants both an incentive to extract natural resources from colonies, since taxes on
shipbuilding items like N ew England white pine trees stayed low, as well as providing
new m arkets for British-m ade goods, particularly textiles.
D espite the complexities o f British technology, economics, and policy, the transition to
coal w as vital to Britain’s empire. W hen forests disappeared, room opened for vital arable land,
even though Britain lost a vital energy resource. Coal provided a suitable alternative. Even
before the beginning o f the early m odern era, B ritons burned coal as heat for food and comfort.

Ibid., 64. O ’Brien notes tliat Britain liad a debt more tlian twice tlie national incom e...astonisliing even
by tlie standards o f profligate borrowing displayed by many governments o f the late twentietli century.”
Paul Langford, A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727-1783 {Oxford; Oxford University Press,
1989), 435.
Ibid., 436. Langford offers no opinion as to whether tliis represents tlie roots of mono-crop farming, but
tlie parallels seem apparent.
Marsliall, British Empire, 10-1.
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Industry used coal to make everything from beer to glass, and everyone from shippers to builders
tapped into coal’s strength. Coal even acted as a nursery for B ritain’s sailors w ho navigated
coal-bearing ships alongside coastlines, on rivers, and through canals to deliver the resource
from its mining origins to urban and m anufacturing centers in London, B ristol, and M anchester.
Such experience proved vital during tim es o f war. According to Patrick O ’Brien, coal w as at
least as im portant as agriculture, for the fuel spurred population, urbanization, trade, and
industrialization - all o f which would have a vital impact on the A m erican colonies.

Industrial United States
Tlie vast forests o f the United States and
Canada cannot long resist the improvident
liabits o f tlie backwoodsman and tlie increased
demand for lumber.
George Perkins Marsli, A/<a« and Nature (1864)

By the middle o f the nineteenth century, G eorge Perkins M arsh noticed a
disturbing trend in his country. A m ericans pushed their forests to the brink o f extinction
due to an insatiable demand for tim ber. At issue for conservationists w as w hether the
country could adapt to dwindling supplies by replacing tim ber with som e other resource.
M arsh proposed tw o solutions that reflect both the idealism and pragm atism o f the young
nation. M arsh thought that Am ericans needed to develop “enlightened self-interest,” the
vague notion that resources should be used only w hen society deem ed them necessary.
M arsh also called for industry to find alternatives, reasoning that “‘a crisis will becom e

” Ibid., 78-80.
Ibid., 59.
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terrible unless the discovery o f.. .pit coal or anthracite’” e m e r g e d . T r u e to M arsh ’s
vision, the United States expanded its resource base to include coal. In 1850, coal
accounted for only nine percent o f Am erican energy consum ption; yet, a h a lf century
later, the fossil fuel m ade up nearly three-quarters.^*
The energy resource transition that occurred in the United States occurred over
several decades, from the m id-nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries. As w ith the
changes highlighted in China and G reat B ritain, A m erica’s energy transition depended on
technology, economics, and policy. The U nited States experience differed in a m ajor
way, though. Although G eorge Perkins M arsh sensed a pattern o f overconsum ption in
the N ew England forests, the United States changed its m ajor energy resources w ithout
first depleting those on which society had previously depended. Rather than change
technology, economics, and policy in an attem pt to com pensate for a lost resource,
America used these three forces proactively to m odernize its society. This capacity to
change w ithout first running out o f an energy source serves as a valuable lesson for the
tw enty-first century.
Before Europeans began settling in N orth America, the energy story here echoed
that o f civilizations elsewhere. Native A m ericans and Europeans each relied prim arily on
renewable energy, such as tim ber and m uscle. As the impact o f w hite settlem ent pushed
Indians aside, though, consum ption patterns changed. Tim ber meant money to early
colonists, and those emigrating from the B ritish Isles harvested varieties o f N ew England

^ George Perkins Marsh, A/an and Nature, Or, Physical Geography as M odified b y Human Action
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, reprinted, 1965), 255-9.
“ Joseph A. Pratt, “Tlie Ascent o f O il,” in Lewis J. Perehnan, August W. Giebelliaus, and Michael D.
Yokell,
. Energy Transitions: Long-Term P erspectives (AAAS Selected Symposium 48, Boulder;
W estview Press, 1981), 10.

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

21

hardwoods in order to participate in B ritain’s im perial m arket e c o n o m y . W h i l e young
industries used wood, mostly as charcoal, to produce iron and glass, depletion o f
tim berlands began at an unprecedented rate in N orth America. H istorian M artin M elosi
figures that to produce one thousand tons o f iron, people had to use six thousand cords o f
wood; with Am erican forests shrinking, society struggled to find new sources o f precious
timber. The United States saw w ood as the key to its early success, lending credence to
the notion that tim ber was “the fuel o f civilization.”
A m ajor difference between energy transitions in United States and those o f
ancient China and early modern Britain lay in the constant availability o f alternative
resources in America. As G eorge Perkins M arsh indicates, forests in the eastern U nited
States suffered rapid over-harvesting, leaving the region depleted by the m iddle o f the
nineteenth century. East o f the M ississippi R iver, tim ber seiyed as a useful barrier to
w estw ard expansion in the U.S., as settlers used the wood cleared for farm ing in
construction, heating, and for cooking. This traditional demand coupled w ith the
developm ent o f the steam engine to accelerate the demand for tim ber in A m erica’s
industrial era. Steam-driven engines initially relied on tim ber as a pow er source,
especially in term s o f w ater and rail transport. Y et the industrializing process caused a
m ajor shift in the American landscape as urban centers exploded with factories and
workers, a scene already playing out in Britain. M artin M elosi concludes that the
transition from wood to coal m irrors the rush from agricultural fields to urban industrial
centers.^*

See William Cronon, Changes in the Land, (New York: Hill & Wang, 1983), 9, and 19-33, and Ponting,
A Green History, 279. Harvests mostly centered on white pines, which were perfect for sliipmaking.
M elosi, Coping with Abundance, 18 and 22.
Ibid., 17.
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Even as Americans consumed tim ber at an unsustainable rate, the U nited States
did not change its energy resources after com plete depletion. M elosi and others argue
that econom ic incentive and technological capability explain A m erica’s shift from tim ber
to coal. Historian Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. com pared the A m erican and E uropean
experiences. Instead o f a total lack o f tim ber production, which w as a central concern in
Europe, American industry heeded the call o f consum er demand. A bundant sources o f
coal allowed Am erican metal w orkers to m ake w rought and cast iron m ore cheaply than
charcoal-fired furnaces, causing a shift to the fossil fuel in the 1830s and 1840s.^^
The spike in coal consum ption began a trend in Am erica that would put the
nation’s coal consum ption on par with the industrial pow er G reat Britain by the last
decade o f the nineteenth century. In 1850, th e com parison betw een the tw o hardly
m erited attention, as the N orth American nation barely exceeded one-seventh o f B ritain’s
56.3 million tons o f coal consumption.^^ B y the 1890s, the US nearly equaled B ritish
consum ption, and at century’s end, A m erica surpassed the form er industrial leader,
outconsum ing Britain by 262.8 million tons to 180.6 million tons.^** The U nited States
com pleted its transition from tim ber to coal by 1900.
The explanation for A m erica’s resource change has little to do with depletion.
Although the country experienced several shortages in its early history, the 1812
Philadelphia wood shortages most prom inent am ong them, problems rem ained isolated.

Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., “Antliracite Coal and the Beginnings o f flie Industrial Revolution in the United
SO A tsr Business H istory Review, vol. 46 (Summer 1972), 142.
R.P. Rotliwel The M ineral Industry, Its Statistics, Technology, and Trade, Volume II (New York:
Scientific Publishing Co., 1892), 221; W. S. levons. The C oal Question, rev. ed. (New York; MacMillan &
Co., 1906), 139; and H. S. Fleming, 4 Report to the Bituminous Coal Trade Association on the Present and
Future o f the Bituminous Coal Trade (New York; Bituminous Coal Trade Association, 1908), 139; quoted
in Sam H. Schurr and Bruce C. Netschert, eds.. E nergy in the Am erican Economy, I850-I975: An
Econom ic Study o f its H istory and Prospects (Baltimore; The Joluis Hopkins Press, 1960), 70
Ibid., 70.
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Localized responses like the M utual A ssistance C oal Com pany in Philadelphia had little
impact on the changing national consum ption p a tte r n s .I n d u s tr ia l developm ent
provides a better explanation for the change.
F or all its benefits to home and industry, c o al’s arrival on the A m erican energy
scene w as anything but smooth. The m ajor problem with the transition from w ood to
coal w as logistical: producers had a tough tim e getting the product to m anufacturing
centers, which had previously em erged near m ajor w ater ways. Early A m erican coal
fields lay m ostly in northwestern Pennsylvania and in W est V irginia’s A ppalachian
region, far away from industrial factories o f the N ortheast. Ironically, the solution to the
transportation riddle lay in transportation. T hroughout the m id-eighteenth century,
railroads relied on w ood burning engines, w hich engineers could transform into coal
consum ers w ithout m ajor e f f o r t . B y the 1870s, railroad com panies invested in coal
m ines and the race for economic pow er took off. Steam -powered w ater and rail
transportation gave coal a stable m arket, and provided a steady supply for fuel-hungry
factories. Soon coal expanded to com pete w ith tim ber and kerosene for the hom e heating
market.
C oal’s widespread use allowed the U .S. to com pete with European nations for
industrial power, but economic success had its share o f problems. U rban centers across
industrialized Am erica belched out debilitating pollution, and people living near factories
began to take notice. By 1900, various groups, m any founded by women, form ed to fight
for cleaner air, yet most Americans held to th e notion that smoke was a sign o f

M elosi, Coping with Abundance, 26-7,
Ibid., 24, 27-8.
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p r o s p e r i t y . A rise in nuisance com plaints follow ed the switch from relatively cleanburning anthracite to smoky, toxic bitum inous coal. Technological advances and
logistical convenience marked the shift to dirtier urban centers.
By the twentieth century, Am erica transitioned from a w ood-based, agricultural
society to an industrial, coal-consum ing pow er. Although the US never fully ended its
use o f tim ber for domestic heating and other purposes, the nation has not returned to preindustrial levels o f w ood consum ption either. The notion that a given society does not
completely abandon a resource m ight seem an irrelevant assertion, but the com petition
that drives one energy source to prom inent use also tends to deplete that source. Those
societies that maintain a more diverse resource base have the best chance o f adapting to
new sources when they run out.^*
As the United States entered the tw entieth century, a new resource com peted with
coal for dominance. The last h alf o f the nineteenth century saw a shift in dom estic fuel
dem and; people typically depended on costly w hale oil or inefficient beesw ax o r tallow
candles for lighting. But just as whales becam e scarce, people in w estern Pennsylvania
noticed a mysterious black substance oozing from the ground and into streams. Locals
dipped rags into the w ater to collect their contents for a wide range o f uses, including
indoor illumination.^^ W ord spread about the mystery fuel, then known as “coal oil,” and
before the start o f the Civil W ar, prospectors set up camp in Titusville, Pennsylvania.
A m erica in the mid-nineteenth century contained a growing population, abundant
resources, and increasing econom ic wealth, ideal conditions for an energy transition.
W ith the cost o f whale oil on the rise and a paucity o f sufficient alternatives, scientific

^’Ibid., 32-3.
I argue tliat wind energy tecluiology is one such example in Chapter 4, below.
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experimentation combined with business acum en to create a m arket for petroleum . O il’s
first major contribution to Am erican energy cam e as the refined product kerosene.
Refined petroleum produced a fuel that burned cleanly and efficiently, but m ore
importantly, America had abundant supplies th at kept prices low.
O il’s utility extended beyond illum ination. Laboratories produced a plethora o f
uses, and petroleum products gained m arkets in dom estic heating and industrial m achine
lubrication. Still, by 1900, oil w as not the n ation’s dom inant fuel source. A t the turn o f
the century, the United States produced a total o f one billion barrels o f oil; how ever, by
1920, Am erica produced over a billion barrels every year."*” W hile home lighting and
heating provided an early m arket, com panies like J. D. R ockefeller’s Standard Oil
Company consolidated the petroleum m arket by buying businesses engaged in all levels
o f oil production, from drilling to refining to retail. N o small producer, refiner, or retailer
had enough capital to assure market stability until Standard Oil Com pany achieved near
total dom inance o f the market.'** Tw o additional discoveries o f petroleum ’s utility
cem ented oil as a major player in the A m erican energy story: electricity and the internal
combustion engine. Before the age o f oil could take o ff in the United States, though, the
nation had to deal with the problem s posed by global conflict.
The Great W ar placed serious dem ands on the Am erican infrastructure, and
industry grew to supply the burgeoning m ilitary market. The period helped spur a
transition from coal to petroleum, although the shift was hardly total: oil accounted for

Daniel Yergiii, The Prize, 22.
M elosi, Coping with Abundance, 39.
For an overview o f Standard O il’s rise to prominence, see Daniel Yergin, The Prize, previously cited; for
tlie postmodernist perspective, see Roger M. and Diana Davids Olien, O il & Ideology: The Cultural
Creation o f the American Petroleum Industry, (Chapel Hill and London: The University o f North Carolina
Press, 2000).
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about twelve percent o f national energy consum ption in 1920, while coal production
peaked in that year, providing over three quarters o f the nation’s energy/^
Transportation, mostly automobiles, provided m uch o f the market for petroleum , but
burgeoning m anufacturing plants used the reso u rce as well, as m any A m erican factories
began the switch from coal to oil.
The transition from “King Coal” to petroleum represents the abundant nature o f
A m erica’s energy transition experience. T h e shift occurred largely as a product o f a
competitive comm ercial economic system and abundant resources. A central feature o f
A m erica’s growing petroleum consum ption lay in the industry’s experience w ith
kerosene, which was a popular illum inant in the last half o f the nineteenth century.
Standard Oil consolidated refining centers and developed a sophisticated delivery system
that allowed the company to transport crude oil efficiently from the fields in w estern
Pennsylvania and from the Lima field in Indiana and Ohio. N ew strikes in the San
Joaquin Valley o f California and in Texas, L ouisiana, and Oklahom a flooded the regions,
and subsequently the nation, in oil."*^ Thus, at the tim e the automobile began m aking a
contribution to transportation, the petroleum industry was able to supply the increasing
demand. Ironically, prior to the auto’s creation in America, refineries had no use for a
by-product o f heating fuel, gasoline.'*'* E conom ic demand coupled with sophisticated
technology and an abundant new resource to spur an energy transition.

Bureau o f the Census, U.S. Department o f Commerce, Statistical Abstract o f the United States
(Waslungton, D C , 1968), 702.
Yergin, The Prize, 82-95. Yergin reports tlmt California production increased from 470,000 barrels in
1893 to 24 million barrels ten years later. Petroleum and natural gas also stunted use o f solar energy as a
resource in California.
Ibid., 80.
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W hile economic incentive and technological advancem ent spurred a shift from
tim ber to coal and petroleum, fossil fuels drew the attention o f US policy. T hroughout
the last half o f the nineteenth century, the A m erican governm ent stayed out o f industrial
affairs, much as Great Britain had done during the early m odern period. W ith the rise o f
big business and a growing concern for labor and pollution problem s, the U S governm ent
began to address energy issues by the early tw entieth century. W hile “Gilded Age”
laissez faire policies tended to ignore industrialism ’s side effects, public health concerns
actually led governm ent to support increased use o f oil and natural gas in urban areas
The United States also dram atically changed its official position tow ards
m onopolies in the late nineteenth and early tw entieth centuries. The antitrust sentim ent
led to a reorganization o f the iconic Standard Oil Com pany in the 1890s, w hile concern
for private utilities spurred growth o f publicly ow ned pow er plants thirty years later."^^
Governm ent played an expanding role w ithin the energy sector o f the economy during
the Progressive Era. By the end o f W W I, public utilities com peted with private
businesses for energy customers, a developm ent that signaled a mercurial relationship
betw een governm ent and business.
The control over petroleum that began w ith the W ilson A dm inistration w ould
have a lasting effect on the industry. To encourage wartim e production, the federal
governm ent increased the oil depletion allow ance in 1918 , which gave the petroleum
industry a decided advantage in the com petition to provide energy in the U.S."*^ The tax
break began in 1913 and originally gave oil and gas producers a five percent deduction as

Scott Hamilton Dewey, D o n ’t Breathe the Air: A ir Pollution and U.S. Environmental Politics, 1945-1970
(College Station; Texas A&M University Press, 2000).
M elosi, Coping with Abundance, 89-90. See also, Richard Rudolph and Scott Ridley, P ow er Struggle:
The Hundred-Year War O ver E lectricity (New York: Harper and Row, 1986).
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a way to calm the volatile market.'** The decision to provide tax relief for oil and gas
production originally resulted from lobbying efforts by the industry in 1913, but the need
for oil in the war solidified the allow ance in th e tax code.
The coal industry saw things quite differently in the 1920s, as industry leaders
called on W ashington to help preserve the industry.

Throughout the decade, dem and

for oil soared and signaled a change from th e production-focused w ar years. N ew
industries began to develop around the grow ing popularity for electricity from both coaland oil-powered sources, while the autom obile boom took petroleum consum ption to new
heights.
Although the transition from tim ber to fossil fuels w as largely com plete by the
end o f the 1920s, the G reat Depression m arks a vital period in the developm ent o f
American electricity plants.^® The era m arks an im portant shift from sm aller,
independent deploym ent systems to larger, regional netw orks o f electricity generation
and fossil fuel consum ption. The transition to centralized utilities also underscores the
abundance o f resources, technological innovation, and econom ic pressures, all elem ents
o f A m erica’s energy transition story. W hen Franklin Roosevelt took office in 1933,
domestic utility com panies concentrated their energies on the twenty percent o f Am erican
households already having electric pow er R oosevelt’s agenda sought to expand
dom estic electricity use by extending pow er to the eighty percent o f hom es lacking

M elosi, Coping with Abundance, 100-1.
Ibid., 100. In 2003, tlie deduction stood at fifteen percent, see
warrenresourcesinc.coin/drilling_prograins.cfin.
Craufurd D. Goodwin, ed.. Energy P olicy in Perspective, 138-9.
Most o f my thesis involves energy used for electricity production, as opposed to transportation resources.
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pow er/^ Household m odernization was a central feature o f the N ew Deal, and several
legislative acts carried out this agenda.
Historian Ronald Tobey likens F D R ’s dom estic electrification efforts to a m odem
“political enclosure m ovem ent” that, served to centralize electricity production and
transmission.^^ M easures like the N ational H ousing Act, the Rural Electrification Act,
and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) served as catalysts for m odernization and a
direct role for the federal governm ent in energy use. The haphazard collection o f pow er
grids during the 1920s soon gave w ay to a m ore system atic approach The m ost lasting
effect o f the N ew Deal on Am erican energy policies related to production, seen
particularly in new dam construction for hydroelectricity and the massive TVA, and
regulation, especially over utility com panies doing business across state lines.
The policy to modernize Am erican hom es also affected the coal industry, which
provided m ost o f the fuel used in pow er plants. The relationship betw een governm ent
and energy becam e closer during R oosevelt’s presidency, especially given the erratic coal
industry. Labor problems affected prices, but FD R built a policy around electrification so
that to Allfill his promise o f a better way o f life, Roosevelt had to rein in costs. The
National Industrial Recovery Act o f 1933 set prices for coal in the hopes o f stabilizing
the industry and expanding the reach o f pow er plants. The Roosevelt A dm inistration
sought to offset problems o f abundance and labor strife by intervening with the market.^'^
L ater, the Bitum inous Coal Act o f 1937 m ade coal production a profitable business by

Ronald C. Tobey, Technology a s Freedom: The N ew D eal and the Electrical M odernization o f the
A m erican Home (Berkeley: University o f Califoniia Press, 19%), 95.
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setting costs artificially high; as a result, an industry that constantly found itself in debt
was finally able to turn a profit by 1940/^
Overproduction remained a problem for the coal industry throughout the
Depression, but the same affliction carried different results for oil. Intervention by the
federal governm ent cam e as a result o f oil shortages caused by wasteful com petition.
Briefly during the late 1930s, an old Progressive ethic re-em erged: conservation. Gifford
Pinchot, a public servant since T heodore R oosevelt’s adm inistration, continued to
influence policy by serving in the Interior D epartm ent in both the Franklin R oosevelt and
Harry Truman administrations. Pinchot and H arold Ickes becam e so concerned about the
possibility o f running out o f oil that the tw o proposed a W orld Conservation Conference
to discuss energy. The Conference, renam ed the Scientific Conference on the
Conservation and U tilization o f Resources, w as held in late sum m er 1949 at Lake
Success, NY, and advocated a “(m )ore effective utilization o f solar energy.” ^^
Aside from conservation, the oil industry asked for governm ent help in stabilizing
the volatile market; the governm ent responded by continuing favorable tax breaks and to
delve into the realm o f interstate regulation. The hodge-podge laws that governed oil
production varied from state to state until the Conally Hot Oil Act passed in 1935, which
merely transferred the practice o f inconsistent policies from the state to the federal level.
The legislation gave the federal governm ent the pow er to enforce state quotas on oil
production and effectively stemm ed the tide o f cut-throat competition.^^ Still crude
production nearly doubled from 1930 to 1945, and the industry found a m ajor boost in the

” Ibid., 139.
Ibid., 25-6. Indeed solar was aji altenialive, but cheap, abundant fossil resources, coupled with tlie
promise o f atomic energy, effectively squelched solar’s development.
Ibid., 63-4.
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Am erican West. In California, coal rem ained an expensive resource, but th e petroleum
industry established itself as a prim ary energy supplier. Jam es W illiam s reports that
C alifornia relied first on hydro-pow er for electricity throughout the D epression; after
1945, steam power, and with it oil, surpassed hydroelectricity as the chief supplier in the
s t a t e . N a t i o n a l l y , coal rem ained a vital source for electricity generation, bu t other
sources continued their march to energy parity.
Natural gas em erged from the fuel-hungry Depression era as a m ajor factor in
Am erican electricity generation. The N ational G as Act o f 1938 legitim ized the resource
by calling for its regulation by the federal governm ent. Thanks to advances in
transm ission technology, gas com panies could ship their product from the fields, located
m ostly in the Southern Plains, to refineries, w hich used the resource to generate
electricity.^^ Inefficiencies continued to m ark natural gas’s marketability; in the thirties,
engineers did not fully understand how to transport natural gas effectively, but by the end
o f the Second W orld War, the resource played a prom inent role in Am erican energy.
N atural gas m ade up only twelve percent o f US energy consum ption in 1940, but by
1960, that num ber rose to one-third.^‘ As w ith other resources, natural gas depended on
abundant supplies, econom ically efficient transport, and a ready market.
A m erica’s energy transition dem onstrated characteristics found in ancient China
and early modern Britain. Technologically, the U S borrow ed from its E uropean forbears
to institute an industrialized society in N orth America, while the market econom y spurred

James C. Williams, Energy and the M aking o f M odern California, (Akron, Tlie University o f Akron
Press, 1997), 146-7.
ArlonR. Tussing and Connie C. Barlow, The N atural G as Industry: Evolution, Structure, and Economics
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1984), 24.
^ M elosi, Coping with Abundance, 154-7.
U.S. Department o f Commerce, Statistical A b stract o f the United States, (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1968), 702.
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resource production into previously untapped reserves. G overnm ent policy vacillated
between the British laissez faire model and one based on the public interest. T he result o f
A m erica’s shift from tim ber to fossil fuels stands as a testam ent to hum anity’s aw esom e
capacity for productivity and growth. As the energy crises o f the 1970s dem onstrate,
such profligate resource consum ption com es at a cost.
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Chapter 2

Lessons from Chaco: Passive Solar Technology and Humanity

Ancient China, early m odem Great B ritain, and the industrial United States
changed their energy resources w ithout a plan. The particular geographies offered each
society a range o f options, and they all drew from available resources for sim ilar reasons.
As outlined in the preceding chapter, a com bination o f econom ics, technology, and
politics worked together to form a broad energy resource policy, yet the patterns o f
consum ption settled upon by the respective societies cam e after each considered, and in
som e cases tested, other options. For virtually every nation, no single source proved to
be a panacea for energy crises, but societies chose resources based upon compatibility.
Econom ics, technology, and politics all played a role. A vailability and fam iliarity were
also important.
Humanity has long held solar energy in high regard. In ancient China, Greece,
and Rome, among others, people have used an option still considered viable today.
Generally defined, passive solar energy refers to the practice o f using the su n ’s energy for
dom estic heating and cooling.' M ost o f h um anity’s efforts to use passive solar energy
involves architecture, and today experts continue to illustrate energy savings as the
resource’s central benefit. Industrial, com m ercial, and dom estic (household) energy
consum ption m akes up nearly three-quarters o f the Am erican total, m ostly in the form o f

' This is the modem definition, at least. See the Sustainable Building Sourcebook’s “Passive Solar Design”
website ate www.greenbuilder.com/sourcebook/PassiveSol.html.
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electricity.^ Passive solar technology reduces the need for electricity production and the
environm entally harmful byproducts related to certain m ethods o f m aking electricity,
such as burning coal This chapter traces the technological developm ent o f passive solar
technology from ancient societies to the m odern era in order to show that energy
conservation and passive solar energy are closely linked. Such a connection
dem onstrates that energy policies o f the early tw enty-first century should not consider
solar resources either new or difficult to understand.
Far from being a recent discovery, passive solar technology has evolved over
millennia. In this chapter, I divide the story into three parts. A ncient China, G reece, and
Rom e all turned to solar architecture when oth er m ore conventional resources becam e
scarce. The legacy that developed in E urope throughout the middle and early m odern
period makes up my second section. I end w ith a discussion o f m odern passive solar
technology in all its forms by looking at the era in tw o parts: the industrial US and
Am erica in the p o st-1973 era. I end this chapter with an observation on how Am ericans
view ed solar energy on the cusp o f the tw enty-first century.
At first glance, such an extensive scope m ight seem impossible in one m ere
chapter, yet my m ethodology makes such an effort reasonable. Using secondary accounts
o f the ancient and middle eras, I present a synopsis o f solar technology. As the story
m oves into the modern era, my analysis becom es both more concentrated, in term s o f
historical sources, and broad, in term s o f technologies. The number o f passive solar
technologies far surpasses the room I have here, so I concentrate on those I believe best
represent hum anity's attem pts to reduce the use o f fossil fuels and those that best

^ Energy Information Aûnùm sim ioïu Annual Energy Review 2002, “End-Use Sector Shares of Total
Consumption, 2002,” available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/sec2_2.pdf.
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represent the latest technology. M y point in taking on such a m ethodology centers on the
role I see passive solar technology playing in the future. Like the other alternative energy
resources in this thesis, passive solar technology has the ability to offset fuels that pose
serious problems for m odern society. As w ith active solar and wind energy,
developments in passive solar technology m ake the resource a viable alternative to those
fuels Americans most depend upon at the beginning o f the tw enty-first century. Yet
today’s alternatives were often am ong the first choices for bygone societies.

Ancient Societies
Ancient societies in China, Greece, and R om e all em braced the benefits o f passive
solar technology. In m ost cases, the turn to solar energy cam e as a necessary step to
w arding o ff threats to the social order caused by fuel shortages. At other points, solar
architecture allowed people to enjoy some degree o f independence and even decadence.
In all cases, passive solar technology allowed people to adapt to their environm ent,
leaving tim e for other im portant developments.
Chinese political unification finally brought peace to East Asia in the third
century BC. The w idespread violence that racked the region threatened to return during
the nation’s fragile early years, in part due to tim ber shortages. W ood was essential to
ancient Chinese life, as construction material and fuel. The disappearing forests even
sounded spiritual chords, as the iconic poet M encius sang saturnine dirges to the
vanishing tim berlands o f m ythical Ox M ountain.
Geography tended to dictate the term s o f countering wood shortages. In C hina’s
northern loess region, vast coal fields allow ed citizens there an alternative source o f

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

36

dom estic fuel. Solar architecture provided another solution. N orthern C hina continues to
struggle with a recurring problem: a constant dem and for tim ber prevents the natural
recovery o f forest lands and allows a foothold for encroaching deserts.^ In ancient China,
one effective measure was to build underground homes. These structures used less wood:
structural support came from the ground itself. The earth covering also provided good
insulation, w hich offset part o f the dem and fo r household fuels. Some am bitious farm ers
even raised crops on their sod-laden roofs."^
Urban planners in other Chinese regions used different m ethods to preserve
valuable tim ber. An intricate knowledge o f seasonal variances allowed architects to build
cities am enable to solar energy. Urban plans took on a grid-like quality: builders set
houses on an east-w est axis to take advantage o f low winter sunlight. By contrast,
overhangs and silk or rice paper window coverings diffused the sun’s heat in the sum m er
months.^ These construction methods helped preserve tim ber for the burgeoning Chinese
population, which accounted for a quarter o f the w orld’s people at the start o f the first
millennium.^
The demand for tim ber plagued ancient Greece as well. Just as M encius w istfully
noted the disappearing forests in China, P lato described the metaphorical “ ‘sick man ” o f
Attica.^ The ancient city did not literally turn into a diseased person, o f course; instead
the description referred to an emerging environm ental problem in E urope’s classical era.

^ See www.worldwatch.org.
Richard G, Stein, Architecture and Energy (Ginden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1977), 35-6;
Clive Ponting,^ Green H istory o f the World: The Environment and the Collapse o f Great Civilizations
(New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 75-8; J. Donald Hughes,
Environmental H istory o f the W orld
(London & N ew York: Routledge, 2001), 59-66.
®Ken Butti and Jolui Perlin, A Golden Thread: 2500 Years o f Solar Architecture and Technology (Palo
Alto, CA: Chesliire Books, 1980), 12-3.
* Ponting, Green History, 92.
’ Plato’s Critias, quoted in ibid., 76.
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M editerraneanization. Farm ers deforested large stands o f cedar, oak, and pine, then used
the tim ber for fuel and the ground for grazing. The process forever altered the bounty
and function o f the landscape, while having an ironically helpful im pact on solar
architecture.*
As tim ber resources slowly vanished, south-facing hom es becam e m ore widely
used. To offset wood shortages, Greeks built hom es oriented to the south to take full
advantage o f the warming w inter sun. Even A ristotle noted the genius o f such a building
plan, which allowed sunlight in and kept the cold north winds out.^
Solar architecture had other benefits, too. In an effort to fend o ff the grow ing
military threat from Athens, one determined G reek com m unity turned to the rugged cliffs
along the Aegean Sea. Olynthus w as home to people who bristled under the Athenian
econom ic and political yoke. O lynthus’ physical geography contained few resources,
except rugged limestone walls that dropped precipitously into the sea. Such a defensible
position had its drawbacks, though, as fuel w as scarce. To survive, these independentm inded people designed solar buildings in a city planned on an east-w est axis. N ot only
did citizens benefit from warm ing w inter sunshine, they built overhangs to w ard o ff
intense summer heat. Construction m aterials added another benefit: the heat-collecting
lim estone dissipated daytime warm th slow ly over time, keeping residents com fortable in
the cool night air.
Rom ans relied less on solar architecture for military success, but Rom an society
did adopt practices developed by Greeks. L ike their M editerranean neighbors, Rom ans
built south-facing homes using m aterials that collected daytime heat and dispersed it at

* Ibid., 75-8 and Hughes, Àn Environmental History^ 59-66.
^ Butti and Perlin. A Golden Thread, 5.
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night.^“ Horticulturists also contributed to the grow ing body o f solar architecture by
creating innovations in raising food. Rom an expansion created a sensation am ong the
E m pire’s elite; exotic fruits and vegetables becam e signs o f pow er in Rome. D esperate
to provide leaders like Tiberius C aesar with these new -found favorites, such as
cucumbers, gardeners built glass-covered heat traps and the prototype o f the m odem
greenhouse came into being."
The link betw een solar pow er and social elites also becam e apparent in the
Roman Empire. W hile wealthy citizens com peted to produce exotic fruits and
vegetables, they also turned to the sun for other luxuries. Transparent glass cam e into the
picture to aid the nascent greenhouse industry by the first century AD, and clear
coverings soon made their way into expensive Rom an housing designs. W hen tim ber
shortages plagued the imperial city, w ealthier citizens fled to their country estates, not for
fuel, which was as scarce there as in the city, but for their passive solar homes. Pliny the
E lder noted that the “heliocam us,” w hich m eans solar furnace, was his favorite room in
his country home.^^ The taste for heat-trapping room s, like saunas o f today, proved
contagious; the idea spilled back into the city, w here Rom an bath houses used glass to
create steamy conditions Enough wealthy law m akers frequented these evanescent
haunts to inspire solar access laws. The Justinian Code, written in the sixth century,
codified Rom ans’s unim peded rights to the sun; initially, the law stated that no one could
build a structure that blocked the popular public baths from the sunshine. L ater Rom ans
expanded the rule to protect the rights o f private hom es to a clear view o f the sun.'^

Ibid.,
" Ibid.,
"'Ibid.,
Ibid.,

15.
19.
19.
27.
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In ancient societies, solar architecture provided a m easure o f relief w hen fuel
shortages struck. W hile ideas passed freely am ong neighboring cultures, the global reach
o f passive solar techniques indicates their base appeal. Chinese designs resem bled those
practiced in Rom e at about the same time, even though the tw o societies scarcely even
knew about each other. In Asia and Europe, the turn to solar architecture usually cam e as
a response to other resource scarcity. In both C hina and Rom e, solar buildings cam e onto
the scene when fuel w ood supplies ran short, but in the Am erican Southwest, A nasazis
built a society in a region that already had few resources.
Anasazis slowly crept into Chaco C anyon around 800 AD, where they found few
allies in the natural world. W ater and tim ber rem ained precious com m odities in the
Chaco River Valley by the tim e the region experienced full-blown settlem ent tw o
centuries later. Lured by an increasingly dependable, if not abundant, rainy season,
Anasazis came to the area for its farming potential. *'* A slow trickle o f im m igrants came
from the cliffed regions o f southwestern C olorado and southeastern Utah, and w ithin tw o
centuries the humans w ho settled in Chaco C anyon had created a society teem ing with
energy.
The social structure that held farm ing and rituals together formed the basis o f
Anasazi cosmology, which in turn created Pueblo Benito. The structure’s building plan
included strict attention to seasonal patterns. The curved section o f the D -shaped
building acted as a courtyard that opened to th e southwest.*^ Engineers used com plex
designs that emulated seasonal rhythms. A nasazis considered seasonal variations, as
well; archeological evidence reveals that certain room s within several structures all

David E. Stuart, Anasazi America: Seventeen Centuries on the R oad from Center Place, (Albuquerque:
University o f N ew Mexico Press, 2000), 65.
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focused sunlight onto important spiritual icons on the solstice. In Pueblo B onito, the
largest structure in Chaco Canyon (and the largest structure in N orth A m erica until the
late nineteenth century), m odem scholars term ed the solstice room the “sun dagger.” *^
The building that stood at the center o f Anasazi culture, and the cosm ology that
produced it, was powerless to stop the clim ate change that drove people out o f Chaco
Canyon. The contract between spiritual leaders and farm ers w as irrevocably breached as
a result o f a series o f droughts that began sporadically in the late eleventh century becam e
routine by the thirteenth.*^ The powerful A nasazis, who once controlled a land area the
size o f m odem W est Virginia, succum bed to the dry conditions o f the M edieval w arm
period.

Early Modern Europe
In Europe, the faith o f millions w ould be put to the test during the M iddle Ages.
Shifting clim ate had less effect on people than disease, as the Black Death decim ated
populations from the mid-fourteenth century until the early eighteenth and seem ed to
ignore fluctuating w eather patterns.** Cathedrals sprouted up throughout the continent,
as people prayed for deliverance from the ravages o f disease. Glass, which was a
m ainstay in Venice since the Rom an era, began to play an im portant part in E uropean
spirituality. An abundant, naturally occurring salt compound, soda, allowed the
M editerranean glass working trade to flourish. Northern E urope held no such bounty.
D riven by demand for stained glass, artisans turned to potash Unfortunately, w orkers

Ibid., 92-3. Stuart notes that the courtyard o f Pueblo Bonito wasn’t walled in until tlie 1100s.
Ibid., 80.
Ponting, yf Green History, 99-100.
Ibid., 229-30.
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could only produce potash by burning w ood, and as cathedrals took on increasing
importance, the once-abundant tim berlands suffered.
As Europeans turned heavenward fo r salvation from the plague’s onslaught,
dim inishing resources spurred overseas expansion. Historian Clive Ponting thinks that
the dwindling tim berlands, which produced E u ro p e’s m ost widely used resource, pushed
nations in new directions to search for vital energy supplies. Despite continued
réintroduction o f plague conditions, E uropeans developed natural im m unities, thus
stabilizing population numbers and spurring dem and for natural resources. C lim ate also
played a role, as the Little Ice Age tightened its chilly grip by the m id-sixteenth century,
driving demand for tim ber (and food) to untenable levels.
Aside from the conquest o f new lands, Europeans turned to tw o resources to
offset the shortages in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: coal and sunshine. Prior
to the early modern era, wealthy people view ed coal with a certain amount o f contem pt only poor people burned the smoky black rocks. Yet during the Middle Ages, people
m ade important technological im provem ents; som e historians suspect these events
amounted to a “M edieval Industrial R evolution,” which these scholars define as the start
o f a mechanical tradition that would later spark the invention o f the steam engine.^®
W hile several elites tinkered with the energy potential coal offered, others turned to
ancient texts for hints on how to offset the cool tem peratures.
Passive solar technology enjoyed a rebirth in the northern regions o f early m odern
Europe. W ealthy farm ers began to use heat-collecting construction m aterials as a way to

Ibid., 97-102.
“ James Burke, Connections (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978); Lynn Wliite, Jr., M edieval Technology and
Social Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962); Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism,
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ripen crops in short growing seasons. South-facing walls found use in France, Holland,
and Great Britain, where planters buried seeds alongside heat-absorbing brick walls to
give crops a better chance to develop. The “fruit w all” idea w as originally used in
ancient Rome, but the concept w as w ell-suited for the cold clim ate o f N orthern Europe.
English horticulturists even nailed branches to the walls in hopes o f staving o ff killer
frosts before harvest time.^* In France, Fatio de Duillier perfected a fruit wall that
tracked the sun’s path during the day, w hich effectively doubled the plants’ exposure to
sunlight. D uillier’s contributions to solar technology exist today in the m odern solar
collectors engineered with the sam e concept in mind.^^
O ther technological developm ents stem m ed from a com bination o f other
knowledge. In Rutland, the duke developed the first known greenhouse in 1700. The
design utilized the slanted angle idea seen in fruit walls, as well as the heat-trap principles
perfected by ancient R o m a n s . D u t c h engineers expanded on these ideas and created the
double-paned glass concept, a vital part o f passive solar design today. Even on cloudy
days, greenhouses with angled, double-paned glass plates could m aintain high
temperatures.^'* In England the conservatory idea impacted high society. A ristocrats
began attaching greenhouses to their homes, and the conjoining rooms, called
conservatories, would benefit from the solar heat that poured in. O ther designs called for
air-tight convection tubes that led from conservatories into homes, supplying heat and
m itigating the demand for fuel wood. These concepts fell out o f favor when the clim ate

Century, volume 1, Structures o f Everyday Life: The Limits o f the Possible (New York; Harper &
Row, 1979).
Butti and Perlin, ^4 Golden Thread, 41-3.
Ibid., 46.
Ibid., 47.
Ibid., 49.
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again warmed. By W orld W ar I, aesthetics to o k over function, and conservatories
becam e fuel consumers. Tight resource supplies spelled doom for these passive solar
structures after WWI.^^

Industrial United States
Across the Atlantic, Americans took their first steps on a journey to electrification
by the mid-nineteenth century. The pow er lines that obstructed my view at C haco
Canyon came into being thanks to a collective m odernizing push in the U nited States.
Throughout the early industrial era, A m ericans developed a passion for things
mechanical. In many w ays electricity had to com e to Chaco — as a sort o f industrial
m anifest destiny — based on consumption patterns that mim icked early m odern Europe.
E ver the jealous cousins, Americans would try to outdo the European industrial example.
Progress in this curious way seems to follow the United States w herever its technological
path leads.
A burgeoning country accustomed to abundance grew into a fully m odernized
society by the late nineteenth century, and the dem and for fossil-based goods and services
began to take hold. The nation was awash not ju st in forests but in coal, natural gas, and
petroleum, too. A m erica’s mechanical tradition extended beyond the use o f fossils: even
solar pow er benefited from the new industrial era. Paradoxically, a society m arked by
innovation still yearned for resources that w ould provide consistency, and by the mid
twentieth century, passive solar designs could no longer m eet such demands.
Even as an era o f industrial expansion took hold in the United States, passive
solar engineers made significant gains. In 1891 Baltim orean Clarence Kem p started a

“ Ibid.. 52-3.
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tiny passive solar water heating company. K em p ’s brainchild, the Clim ax w ater heater,
w as simplicity defined. The rooftop system operated on the heat trap principle; the
Clim ax ran domestic w ater pipes through four cylindrical tanks that rested inside
rectangular wooden boxes. Sheet glass covered the tanks and the system w as painted
black to maximize heat absorption.
Clim ate spurred K em p’s unique design and it later drove the Clim ax creator to a
w arm er region. The freezing B altim ore w inters prevented the w ater heater from w orking
year-round, so Kemp moved his com pany to Pasadena, California. The allure o f
Southern California was twofold; first, the sun shone steadily throughout the year; next,
competition, which appeared m ost om inously in the form o f electricity, had not m ade its
w ay there yet. By 1895, Kem p sold the rights to m anufacture and sell his solar w ater
heaters to a pair o f Pasadena businessm en, w hile retaining control over the com pany
i t s e l f . A lack o f timber, coal, and natural g as caused sales o f the heaters to take off.
The traditional resources that m ost A m ericans used to heat their w ater simply did not
exist in Southern California, and expense o f the Climax more than offset yearly
expenditures on such items.

The price sold a num ber o f custom ers on new w ater

heaters, which cost about tw enty-five dollars; the cum ulative total o f coal (three-quarters
o f a ton annually) and wood (about a cord p er year) purchased by households am ounted
to about nine dollars per home every year.^^
W hile the Climax had advantages over traditional heating methods, success w as
hard to come by. A skeptical public ignored solar heaters until Frank W alker made some

Butti and Perlin, A Golden Thread, 117-8.
Ibid., 120.
James C. Williams, Energy and the M aking o f M odern California, (Akron: University o f Akron Press,
1997), 86-7.
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important technical adjustm ents that im proved the C lim ax’s efficiency. U ntil W alker tied
the Climax to the domestic heating system, people had to heat their w ater w here they
used it (ie; in the bathroom or kitchen) w hen th e Clim ax w asn’t operating (at night, eg).
The centrality o f heating increased convenience and sales took o ff in C alifornia, w here a
sixty-five dollar system could provide a house’s w ater heating needs for all but a hundred
days in 1913. Econom ic savings w as only on e side o f the coin, though: historian Jam es
W illiams estim ates that domestic fuel consum ption fell as much as seventy-five percent
thanks to passive w ater heaters.^® Eventually, electricity and natural gas drove the
Climax and its progeny out o f favor. Solar’s cost-effectiveness dim inished in the face o f
competition from fossil fuel com panies, but in California, solar energy later reemerge.
W hile natural gas drove passive solar w ater heaters out o f business in Southern
California, the reverse was true in South Florida after 1918. Miami experienced a post
w ar population boom, and new com ers w anted all the com forts a modern society could
offer, included hot water when they w anted it. Electricity could supply the energy
needed to heat domestic water, but these system s were erratic and unsafe.^* Sunshine
offered a more reliable alternative. Passive solar heaters kept pace with the boom ing
housing market, and by the m id-twenties, M iam i w as awash with w ater heated by the
sun. Like the stock market, the construction bubble burst by the end o f the decade, and
the solar heating industry faced som e difficult days ahead in the thirties.
The building downturn could have ended solar w ater heaters in Florida, but tw o
events staved o ff disaster. Innovation provided the first solution. M iam i’s dom inant
Solar W ater Heating Company turned from its traditional role as hot w ater heating

Ibid., 87.
Ibid., 88.
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supplier for new homes into retrofitting specialists. The com pany’s owner, C harles
Ewald, could have followed his partner into retirem ent, yet Ewald couldn’t resist a
challenge. Figuring that the housing boom included only a percentage o f M iam i’s
residences, Ewald began selling his heaters to existing hom es that needed w ater heating
systems. Technologically, the design im proved to com pete with a m ore m odem
electricity system. The Solar W ater H eating C om pany began using hum idity-resistant
metal boxes instead o f w ooden ones; efficient soft copper replaced steel tubing; and
granulated cork, a readily available industrial w aste product, provided excellent
insulation between the tubing and the metal shell.
Even with design improvements, people w ere hard pressed to come up w ith the
money to afford E w ald’s heaters. In 1934, the federal governm ent provided a solution
A s part o f F D R ’s N ew Deal, Congress approved low-interest home m ortgages and hom e
im provem ent loans through the Federal H ousing Adm inistration (FHA).^^ The
availability o f money for housing jum p-started the Solar W ater Heating Com pany, which
could install and service new units for as little as six dollars per m o n t h . F e d e r a l action
not only reinvigorated the solar heating industry; W ashington’s presence kept shoddy
workmanship in check as well. Com petition for the solar w ater heating m arket produced
several fly-by-night operations that sought to capitalize on the demand in South Florida.
Solar experts Ken Butti and John Berlin figure there were at least ten solar w ater heating
com panies operating in Florida by 1935.^^ W hen custom ers com plained to the federal

Butti and Perlin, Golden Thread, 143-4.
Ibid., 147-8.
Ronald C. Tobey, Technology as Freedom: The New D e a l and the Electrical M odernization o f the
A m erican Home (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1996), 117-9.
^ Butti and Perlin, A Golden Thread, 149-51.
” Ibid., 151.
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governm ent about poor quality heaters purchased w ith FH A loans, W ashington stepped
in and ended the corruptive practice.
Innovation and the FH A helped save passive solar w ater heaters in th e short term,
but the nation’s direction was headed tow ards electrification. The G reat D epression
exposed many Am ericans to the downside o f unchecked capitalism. In the 1930s, the US
had abundant natural resources that held prom ise for a higher standard o f living than m ost
enjoyed; unlocking this potential rem ained a problem , though. D espite an era o f
unprecedented governm ent intrusion into th e m arketplace, private interests continued to
dom inate the household energy market. L arge energy corporations began consolidating
their power by forming holding com panies in the twenties, and despite federal laws
designed to prevent m onopolistic behavior, these private enterprises proved indispensable
for modernization.
W hile the governm ent maintained an antagonistic attitude tow ards utility
companies, the tw o entities worked together to provide electricity to A m ericans that
didn’t have it. Through the 1920s, private corporations decided w here and when
electricity would expand, and the com panies tended to focus on larger customers. B y the
end o f the 1920s, three-quarters o f US factories ran on electric power. The num bers o f
households with electricity also grew in the twenties, as tw o-thirds o f Am erican hom es
enjoyed electric pow er by 1929, although th e w iring supplied to m ost o f these houses
lim ited the amount o f usable power.^^ Throughout the Great Depression, the governm ent
sought to bring electricity to homes that lacked it and to improve the quality o f pow er for
those already having it. Congress passed laws to expand the reach and scope o f the grid:
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the Tennessee Valley Act, the N ational H ousing Act (w hich established the FH A ), and
the Rural Electrification Act helped establish electricity as a priority to governm ent and
private corporations alike. Historian Ronald Tobey notes that the utilities concentrated
on modernizing the hom es o f society’s richest sector, w hile the Roosevelt A dm inistration
hoped to provide improved w iring system s — and the pow er needed to run

them — for

the vast majority o f hom es w ithout such infrastructure.^^
By the second world war, A m ericans had grow n accustom ed to abundance, and
although the war effort necessitated conservation efforts, postw ar consum ption boom ed.
Passive solar designs played a marginal, even ironic, role during the war. E xperim ents at
the M assachusetts Institute o f Technology m ade im portant advances in solar air heating
designs, but most o f these developm ents w ouldn’t find application for years, if at all.^*
Com mercially successful passive solar w ater heaters succumbed to the demands o f the
military, which halted dom estic use o f precious copper.^^
The postwar era found Americans generally disinterested in passive solar
technology, but the sam e w as not true in other nations. In Israel, Levi Y issar researched
developments made elsewhere — primarily (and ironically) in the US — to develop the
nation’s first major solar w ater heating com pany. Y issar’s tale strikes a fam iliar tone
with passive solar’s own story: the technology took o ff when other energy sources were
scarce. In 1953, the first year o f Y issar’s N er-Y ah Company, Israelis im ported all o f
their electricity-generating fuels.'*® From 1957 to 1967, Israeli solar w ater com panies

Martin V. Meiosi, Coping with Abundance: Energy an d Environment in Industrial A m erica (New York:
Alfred Knopf, 1985), 112. Wliile modem conveniences, like wasliing macliines, were available, people
couldn’t typically use tliein at the same time as some tiling else due to inferior capacity and wiring,
Tobey, Technology as Freedom, 44-5.
Butti and Perlin, A Golden Thread, 202-6.
Ibid , 154.
Ibid., 235. Yissar’s main contribution was adding a de-humidifier inside tlie actual heater.
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sold nearly fifty thousand heaters and exported tens o f thousands m ore/^ T he Six D ay
W ar in m id-1967 allowed Israel to gain oil fields in the Sinai, and the petroleum
tem porarily stunted solar energy. The secret to Israel’s renascent solar w ater heating
industry in the past several decades centers on the governm ent’s zoning laws: building
contractors are required to offer passive solar heaters in new homes. The m andate has
resulted in a healthy industry: nearly fifty thousand heaters are sold each year at an
inexpensive one thousand Am erican dollars per unit."*^ In Australia, R oger M orse
developed a governm ent program m odeled on the M IT housing experim ents undertaken
during W WII. As in Israel, governm ent m andate proved vital. In the m id-1950s,
Australia’s governm ent required that homes constructed in “tropical areas” be equipped
with solar w ater heating systems.'*^ A fter resolving design flaws, the solar heating
industry took off, selling nearly forty thousand units between 1958 and 1973. Japan
experienced a postw ar solar honeymoon as well. Designs that bore a striking
resem blance to Clarence K em p’s Clim ax heater sold extremely well; by 1966, solar w ater
heater companies sold a quarter o f a million units per year.'*'* Japan’s turn to the global
m arket, particularly OPEC, for petroleum spelled doom for the solar heating industry.

The Age o f Limits
As the crumbling sandstone and adobe bricks lay as testam ent to Anasazi society,
dusty governm ent records bear witness to the consum ptive excess that followed
Am erican victory in WWII. Abundant sources o f coal, oil, and natural gas obviated the

Ibid., 238.
Daniel M. Bennan & Jolin T. O ’Connor, Who Owns the Sun? People, Politics, and the Struggle f o r a
Solar Economy, (Wliite River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Pviblislung Co., 1996), 14-5.
Butti & Perlin, A Golden Thread, 239.
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need for energy conservation, passive solar’s c h ie f asset. Conserving energy never made
it into the public debate, as Am ericans consum ed staggering am ounts o f energy. In 1940,
households consumed about thirty-eight quadrillion British therm al units (B tus) o f fossil
fuel, equal to about seven trillion kilow atts o f power.^^ By 1965, consum ption nearly
doubled to sixty-eight quadrillion Btus, or about thirteen trillion kilowatts.'*^ In the six
following years, the annual rate o f demand fo r energy spiked from three to five percent,
which equated to an enorm ous increase considering A m erica’s already gluttonous
appetite. The increase pushed Am erican resource production to the brink: as early as
1967, imported petroleum exceeded national reserve capacity; by 1972, the U S w as
producing as much as it could.'*^ The stage w as thus set for O PEC ’s surprising em bargo
the following year.
As a response to the em bargo-induced petroleum shortages. President N ixon
launched Project Independence. Calling on “the spirit o f Apollo” and the “ determ ination
o f the M anhattan Project,” Nixon pledged th at by 1980 “w e shall be able to m eet
A m erica’s energy needs from A m erica’s ow n energy resources.”'** As part o f the effort
to establish energy independence, N ixon increased federal allocation for solar energy
research. In his proposed budget for the 1975 fiscal year, Nixon set aside fifty million
dollars for solar energy, specifically calling for research and developm ent o f heating and
cooling technologies — a clear attem pt to attack the demand side o f A m erica’s energy

Ibid., 245-6.
Bureau o f the Census, US Department o f Commerce, Statistical A bstract o f the United States
(Wasliington, DC, 1968), 702. One kilowatt equals 3,413 Btus.
Energy Information Administration, US Department o f Energy, Residential Sector Energy Consumption,
1949-2001, from website http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/txt/ptbo2Dlb.html, last visited 7 July 2003.
United States Congress, Executive Energy Docum ents (Wasliington, DC: US Government Printing
Office, July 1978), 32.
Ibid., 86.
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problem s/^ The same year Nixon boosted m oney for passive solar projects, Congress
passed the Solar Energy Research, D evelopm ent, and D em onstration Act, w hich tried to
forge a relationship between governm ent research and the private m arket/^
The push to foster a partnership betw een federal researchers and private industry
stemmed from policym akers’ affinity tow ards nuclear power. For the previous tw o
decades, every president spoke with the highest praise for atomic energy and in the
language W ashington insiders have grow n to love: appropriations. The attitudes tow ard
solar pow er reflected those heaped upon the nuclear industry, even if on a sm aller scale.
Indeed, funding for solar research w ould rem ain a “flea on the back o f the nuclear
elephant.”^' Despite its second-class status, solar research and developm ent received
over ten billion dollars in the first five years that followed the OPEC embargo; yet in
those five years, most Americans still did no t know about, much less adopt, solar
energy.
Policy under the Nixon and Ford adm inistration centered on increasing dom estic
fuel production, but President C arter tried to encourage mainstream use o f solar
technology. C arter extended a welcom ing hand to alternative energy gurus w ho em erged
from the crisis years as cham pions for what becam e known as “the soft energy path.”^^
D eclaring “the moral equivalent o f w ar” on energy consum ption. President C arter and the

Ibid., 139.
^ Ronald W. Larson and Ronald E. West, eds.. Implementation o f Solar Thermal Technology (Cambridge,
MA: Tlie MIT Press, 1996), 81-2.
Donald A. Beattie, e d , History and Overview o f Solar H eat Technologies, ((Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 1996), 34.
US Congress, Executive Energy Documents, 163
Carter even met with the “soft energy path” founder, Amory Lovins, in 1977 — going so far as to display
L ovins’s book prominently on his Wliite House desk. See Daniel M. Bennan and Jolm T. O ’Coiuior, ivho
Owns the Sun? People, Politics, and the Struggle f o r a Solar Economy (Wliite River Jiuiction, VT: Chelsea
Green Publishing Co., 1996).
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95* Congress passed a dizzying num ber o f energy-related laws - thirty-eight in all —
culm inating in the National Energy Act o f 1978.^'*
Three parts o f the NBA dealt directly w ith renew able energies. T he N ational
Energy Conservation Policy Act (N EC ?A ) provided billions o f federal dollars to prom ote
solar technology. The law included a provision for a one hundred million dollar loan
program, available to consumers in eight thousand dollar loans to be used fo r solar
heating and cooling equipm ent purchases; an o th er one hundred m illion dollars w ent to a
solar dem onstration program for federal b u i l d i n g s .M o s t Am ericans never felt the
impact o f program s like the N E C ? A; according to journalist Ray Reece, corporations
were the m ajor benefactor o f such governm ent contracts. Reece reports that in one eight
million dollar disbursem ent, over half the m oney w ent to a mere three companies.
Tax credits made up the second part o f the N E A concerning solar energy. The
Energy Tax Act gave credits o f up to fifteen percent toward the purchase o f solar w ater
heaters, which created a boom market w ithin the i n d u s t r y . A virtual solar craze took o ff
in California, where G overnor Jerry B row n created a state cabinet-level position to deal
with energy issues, the Office o f A ppropriate Technology (O A T )/^ Brown and the
California legislature also extended federal tax breaks by allow ing an additional fifteen
percent .

Swimming pool heaters m ade up m ost o f the market in new solar hot w ater

*'* US Congress, Energy Initiatives o f the 95'^ C ongress (Wasliington, DC: Government Printing Office,
May 1979), 24.
US Congress, The National Emergy
(Wasliington, DC: GPO, January 1979), 5-6.
Ray Reece, The Sun Betrayed: A Report on the C orporate Seizure o f U.S. Solar Energy D evelopm ent
(Boston: Soutli End Press, 1979), 200.
US Congress, The National Energy Act, 521. Tlie 15% figure applied to tlie first $2,000 used in
“renewable energy source expenditures,” and Congress capped tlie original rebate amoiuit at $300.
^ Williams, Energy and the Making, 321.
Berman & O ’Coiuior, Who Owns the Sun?, 29-30.
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heaters. W ithin tw o years, state and federal tax breaks produced nearly eighty thousand
solar installations in California homes, m ost o f them pool heaters.^^
The boom years were not without trouble, though. Although w ater heaters and
other passive solar technologies had been around for years, com panies new to the solar
scene assum ed they had to start from scratch. U nfortunately for consum ers, solar
charlatans produced inferior goods — often tim es w ith design flaws overcom e by
engineers decades prior. The California E nergy Com mission, itself a spin-off o f the
OAT, set up a phone hotline to deal with the flood o f complaints about poorly designed
solar equipment.^* The financial incentives that drew interest in solar pow er ended up
souring many people on the sun as an energy source, a result that w ould have long-lasting
consequences.
The Public Utility Regulatory Policies A ct (PURPA) m ade up the third
renewable-friendly section o f the NEA. By including a section that gives small
independent energy producers, called qualifying facilities, the chance to participate in
energy production. President Carter and C ongress stum bled onto what would becom e the
farthest reaching law o f the solar generation. Although the tax credits w ould stunt a
burgeoning, if inefficient, solar technology m arket, the mandate for equal access to the
electrical grid w ould provide solar and other renewable energy generators an outlet for
their power. PU R PA ’s main benefit was forcing utility com panies to purchase energy
from qualifying facilities at a fair price, and the law ’s longevity (and judicial affirm ation)
created a sense o f stability in a turbulent electricity market.

^ Williams, Energy and the Making, 337.
Ibid., 336.
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The enthusiasm for solar energy rode a tortuous path during Jim m y C a rte r’s
presidency. Amid the giddiness for its new presidential cham pion, the Solar L obby — a
group o f solar industry lobbyists in W ashington — organized a nation-w ide celebration in
1978. Sun Day marked the high point for solar advocates, and at the W ashington rally,
the Solar Lobby proclaimed that given a fair choice m ost Am ericans would choose solar
energy over fossil s.

Fairness was a m ajor issue confronting passive solar technology.

As C arter’s regulations prom oting solar energy took effect, the president took criticism
from all sides. For big business, interventionist policies w ent too far. Coal com panies
fought stringent environmental laws, while natural gas producers argued that full federal
control over prices created disincentives for dom estic gas p r o d u c tio n .In d iv id u a ls also
complained that the massive governm ent expenditures translated into few usable
technologies, while Ray Reece argued that C arter’s policies favored corporations rather
than small businesses and individual inventors.^"^ Form er D O E policym aker Donald
B eattie thinks the tax incentives w ere a problem . Rather than creating an avenue for
energy savings through solar energy, federal tax breaks sim ply rewarded the sales o f
shoddy technology, like w ater heaters.^^ M ore importantly to Beattie, the credits w eren’t
tied to any significant societal cost o f fossil fuel use; rather than rewarding people for
reducing use o f coal or natural gas, the governm ent provided incentive to purchase a
technology that wasn't able to fill the dem and for energy.

Berman & O ’Connor, Who Owns the Sun?, 35.
See Goodwin, Energy Policy in Perspective, 589-96 and M eiosi, Coping with Abundance, 291-3.
Federal management o f natural gas liad tlie added burden o f inconsistency. Tlie newly-created DOE
warned against serious natural gas shortages, while a department report leaked to the Wall St. Journal
reported tliat tlie US was awash in natural gas, giving people the impression tliat the crisis was illusory.
Ray Reece, The Sun Betrayed, 12-3. Reece quotes Barry Coimnoner to illustrate corporate takeover of
energy, particularly the nuclear, industries.
Beattie, H istory and Overview, 240.
Ibid., 240.
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W hile Jimmy Carter helped popularize and implement som e form s o f solar
energy, the steps he took to promote w iser energy use actually helped exacerbate public
perception problems. Ronald Reagan sw ept into office in 1980 on a powerful antigovernm ent tide, a mood created in part by a spraw ling bureaucracy, including the
Departm ent o f Energy. Despite law m akers’s hope that it would act as a stream lining
agency, the D O E remained a bureaucratic quagm ire for much o f C arter’s presidency.
R eagan’s solution for all the red tape was sim ple: rem ove it. W hile he failed in his goal
to abolish the DOE, Reagan did succeed in starving funds for renew able energies.
Hostility tow ards solar power effectively cut budget allocations that centered on research
and development, but the tax incentives in C a rte r’s Energy Tax A ct would rem ain in
place until after R eagan’s first term.^^ W ith no interest in renewing the credits, Reagan
killed the solar w ater heating business, hot an insignificant act. M any o f the heaters
purchased betw een 1978 and 1984 contained design flaws and operated inefficiently, yet
the industry had an impact on the Am erican econom y, judging by the nearly seven
hundred thousand solar heaters people purchased and installed.
Reagan succeeded in killing federal funding for solar energy because, by 1983,
the economic fallout from the energy crises had subsided. In the early eighties, the US
Federal Reserve Bank policies called for greater restrictions on federal m oney lending —
with the prime rate reaching as high as 21.5% ! — and high oil prices cut into the spending
pow er o f most Americans.^^ The foreseeable recession o f 1982 had subsided by 1983, in
part because oil and gas production from non-O PEC nations shot through the roof. Yet

Clearly solar power wasn’t yet a huge election issue, if Reagan’s landslide victory in 1984 is any
indication.
Larson & West, Implementation, 141. Tlie authors figure tliat sales dropped by 90% in 1986.
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increased production only tells part o f the story. The increased availability o f fossil fuels
cam e at a time when conservation m easures had a chance to impact the overall dem and
for such energy. Expert Daniel Yergin explains that not only did o il’s share o f the energy
pie shrink as other sources, like nuclear and coal pow er, rushed to fill the shortage, but
the entire pie itself shrank. Conservation, w rites Yergin, was “often dism issed o r even
ridiculed,” yet the practice “turned out to have (a) m assive im pact.”^®
Even amid all o f the political and popular rancor that roiled around the debate
over alternative energy resources, passive solar technology made som e im portant gains in
the age o f limits. W hile several solar w ater heating com panies existed solely to shear a
naively sheepish public, some o f the m ore honest com panies confronted recurring design
flaws. Freezing tem peratures and hard w ater topped the list o f problem s confronting
passive solar w ater heaters in the 1980s. A djustm ents to these units, including
introducing antifreeze into a closed-loop system , have made m odem heaters m ore
e ffic ie n t.Im p ro v e m e n ts to other passive solar designs continue to make the technology
attractive. At his high altitude “ ‘passive-solar banana farm ,’” Amory Lovins uses a
combination o f high-tech and common sense. His glazed, double-paned w indow s include
an infusion o f insulating krypton, a heavy gas, and his insulation is like m ost others,
except that Lovins uses twice as much.^^

Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest o f Oil, M oney, and Pow er (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1991), 717.
Ibid., 718.
See Ken Olson, “Solar Hot Water: A Primer,” Northern California .Solar Energy Association Energy
Resource Guide, September 2002, 10-8.
Amory B. Lovins, “Who Needs a Furnace?,” Orion Afield, vol. 6, no. 3, Summer 2002, 16-8.
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A Modern Perspective
Americans have a love affair with energy. Every year, w e spend over tw o
hundred billion dollars ju st to heat, cool, light, and operate our hom es and o f f i c e s . O u r
buildings consumed thirty-six percent o f the total energy used in the US in 1999 and over
two-thirds o f all the electricity generated.^'* Transportation, usually viewed as the m ajor
culprit behind A m erica’s soaring energy consum ption, made up only tw enty-seven
percent o f the national total.^^ Popular perception, it seems, has a m isleading view o f our
energy appetite.
According to the Departm ent o f Energy, the United States could reduce its energy
consum ption by seventy percent by incorporating efficiency and renewable energy
measures. M ost o f w hat the governm ent recom m ends deals directly with passive solar
technology. The trouble is that when it com es to homes and offices, solar energy suffers
from a public perception problem o f its own. From both a building and a buying
perspective the hangover from the solar party o f the seventies and eighties still lingers. In
studies undertaken by four major housing groups, ranging from the National A ssociation
o f H om e Builders to the California Energy Com m ission, the main findings reveal a
public that has a blurry view o f solar w ater heaters7^^ Many people didn’t know much
about the technology, and the few w ho did saw it negatively. Various factors contributed
to the misperception. Com petition from natural gas and electricity, the high costs o f

Department o f Energy, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, “Buildings Research,” NREL Facts,
FS24867, December 1998.
International Energy Administration, “Energy Efficiency Update: United States,” November 2002, 2.
Ibid., 8.
P. Ghent and C. Keller, “A Comprehensive Review o f Market Research on Solar Water Heaters,”
Subcontract Report, (Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, October 1999, NREL/SR-55027123).
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heating systems, and unappealing designs all com bined to give solar w ater heaters a bad
public im aged’ Yet when given the chance to see m odem heaters at work, m ost people
found them “significantly more appealing;” the hom eow ners who used new system s
becam e “very committed to solar energy.”^* M odem solar technology’s problem lays
m ore with a misguided perception than faulty design; if given the chance, m ost
Am ericans would likely embrace solar technology.
Complacency has allured hum anity before. A thousand years ago the priesthood
in Chaco Canyon seemed settled in its role as spiritual conduit between the rain-granting
gods and the harvest-yielding farmers. The road leading out o f Chaco Canyon w ould
prove a difficult one for many Anasazis, bu t the future would not always appear so bleak.
Spurred from complacency by drought and hunger, Chacoan farm ers moved out to form
m odern-day Pueblo tribes that live w ithin N ew M exico’s northern Rio Grande Valley.
H ow can a lesson from such an out o f the w ay place hold any im portance for
societies in the twenty-first century? C ertainly m odern Am ericans have taken the lesson
o f embracing change to heart, given the rapid, alm ost daily, improvements in technology.
The next chapter explains the second h a lf o f solar energy’s story, which relies heavily
upon scientific knowledge and technological advances. Im plicit in these developm ents
are the lessons from Chaco Canyon: to survive, you must adapt.

Ibid., 3.
Ibid.. 5.
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Chapter 3

Voting as i f it Mattered: VoteSolar 2001 & the Story o f Solar Electricity

M y first up-close experience w ith m odem solar energy technology stem m ed
neither from wisdom o f a bygone era nor a genuine interest in renew able energy. In fact
the first time I wondered about solar energy, I cursed. After a long day spent winding m y
way down the spine o f the Sangre de Cristo m ountain range from Denver, Colorado, I
finally m ade it to my m other’s Taos County, N ew M exico home. W ell, almost. It was a
hot sum m er day, and m y brother’s directions to m om ’s new house sim ply had no basis in
reality. I w as lost. M y supplies o f petroleum and patience w ere running on fumes. For
the um pteenth time I swore that the next turn dow n an unknow n lane w ould be m y last.
As I cam e up with new term s to describe Taos C ounty’s high desert terrain, I
happened upon an elderly gentleman. W hen I asked i f he knew where the com m unity o f
“Earth Ships’’ was, he replied, “You m ean those weird houses w ith solar panels?’’^
W ithin seconds I was speeding past the Rio G rande Gorge Bridge. Pulling into the
driveway, I gazed in bem used wonder. T here, shim m ering in the overpowering New
M exico sunlight, I saw what appeared to be m isplaced siding. Black, quiet, and
futuristic, five flat-plate solar panels hypnotized m y tired, vulnerable mind. Busily
collecting energy to pow er everything from light bulbs to the washing m achine, these
strange embodim ents o f science fiction m ade m e forget m y frustration. M ore
im portantly, they piqued m y interest.

‘ The term “earth ship” refers to off-the-grid homes that use passive and active solar, as well as wind
energy, recycled construction materials, and a complex water treatment system. Mike Reynolds takes
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Active solar technology achieves a fantastic dream and differs in tw o im portant
ways from its passive brethren. B y converting sunshine into electricity, m odern solar
equipm ent goes beyond conserving energy by converting solar energy into usable
electricity. The other major difference has less to do with the complex technology that
can accomplish this feat and m ore in com m on w ith the imagination that preceded it.
Even before humans fully understood electricity, thoughtful scientists and backyard
tinkerers experimented with w ays to harness the sun’s incredible pow er into a
m anageable form. The technology that resulted affects energy decisions in places as
modern as San Francisco and as isolated as rural Brazil
This chapter explains how solar technology m ade the leap from energy
conservation to conversion in three sections. The vast majority o f human experience with
solar technology occurred before the nineteenth century, before Edm und Becquerel
discovered that sunlight contains electricity. The first section describes the background
and nascency o f solar electricity technology. Next, I turn to post-W orld W ar Tw o
America, where solar technology played a larger role in Cold W ar politics than dom estic
energy policy. The final section analyzes the American governm ent’s attem pt to merge
technology and economics into a cohesive, solar-friendly policy after the 1973 energy
crisis and until the expiration o f the solar tax credits in 1985. As a postscript I describe
the impact o f active solar technology on a global scale. Active solar technology w as bom
o f a dream to convert sunlight into electricity, and the physical result o f that vision
m anifests itself in some unusual and inspiring ways.

credit for tlie name; still actively involved in the earth ship trade, Reynolds also nms tlie “Greater World
Eaitlisliip Comimuiity” in Taos that includes mom’s house.
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Photoelectricity
Solar technology advanced beyond architectural designs by the eighteenth
century. The hot box designs built upon the heat trap principle inspired m ore than a
burgeoning solar w ater heating enterprise. O ther European scientists applied the idea in
different ways. European scientist H orace de Saussure built a com plex m iniature
greenhouse with glass plates The box design, a sort o f solar Russian doll, had five
square glass walls that fit inside each other w ith a small gap in betw een them.^ D e
Saussure used his hot boxes to grow fruits and vegetables, but the idea had other
applications as well. O ther scientists im proved upon de Saussure's design by adding
better insulation for higher tem peratures and piping systems to heat water.^
Solar engineers experimented with m achines into the nineteenth century. In 1839,
French scientist Edmund Becquerel discovered that sunlight contained electricity.
Becquerel experimented with selenium to produce a low current, solar pow ered charge,
the first o f its kind. Electricity was still a relatively unknown entity in the early
nineteenth century, and few scientists investigated the possibilities o f producing solar
electric technology. The incentive for developing sun-powered m achines cam e from a
lack o f resources in France. The social and econom ic transform ation that occurred with
advances in industry depended on creating steam efficiently and m ost factories relied on
coal. In France, the fossil fuel was not abundant, so the French governm ent invested in
scientific ventures that promised to create industrial power without coal. In 1860 a
French m athematics professor, Augustin M ouchot, noted that industry w ould eventually

^ Ken Butti and Jolm Perlin, Golden Thread: 2500 Years o f Solar Architecture and Technology (Palo
Alto: Cheshire Books, 1980), 55-6.
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deplete all native resources, placing the nation into a disadvantaged position. R ather than
import coal from nations like Britain, M ouchot recom m ended that France “(r)eap the rays
o f the sun.”'*
Such an impossible dream m otivated M ouchot to develop the first solar pow ered
engine. Using advances in heat traps and m irror technology, which M ouchot used to
concentrate sun rays, the scientist attempted to build a steam engine powered by the sun.
M ouchot eventually struck upon the idea o f using parabolic trough mirrors that
concentrated sunlight onto copper tubes that held water. To produce steam, M ouchot
designed a tank that fit atop these tubes w here a small engine ran on solar power. This
1866 design combined several principles o f solar engineering and m arks a m ajor advance
in solar technology, yet the engine M ouchot created was far too small to be considered
useful. To create a bigger, m ore useful m achine, M ouchot had to think big. U sing funds
from Napoleon I ll’s nationalistic governm ent, M ouchot built a huge solar pow ered steam
engine. M easuring twenty feet by twenty feet, the “Tours m otor” used sunlight as fuel
and powered a motor with one-half horsepower. Unfortunately for M ouchot’s dream s o f
creating a useful solar industrial engine, m ost o f the coal-fired engines produced one
hundred horsepower. For M ouchot’s m achine to be useful to industry, he w ould need
nearly 100,000 square feet,^
At the same tim e he created a steam -driven solar motor, Augustin M ouchot
experimented with the effects o f concentrating sunshine onto a variety o f metals.
Disregarding Edmund B ecquerel’s elem ent o f choice, selenium, M ouchot tried to
produce electric current with other metals to no effect. European scientists o f the late

^ Ibid., 58-9.
Quoted in ibid., 63.
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nineteenth century distrusted claims that solar energy contained electricity, and by the
turn o f the century, no European had conclusively proved that sunlight held such
properties. In the United States, a group o f inventors made som e im portant discoveries in
the 1880s.

As he bemoaned the paucity o f w ays to pow er his telegraph cable testing

apparatus, solar pioneer W illoughby Smith experim ented with selenium. Sm ith and his
team o f inventors, employed by a telegraph com pany, found that selenium reacted to
light. After Smith’s late-nineteenth century discoveries, other scientists tested selenium ’s
limits. Dr. William Adams and his assistant, Richard Day, tinkered with flam es and
batteries, and they concluded that light caused selenium to produce an electric charge. A
N ew Y ork scientist, Charles Fritts, outfitted the w orld’s first solar panels, using selenium,
in 1885.^ W hile his colleagues properly congratulated Fritts on his achievem ent, no one
could satisfactorily explain how selenium cells generated electricity ju st from exposure to
sunshine.
About twenty years after Fritts constructed his inefficient and cum bersom e
panels, in 1904, Albert Einstein published his fam ous paper on the theory o f relativity.^
Im portantly for solar electricity’s developm ent, Einstein proved that light exists in w aves
that contain packets o f energy called photons. Einstein further dem onstrated that the
am ount o f force contained in light is relative to its wavelength: the shorter the wave, the
m ore pow er it has. Why is this im portant? B ecause short light waves contain photons
that generate electricity. Scientists discovered that electricity forms once a substance can
absorb the packets o f power. After sunlight gets trapped, its energy transfers to the

* Ibid., 67-70.
^ Jolut Perlin, From Space to Earth: The Story o f Solar E lectricity (Ann Arbor: AATEC Publications,
1999), 17-18.
’ Ibid., 20.
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electrons within the trapping substance. H arnessing those electrically charged electrons
is the basis o f photovoltaic technology. Tw o elem ents contain nuclei w ith poorly rooted
electrons. Selenium is ju st such a substance. Silicon is another.
After Einstein’s discoveries earned him the Nobel Prize in 1921, the scientific
com m unity began to test and experim ent with principles. N ot only did em pirical data
confirm E instein’s findings, scientists also cam e up with the term used today to describe
photoelectricity: photovoltaics. The telecom m unications industry em erged as a leader in
PV technology for the next several decades. M ost discoveries in the early tw entieth
century centered on the rare and inefficient elem ent, selenium. The high costs o f
selenium and the low efficiency o f the metal m ade investm ent in solar electricity cost
prohibitive during through the Great D epression and W W II era.

The Space Race
The marriage betw een PV technology and econom ics grew happier after the war.
A Bell Laboratories team, headed by PV pioneer Russell Ohls, discovered the utility o f
silicon as a conductor in 1954; nevertheless, photovoltaics rem ained in its infancy due to
its inefficient transfer o f energy into electricity, known as the efficiency rate. The higher
the rate that an electricity-producing technology transfers energy into electricity, the m ore
efficient it is. New coal-fueled pow er plants in the early tw enty-first century operate at
about forty-five percent, while older plants generally attain roughly tw enty-five to thirtythree percent.* To put the technology into perspective, the breakthrough efficiency rate
dem onstrated by Ohls and his Bell Labs colleagues was only six percent, which w as an
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im provem ent at fifteen tim es more efficient than previous r a te s / In the 1950s, m ost
electricity cam e from coal-fired plants that operated at thirty-six percent efficiency,
m aking solar electricity a non-participant in A m erican electricity generation/®
O hls’ breakthrough signaled an im portant change in the resource used in
photovoltaic cells. Rather than focus on the abysm al efficiency rate, solar scientists
turned their attention to the w orld’s second-m ost abundant elem ent on the earth’s surface:
silicon. Unfortunately, PV technology in the 1950s required silicon in incredibly pure
form - not that sandy silicon on the beach. So, aside from an encouraging project in
Georgia that allowed Bell Telephone to install solar panels to pow er telephone lin e s,"
industry leaders could not justify P V ’s exorbitant expense - $600 per watt o f pow er by
the m id-1950s."
By the tim e the Soviets launched Sputnik in 1957, photovoltaic technology
experienced a lull. The few gains scientists made translated into fewer profits, and the
opportunity for advancem ent in the PV realm seem ed to slip from A m erica’s collective
grasp. The upside o f early Soviet superiority in space flight was a rekindled interest in
solar technology. The Vanguard I satellite, N A S A ’s second response to Sputnik, came
equipped with a chemical battery designed to pow er the radio that beam ed m essages back
to ground control." W hen the battery failed, the backup system began to work, and
photovoltaic technology scored its first real victory. Finally the solar industry found a

* Heinz Termuelilen and Werner Emsperger, Clean a n d Efficient Coal-Fired Pow er Plants: Developm ent
Toward A dvanced Technologies, (Fairfield, NJ: American Society o f Mechanical Engineers Press, 2003).
Tliis figure includes loss o f power that inevitably occurs during transmission.
^ Martin A. Green, “Crystalline- and Polycrystalline-Silicon Solar Cells,” in Tlioinas Johansson, et al., eds.,
Renew able Energy: Sources fo r Fuels and E lectricity (Wasliington, DC: Island Press, 1993), p. 338.
Cliristopher Flavin and Nicholas Lenssen, Pow er Surge: Guide to the Coming Energy Revolution (New
York & London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1994), 41.
" Perlin, From Space to Earth, 36,
Flavin and Lenssen, Power Surge, 154.
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partner with nearly unlimited funds, which allow ed leaders o f the solar cell industry to
experim ent with greater confidence know ing th at achievem ents would find practical and
profitable applications.
Solar electricity panels convert sunlight directly into electricity. The futuristic
cells I found dancing in the N ew M exico sun operated smoothly, quietly, and w ith no
m oving parts or exhaust. To understand how a panel transform s sunshine into electricity,
w e have to go back to Einstein’s quantum theory. All the fuss generated by the brilliant
Dr. Einstein focused on his contention that light exists in waves (which scientists already
knew) and that those waves contain packets o f energy, which he called light quanta.
Einstein theorized that the shorter the wave, the m ore powerful its quanta. H is colleagues
rushed to test his theories, and within a couple o f decades scientists proved m any o f
Einstein’s i d e a s . T e s t s showed that only “absorbed” photons can generate electricity.
The photon’s energy, once captured by a substance like silicon, transfers its pow er to
electrons that are charged with energy. T hese charged electrons then escape their orbits
around the nuclei and form an electrical current. W hen an electron leaves its flight path
around a nucleus, it leaves a gap. Photovoltaic w afers allow an electrical field to form as
a result o f the empty spaces; a current results when solar cells absorb sunlight, which
energizes loose electrons. For an electric field to be effective, sem iconductors m ust
operate efficiently. Solar scientists m ade an im portant advance when they discovered an
efficient way o f m anipulating silicon sheets that contain different num bers o f electrons.
A silicon sheet that houses a “p” layer has m ore holes than electrons, and an “n” layer has
m ore electrons than holes. The m eeting point betw een the tw o sheets is called the p-n

Green, “Crystalline-and Poiycrystalline-Silicou Solar Cells,” 338.
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junction, and this area generates an electric flow.
PV panels consist o f two layers o f silicon placed together, with a layer o f another
material that m anufacturers affix either behind or betw een them. These secondary
substances help the silicon absorb or conduct the electricity.^^ W hen electricity form s in
solar panels, they form a direct current, DC. Since m ost electric outlets are set up on an
alternating current, or AC, the electricity from the solar panel has to go through an
inverter that switches the power from a direct current to an alternating current. From that
point, depending on where you are and w hat you set up the panels for, you have a source
o f electricity to power your television or com puter or electric blanket.
One concern about PV technology centers on manufacturing the silicon cells and
other materials necessary for smooth, pollution-free operation. Two substances attract
the attention o f the Environm ental Protection Agency (EPA). Com panies that m ake solar
panels containing copper indium and/or cadm ium have to use caution when handling
these materials.

W hile each may help increase efficiency, they are both potentially

dangerous heavy metals. EPA officially designates them as toxic, and concern arises as
to what happens to these harmful substances when panels no longer work. In m ost places
where technological infrastructure exists, people can return their PV cells to the
com panies that sold them. W here such recycling facilities do not exist, the danger that
harmful chemicals will enter the environm ent increases. A similar concern exists for the
batteries that store excess pow er from PV cells.
Photovoltaic technology lagged behind energy consum ption from fossil fuels for

Einstein published liis paper in 1904, received the Nobel Prize for it in 1921, and liis colleagues caught
up to him by tlie mid-Twenties.
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h a lf a century. By the time OPEC imposed its em bargo in 1973, PV cells appeared
alm ost exclusively on satellites. The space program , locked in com petition w ith the
Soviets, had a different agenda regarding cost and efficiency o f silicon-based solar
electricity. W hen developed nations finally figured out that they should investigate
practical applications o f PV cells, efficiency rates, the percent o f energy usable after
generation, hovered around the unim pressive six percent mark achieved in the mid1950s.

As an alternative to fossil fuels, PV needed to im prove its rate o f conversion if

it was to be a viable option. Thanks in part to an increase in federal spending, Am erican
scientists improved on the silicon idea. Up until the mid-1970s, PV technology relied on
flat-plate cells, m ade up o f a substance called crystalline silicon. The crystalline silicon
cells made in the 1970s and 1980s required a thickness and purity level that m ade them
too expensive to compete effectively with traditional energy sources.
Some ingenious scientists cam e up w ith alternatives that can com pete with
traditional pow er sources. Options to traditional flat-plate cells include the catchall
category called thin-film crystalline silicon, which m ost o f us have seen pow ering
calculators and wristwatches. Since it costs less to produce solar panels that contain less
silicon, scientists focused most o f their attention on increasing the efficiency o f thin-film
c e l l s . T o d a y , several conductors com pete in the PV market.

M ost o f these materials help make pajiels tliin and include amorphous silicon, copper indium diselenide,
cadmium telluride, and gallium arsenide. Tliese substances factor into enviromnental concerns in
manufacturing. See the Department o f Energy’s web site at www.nrel.gov for an excellent overview.
Green, “Crystalline-and Polycrystalline-Silicon Solar Cells,” 338.
” It costs less because the industry can utilize mass production teclmiques, like spraying silicon onto
sheets. SttV txlux, From Space to Earth, 163-183.
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Photovoltaics in Crisis
The technology that em erged from th e space race in the Sixties rem ained above
the clouds into the following decade. The popular rise o f environm entalism influenced
American policy and funding regarding solar electricity. The first celebration o f E arth
D ay occurred in 1970, and the push for non-polluting energy sources began in earnest.
Am idst the haze spewed from exhaust pipes o f m uscle cars^ tree hugging took a central
role in Am erican energy policy. Even President Nixon jum ped on the bandw agon,
calling for a comprehensive clean energy program as early as June, 1971.
Americans called for cleaner air, w ater, and land in the early 1970s, but solar
electricity continued to play a m inor role in national energy policy. W hile no single
event can claim credit for P V ’s terrestrial application, a series o f events jolted
industrialized nations out o f their fossil fuel-induced stupor. As a response to continued
support for Israel, in October, 1973, the O rganization o f Petroleum E xporting C ountries
(OPEC) enacted a crippling policy that restricted the sale o f petroleum to m any w estern
nations, particularly the United States. The ensuing oil em bargo m eant a dedicated effort
to apply the American space program ’s im pressive use o f PV technology to everyday life.
Prior to actions by OPEC, European and Japanese companies led the way in term s o f
governm ent spending on solar electricity, but the United States increased its allocation o f
federal funds, too. The demand for dom estically-produced energy rose during the 1970s,
and alternative energy technology research and developm ent received millions o f dollars
in federal funding, with private industry follow ing suit. Tax dollars earm arked
specifically for solar cell research barely deserve m ention prior to 1971, but thanks to an

Donald A. Beattie, “The Early Years o f Federal Solar Energy Programs” in Beattie, et al., eds.. H istory
an d O verview o f Solar Heat Technologies (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 27.
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earnest effort to reshape American energy policy by Jim m y Carter, the US governm ent
set aside $260 million for photovoltaics by 1 9 8l /^
Spurred by this interest, research and developm ent o f PV technology to o k o ff
W hile the solar dreams o f many believers failed to materialize, practical applications
cropped up everywhere. Silicon technology, also spurred by the w ell-established
telecom m unications and the em erging com puter m arkets, gave rise to solar cells on
everything from wristwatches to maritim e buoys. Even though the Reagan
administration quietly abandoned investm ents in solar electricity, efficiency im proved to
such an extent that the photovoltaic industry attracted the attention o f nonrenew able
energy companies on a global scale. In the 1980s, M arkus Real dem onstrated P V ’s
potency by successfully placing solar panels on 333 rooftops in Zurich. By the 1990s,
the technology established itself worldwide. Today, a PV system that can pow er the
average American household is about seventy percent cheaper than it w as in 1980.^°
The m ost popular silicon cells, crystalline, typically cost far less than their
alternatives. This kind o f solar cell operates at about a fourteen percent efficiency rate,
depending upon several factors like tim e o f year and am ount o f cloud cover. W ithin the
crystalline cell branch o f PV technology, som e interesting advances have been made.
Solar panel manufacturers continue to im prove upon the popular w afer design. R ecent
estim ates show this style can achieve efficiencies o f up to twenty percent

The biggest

knock against w afer cells is that they cost too m uch to manufacture. Finding cheap
silicon w asn’t much o f a problem well into the 1990s because PV producers could

Beattie, “Tlie Early Years o f the Federal Solar Energy Programs,” 29; 1981 budget figure from Flavin
and Lenssen, Pow er Surge, 170, imposes 1993 dollars.
Arlie Hochschild, Hooray for the Red, Wliite, Blue and Green,” LA Times, November 11, 2001.
Tliis figure comes from a number o f sources, and it is generally the accepted standard.
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purchase unused stocks from com puter com panies at a cut-rate price. H ow ever, the
com puter industry boom meant that PV com panies had to find alternative sources for
their silicon. M arket forces thus spurred investigation into m ore cost-effective w ays to
produce the precious silicon.

A Global Movement
Technological advances by the PV industry im pact energy use throughout the
world. In Brazil, solar cells help people achieve goals otherwise inconceivable. In 1992,
an ambitious program headed by the US D epartm ent o f Energy (DO E) and C entro de
Pesquisas de Energia Electrica (CEPEL) aim ed at powering h alf million homes, schools,
and clinics. The project, influenced by the 1992 United N ations Conference on
Environm ent and D evelopm ent (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro the same year, projected
an infusion o f technological and financial resources from renewable energy industry
leaders. W hile some analysts hoped that involving com panies like Siemens Solar and
Solarex would increase production - and low er the costs - o f alternative energy paths,
Brazilians in places like Sertao de Sao Francisco hoped to gain access to electric pow er
for the first time.
In 1997, the National Renew able E nergy Laboratory (NREL) estim ated that
tw enty million Brazilians went without electricity.^^ In order to get coal-fueled pow er to
rural inhabitants, utility com panies expect exorbitant costs; most o f this expense stems
from rem oving physical barriers. Rather than resort to destroying B razil’s already
rapidly-depleting ecosystems, projects such as the N REL/CEPEL cooperative allow

Roger Taylor, “Joint US/Braziliaii Renewable Energy Rural Electrification Project,” Renewables fo r
Sustainable Village Power (Golden, CO: NREL FS-510-24195, 1997), p. 2.
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people to plug into a better life w ithout resorting to ecological sabotage. Financially,
alternatives make sense, too. N REL estim ates that funding PV cells, including
installation, batteries, and training, costs h a lf as m uch as extending existing pow er lines.
H ow do people with newly found access to electricity use that power? In Sertao de Sao
Francisco, the N REL/CEPEL project allowed people in four hundred dw ellings to plug in
old television sets and radios. These m odem inventions let folks know about the
vaccinations being housed at the PV -pow ered health clinic o r about the new com puters
hooked up at the school.
South A frica’s rural areas also prove difficult to supply with electricity. Like
areas in Brazil, rural outposts in South A frica see no hope for electric pow er from
traditional sources. D oug Arent figures that about one in every five citizens shouldn’t
expect electricity for at least a score o f years.

The World Bank considers South A frica

a likely candidate to achieve its national goal o f providing PV cells to two thousand
clinics and over sixteen thousand s c h o o l s . T h e same study estim ates that one kilow att
per hour (kWh), the amount o f energy needed to keep ten 100-watt light bulbs lit for an
hour, o f solar electricity will cost between eight and ten cents ($0.08 - $0,10).^^ Fossil
fuel-powered plants typically do not exist in rural areas o f developing nations, and the
costs for constructing large energy-producing plants outweigh renewable alternatives.
Thandizwe Frank Gwala, leader o f the K w azulu Natal tribe in the tow n o f M aphephethe,
expressed his hope that the solar panels serving his village’s twelve thousand m em bers

Ibid., 1
Doug Arent, "Rural Electrification in South Africa,” Renewables f o r Sustainable Village Pow er (Golden,
CO: NREL FS-520-24633, 1998), p. 1.
Edward M. Petrie, H. Lee Willis, and Masaki Takalialu, "Distributed Generation in Developing
Countries,” from the Dept of Energy web site, www. rsvp.nrel.gov, 6.
“ Petrie, et al., p. 4.
24
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will “give people independence.”^^ N ot only do the PV cells pow er lights at
M aphephethe’s schools, electricity m eans th at people can begin to earn their livings
closer to home.
The answ er to the question, “ Can solar electricity really m ake a
difference?” then, is yes. The world houses tw o billion people that lack electricity.^*
Setting up non-polluting electricity sources will help keep carbon em issions from getting
out o f control, but photovoltaics can do m ore than help reduce clim ate-altering carbon
dioxide emissions. Robert Foster, head o f the Southwest Technology D evelopm ent
Institute, thinks there is som ething subversively appealing about solar electricity;
Tlie unique aspect o f PV is that it is a ‘radical' or ‘disruptive’ type
o f teclmology as compared to conventional power generation teclmologies.
PV is a teclmology tliat does not build from the old teclmology base,
but rather replaces tliat base from tlie bottom up. PV allows people the
opportunity to ignore traditional electrical power supply structures
and meet tlieir own power needs locally."^

The independent streak Foster expresses also parallels the sentim ents o f
Thandizwe Frank Gwala. The prom ise o f tom orrow must depend on our w illingness to
share what we know with other people; equally im portant is our ability to adapt to a
changing world. By learning what we can from each other and pushing for sustainable
energy paths other Am erican com m unities can replicate San Francisco’s success.

Quote in Siemens Review, “A Zulu Village Looks to the Sim: An Interview with Thandizwe Frank
Gwala,” 3-4/96, p. 25.
^ Petrie, et al., p. 1.
Robert Foster, “Photovoltaic Markets and Applications” from the El Paso Solar Energy Association’s
web site at w w w .epsea.org/pv.html.
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Chapter 4

Son o f Wind, Ready~to-Give: Wind Energy and the Lesson o f Constancy

My son, I am your father. I am one o f the gods and
I stand in the north. My name is Ready-to-Give.
When the people are hungry for buffalo, I b low my
breath upon the land. My breath drives the buffalo
to the people, and they slaughter many.
Yellow-Bird, Chaui (Pawnee) leader, “The Son o f Wind, Ready-To-Give”

W ith the wind comes the buffalo. L ike m any o f its neighbors on the prairie, the
buffalo meant more to the Chaui Paw nees than an anim al to hunt. It w as a w ay o f life.
The sustenance provided by this icon o f the A m erican Great Plains m eant that several
tribes imparted a spiritual aspect to the anim al. For the Chaui, wind played a vital role.
In the tale related by Yellow-Bird, the w ind figure appeared from the north during tim es
o f w ant and “send the people som ething to eat.” ' The ritual that called forth the wind
spirit, know n as Ready-to-Give, becam e a vital part o f Chaui life.
From an early point in its history, hum anity has given thoughtful consideration to
wind. In different places around the w orld, people have developed technologies designed
to harness the power in gales and breezes alike. Part o f w ind’s allure centers on the
m etaphorical qualities celebrated by Y ellow -B ird, that o f constancy. W hen the sun
shines on our planet’s surface, it w arm s air as w ell as land; when w arm air rises, cooler
air rushes in to fill the void, creating breezes. This chapter tells the story o f hum anity and
wind, while also revealing w ind’s dependable nature.
Hum ans first became interested in harnessing w ind’s power thanks to its
' George A. Dorsey, The Pawnee: M ythology (Part I) (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution o f
Washington, 1906), 94.
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regularity. This chapter begins with a b rief overview o f wind technology in the ancient
world. Next, I cover wind energy in the E uropean M iddle Ages. Technological
developments and social im plications m erged across the continent as wind energy gained
increased attention and importance prior to E u ro p e ’s quest for empire in the W estern
Hemisphere. Finally I analyze wind in the m odern era. I turn my attention to wind
energy in the industrialized world, particularly the United States. As in the M iddle Ages,
wind technology gained utility in nineteenth century America, yet reliance on other fuels
eventually stunted wind energy developm ent. Paradoxically, wind today can thank its
present usefulness to the centralized pow er structure that initiated the resource’s early
demise.^ I analyze this apparent contradiction by tracing w ind’s transform ation from an
individualistic pow er source into one that m akes use o f the same centralized electrical
grid used by other, m ore environm entally caustic, fuels.
W ithin the context o f this thesis, wind energy might inspire comparison to the
passive solar technological realm. People have long used wind as an energy source, and
although we in the twenty-first century often refer to wind as an alternative, the practice
o f harnessing w ind’s pow er far precedes th e use o f fossil fuels. Like passive (and later
active) solar designs, wind energy technology has adapted to reflect the needs o f societies
using it. Exhibiting characteristics m ore closely associated with active solar and hydro
technology, modern applications o f wind pow er produce electricity. For all the
characteristics it shares with its renew able kin, wind energy has a story all its own. This
chapter relates that tale and em phasizes w ind’s m ost compelling trait; constancy.

Wasliington, 1906), 94.
^ Centralized power means electricity generated at a single point then distributed tlirough power lines to
end users.
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Wind and People —A Long Relationship
Early developm ent o f wind energy technology relied, strangely enough, on water.
W hen Egyptians hoisted their first square sails in 5000 BC, they dem onstrated a pattern
o f technological developm ent repeated around the globe from Egypt to China and
beyond.^ Some experts think that as early 5000 BC ancient Egyptians used linen o r
papyrus sails to navigate the Nile River."^ T he concept at play in these ancient sailing
ships is known today as lift, and the design o f the wind-catching sails did not change
significantly for several c en tu rie s/ This does not mean that such sails w ere particularly
efficient. Energy expert Valclav Smils estim ates that the M editerranean square sail,
attached to a mast and set at right angles across the ship’s axis, did not operate very
smoothly. Thus began a long struggle betw een engineers and the mercurial tem peram ent
o f the wind. In Sm ils’ estimation, engineers from different parts o f the world cam e up
with unique solutions to the problem o f how best to capture the wind energy efficiently.®
At first glance these developm ents seem to have little to do with earth-bound
wind pow er as we know it today. Yet, capturing the wind for sailing purposes had a
dramatic impact on land-based wind technology. Like their sea-born counterparts, early
grounded windmills related to water; unlike w ind sails, these small w indm ills found their
nascency in the arid fields o f Persia, far from their ocean brethren. Needful o f efficient
ways to pump w ater and grind grain, the Persians developed the “carousel” style

^ Polynesians, too, acquired a vast store o f knowledge about the winds even though tliey probably didn’t
use sails. See Robert Righter, Wind Energy in Am erica: A H istory (Nonnan: University o f Oklahoma
Press, 1996), 6.
■*See “History o f Wind Power” at http://www.ews.uiuc.edu/~enation/History.html. Robert Rigliter puts tlie
date at 3100 BC; see Robert Righter, Wind Energy in Am erica, 6.
^ Darrel M. Dodge, “Illustrated History o f Wind Power Development,” from website
http://www.telosnet.com/wiiid/iiidex.html.
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windmill by 500 A D / Engineers constructed wind scoops made o f reeds o r w ood then
attached the bundles to a vertical shaft. W hen the wind caught the bundles, they spun on
a horizontal plane, much like the horses o f a m odern carousel, and turned a vertical shaft
that created mechanical energy.*
In Europe, wind and w ater parted w ays during the classical Greek and Rom an
eras. Used primarily as pow er for m illing grain, flow ing w ater exhibited a characteristic
not as readily found in wind: consistency. A s early as the first century BC, a
Thessalonian, Antipater, wrote o f a sim ple m achine driven by w ater power.^ Later,
ancient Roman solar architect Vitruvius reported a design for w aterwheels found
throughout the M editerranean world.

W hile technological innovation benefited

waterwheels in the Rom an world, no E uropean society invested much tim e tinkering with
windmills.** With a large population and w idespread slavery, Rom e had little incentive
to develop labor-saving machines.

Middle Ages Europe: The Ascendancy o f Mechanical Energy
In the centuries following the breakup o f the Rom an Em pire, several pow ers
sought to establish them selves as legitim ate successors. An Arabian presence filled the
void in the eastern and southern M editerranean world, and in these regions, wind pow er
continued as an important energy source. Y et in Europe, wind technology developm ent
all but ceased. Political turmoil constantly threatened public order; warfare becam e

^ Valclav Smils, Energy in World H istory (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 137.
’ Ibid., 108; see also, Rigliter, Wind Energy in Am erica, 7,
®Dodge, “Illustrated History o f Wind Power Developm ent,” I. We don’t really know what tliese macliines
looked like, as scribes only mentioned them in writing and didn’t draw tliem. D odge’s website has a
speculative illustration.
^ Sm ils, Energy in World History, 103.
Ibid., 103.

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

78

common for much o f the continent; famine sickened many; and those who survived had
to deal with disease. Population dwindled, leaving few hands to undertake the burden o f
harvesting crops and grinding grain.
As Europe moved into the post-R om an era, the economic structure centered on
agriculture. The manorial economy that w ould develop centered on hierarchical
allegiances, with the monarch at the top and peasants at the bottom. Nobles, clerics, and
other m iddlemen all benefited from the system because they owned the land used by
peasants to raise crops. Agriculture, labor intensive as it was, form ed the foundation
upon which Europe built its society in the M iddle Ages. L ow populations m eant less
available muscle pow er and a greater dem and for alternative forms o f energy. W hile
R om e’s huge population offset the demand fo r labor-saving technologies like wind, the
sparsely populated nations in the M iddle A ges bore such burdens m ore heavily.
In response to labor shortages, European nations developed tw o im portant
renewable resources: wind and water. Prior to the M iddle Ages, Europeans generally
used wind as a way to control water, either by sailing over it or by pum ping the resource
from the ground. By 1000 AD, the relationship had changed. W ater pow er em erged as a
leading energy source in the first m illennium thanks to the vertical waterwheel. A
departure from its inefficient horizontal brethren, the vertical wheel, also known as the
post-mill, was a sim ple design. Rather than spinning around horizontally, engineers
flipped the wheel to an upright position, m oving the power-producing axle to a horizontal
station.*^ This seemingly insignificant shift m ade a huge difference in the pow er

" Rigliter, Wind Energy in A m erica,!.
Also known as the Greek or Norse wheel, these macliines spim horizontally, along witli the rusliiiig
water, and generated just enough energy to power a millstone. See Smils, Energy in World H istory, 103;
Braudel, The Structures o f Everyday Life, 354-5.
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waterwheels could generate. An undershot m achine, whose paddles gathered w ater at the
surface o f a flowing stream, could boost the w aterflow ’s energy output eightfold and
greatly reduce the amount o f people required to accom plish basic tasks, like grinding
grain.
Despite an increase in energy capacity, vertical waterwheels had little im pact on
M iddle Ages Europe, where windmill technology m aterialized slowly. In w hat historians
term the “M edieval Industrial Revolution,” a slow series o f technological innovations
occurred over three centuries.

W ater technology w as the catalyst. The Dom esday

B ook o f 1086 reported 5,624 watermills in E ngland, where the manorial econom y had
taken root.*^ The waterwheels that powered the self-sufficient m anors o f M iddle Ages
Europe created a problem when nobility began asserting ownership rights over flow ing
streams. Resolution o f this conflict provided a boost to windmill technology.
In the twelfth century, the papacy m andated that nobles and clerics held the rights
to flowing water. The decree bestowed w aterm ill rights as well, and owners could
depend upon steady income from a certain m arket and perpetual control over lower
classes. Rivers provided the central feature o f tow ns during the M iddle Ages, and the
agrarian community, the bulk o f European society at this time, depended on w aterw heels
to mill grain. Manorial control over tow ns began to suffer challenges from an em erging
m iddle class that grew tired o f a stagnant class system.
Across Europe, wind energy becam e a popular form o f econom ic and social

Smils, Energy in World History, 103. Such macliines existed in Rome.
Braudel, The Structures o f Everyday Life, 353; Righter, Wind Energy in Am erica, 8. Braudel reports tliat
water had other applications, as well, including tidal power in the Islamic and European worlds; see
Braudel, 354; Righter reports tliat William the Conqiierer’s invading hordes saw tliem in tlie Nonnan
Invasion o f 1066, Righter, 8.
Smils, Energy in World History, 103; Braudel, Structures, 356.
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protest. Small farm owners built w ind-pow ered postm ills to avoid costly m illing fees.
W indm ills saved m oney by milling grain w ithout fliel or tim e costs, and people could
build them cheaply.

Northern E urope’s environm ent also had an impact. In

comm unities that relied on smaller stream s fo r their energy supply, cold w inter w eather
could disrupt productivity. People alert to th e dangers o f freezing could prevent such an
interruption o f pow er by building w indm ills that w ere less likely to succumb to cold
temperatures.
M onetary concerns helped develop E uropean wind technology, but w in d ’s
ubiquitous character also reflected independence in the people who em braced it. At a
tim e when the daily lives o f most people w ere controlled by a rigid pow er structure, wind
provided an outlet for self-sufficiency. E ven though they w ere cheap to build, windm ills
entailed a considerable gamble. Raising such m achines risked upsetting waterwheel
owners, generally the same people responsible for the daily governance o f the
community. These town rulers held pow er by rights granted by infallible m onarchs and
popes. Pope Celestine III, who ruled in the late twelfth century, issued a decree ordering
windm ill operators to pay tithes, or fees to th e church.** Hence, the people w ho dared
challenge the local authorities also ran the risk o f upsetting the center o f E uropean
society. As wind energy expert R obert R ighter asserts, "(a) tiny ruling class, w hich
thrived on monopoly and privilege, began to lose out to rural entrepreneurs and a
grow ing urban middle class” that saw the technology as a way to better their lives. *^ The
grow ing appeal o f windmills also hints at a shifting society. Lynn W hite, Jr., explains

Debeir, et al.. In the Servitude o f Power, 78.
” Lynn Wliite, it.. M edieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 88
'* Ibid., 88.
'^Rigliter, Wind Energy, 13.
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that technologies such as post-mills led to com plex cultures founded m ore on individual
freedom than forced l a b o r . T h e success o f w ater and wind pow er changed E uropean
society by freeing its citizens to pursue other ambitions.
In Holland, wind technology becam e a national icon. The same tow er w indm ills
that drained w ater from the encroaching N orth Sea also served as sym bols o f public
sentiment. W indmills drained low-lying land, know n as polders, and served as living
quarters for m illers and their families, w hich often christened their hom es w ith proper
names.^* Improved blade designs m ade the m achines m ore efficient and m ade public
displays m ore prominent. On somber occasions, m illers stopped the four blades in a w ay
that reflected a Christian cross. W hen celebration w as in the air, the locals adorned the
sails with colorful banners.

Holland thrived as a global pow er on the cusp o f the

m odern era; in the golden era o f the seventeenth century, windm ills played a vital role for
the nation. The preindustrial m otor had staying pow er, dom inating H olland’s pow er
m arket well into the industrial era. W ind accounted for roughly ninety percent o f the
country’s energy in 1850.^^

Wind Energy in the Industrial World
B y the m id-nineteenth century, wind technology could not compete physically or
financially with the fossil-powered industry. A century before, several European nations
began their evolution from a patchw ork o f self-sufficient manorial societies into nations
com peting for resources across the globe. T he political structure also saw a shift, as strict

^ Lyim Wliite, Jr., M edieval Religion and Technology {Berkeley; University o f California Press, 1978),
223.
Rigliter, Wind Energy in America, 14.
^ Smils, Energy in World History, 109; Righter, Wind Energy in Am erica, 15.
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regimes o f the sixteenth century slowly gave w ay to m ore enlightened, secular rulers in
the eighteenth. This change led to a new era o f European intellectual and technological
achievement, and the gradual gains m ade during the repressive M iddle Ages gave way to
accelerated development in the m odern age.
In the United States, the transition to steam pow er came m ore slowly. M uch o f
the nation still depended on w ater and w ood for pow er in the antebellum period, but after
the Civil W ar, industry demanded fossil resources. In the Am erican M idw est, coal had
an early influence over industry, but wind technology held the attention o f individuals
determined to survive on the Great Plains. C onnecticut native Daniel H alladay perfected
his multi-bladed farm windmill by 1857, and m oved his company, the H alladay W ind
Mill Company, to Batavia, Illinois shortly a f t e r . S o o n , the farm windmill w ould head
across the M ississippi River and earn a reputation as a symbol o f Am erican
independence.
The w indm ill’s introduction to the G reat Plains came alongside coal-pow ered
railroads. Industry in the East sought the natural abundance and new m arkets o f the
American West, and the transcontinental rail line provided a vital link betw een them.
The steamships that journeyed through the G reat American D esert constantly threatened
engines with overheating, and railroad com panies searched for ways to supply cooling
w ater for the boilers. The Halladay w indm ill proved the perfect solution because it
operated without human assistance, and the w ater-pum ping m achines could keep railroad
station w ater tow ers well stocked. The unique design o f the Halladay also adapted to the
gusty conditions o f the Great Plains. U nlike the sturdy four-bladed Dutch tow er mill, the
23

Paul Gipe, Wind Energy Comes o f Age, (New York: Jolui Wiley & Sons, 1995), 122.
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American farm windmill had num erous, feathered blades connected to a central hub that
powered the water pump. The spindly, futuristic design allowed the sections to furl
inward during heavy winds.
W indmills may inspire rom antic notions as we look back on them today, but in
the late nineteenth century people depended on them for survival. In his classic work.
The G reat P lains, W alter Prescott W ebb argues that three things m ade w hite settlem ent
o f the American W est possible.

The first tw o, barbed w ire and the Colt .45, kept som e

semblance o f order out past the reach o f the law. The third, the windmill, played a far
m ore im portant role. W ebb notes that the fam iliar, m ulti-bladed m achines allow ed
farm ers to pump water for thirsty crops and ranchers to w ater livestock in the good years.
W hen drought hit the Plains in the late 1890s, w indm ills took on even greater
significance because they “enabled the hom esteader to hold on when all others had to
leave. . .(windmills) m ade the difference betw een starvation and livelihood.”^^
Even as hom esteaders on the Great Plains turned to the farm windm ill for
survival, innovators back East pushed the technology in new directions. In northern
Ohio, a thousand miles from the arid farm s o f the W est a m illionaire industrialist
experimented with wind energy. Charles B rush m ade his fortune by creating the fam ous
Brush arc light in the 1870s, but the inventor’s pioneering spirit w as far from satisfied.
The next decade. Brush began experim enting with electricity. The nation had taken to
this exciting new phenomenon, as people all over the nation lined up at shop window s to

Gipe, Wind Energy Comes o f Age, 124 and Righter, Wind Energy in Am erica, 24. Halladay moved his
company to Batavia, where he changed its name to the US Engine and Power Company,
Rigliter, Wind Energy in America, 24-5. The machines faced away from the wind.
Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains (New York; Grosset & Dunlap, 1931) 320
Ibid., 346.
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bask in the glow o f electric light.^* D uring th e w inter o f 1887-88, Brush invented the
first electricity-generating windmill in the w o r l d . T h e colossal “B rush w indm ill” stood
sixty feet and weighed 80,000 pounds. The Brush windmill had a gear ratio o f fifty to
one: for every revolution o f the tightly-packed blades, the electricity-generating dynamo
would turn fifty times, generating about 12 kilow att hours (kWh).^°
W hile small electricity-generating stations operated in m ajor Am erican cities by
the turn o f the century, a major developm ent in Chicago proved a catalyst for w hat would
become the nation’s electric grid system. In 1903 Samuel Insull funded installation o f a
five m egawatt (MW ) turbine generator that produced electricity in alternating current
(AC). Until that time, electricity production cam e in tw o inefficient forms. Direct
current (DC) was a direct byproduct o f late nineteenth century generators. Although easy
to produce, the DC current was nearly im possible to transport over distances o f m ore than
a couple o f miles.^* Until 1903, the other alternative was to produce AC pow er with an
inefficient reciprocating steam engine that cost over twice as much per w att than rotating
steam t u r b i n e s . F i r s t produced in 1884 by Englishm an Charles Parsons, the rotating
steam turbine could create electricity cheaply and in the m ore readily transportable AC
form. Soon a grid system emerged that included a central electricity-producing station
and transmission, or power, lines that transported electricity to end users, m uch like
today’s distributed electricity system.
M indful o f Am erica’s growing dependence on the centralized grid system.

^ See David E. Nye, Electrifying America: Social M eanings o f a New Technology (Cambridge, MA: Tlie
MIT Press, 1990).
^ Rigliter, Wind Energy in America, 43.
Ibid, 43-5.
Richard Rudolph and Scott Ridley, Pow er Struggle: The Hundred-Year War O ver E lectricity (New
York: Harper & Row, 1986), 26-8.
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Charles Brush turned his considerable energies aw ay from w ind-generated electricity.
Tying into the grid simply didn’t m ake econom ic sense for windmills, and sinking the
necessary capital into such an enterprise w as a risk Brush was not willing to take. As
Brush explored other possibilities, D ane Poul L eC our set about proving that wind energy
could contribute to the electricity supply. B acked by the Danish federal governm ent,
LeC our designed and built 40 electricity-generating windm ills in 1906.^^ L eC o u r’s
accom plishm ents set European wind energy on a different course than A m erica’s. The
Danish governm ent understood w ind’s potential, and funded studies to determ ine the best
areas for windmills, called siting. Interest in w ind energy spilled beyond D enm ark’s
borders, as Germany and Great Britain invested scientific capital in the potential
electricity provider.^'*
W hile B rush’s achievem ents m ade w ind a viable, if impractical, energy source, at
the tim e o f his death in 1929 the nation as a w hole w asn’t ready to embrace the breezes as
a source o f electricity Dem onstrated successfully by Samuel Insull in Chicago,
championed by corporate leaders, and pow ered by fossil fuels, the centralized grid system
emerged as the main energy providers in A m erican cities.
On the Plains, a significant num ber o f farm ers continued to use windm ills to
pum p water, and in some cases, pow er low voltage batteries. M ail-order catalogs enticed
farm ers with electric gadgets, and many sold kits that allowed farmers to retrofit their
w indm ills with a generator and a battery. T he com pany that cornered the market,

Jeff Hein, “ 1896 to 1928; Eleciric Industry Evolves,” C losed Circuit (vol. 25, no. 20, September 26,
2003), reproduced at website www.wapa.gov/niedja/cct/2003/sept26/25no206.htin last visited May 8, 2004.
Rigliter, Wind Energy in A merica, 61.
Ibid., 61-5. Part o f tlie explanation for Europe’s lead might be tliat electricity on tlie continent comes to
consumers as direct current (DC), an easier form to generate with renewables like wind and solar, ratlier
tlian tlie alternating current (AC) that came into use in the US. See Nye, Electrifying Am erica and Ridley,
P ow er Struggle.
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however, didn’t need mass marketing. The legendary Jacobs W ind E lectric Com pany
began in 1927, and despite a distaste for advertising, sales num bered in the hundreds o f
thousands through the thirties and forties.^^ The reliable, affordable w indm ills earned a
reputation for reliability, and the com pany stubbornly rem ained in business until 1956.
The Jacobs model changed the look o f rural w ind m achines (and, later, m odern turbines)
by using only three blades. The design pow ered a 32-volt battery for m odest home
appliances.
Country windm ills retrofitted with electricity-providing generators and batteries
couldn’t quench the thirst for modern power. As the Great Depression descended upon
the nation, a progressive governm ent took pow er in W ashington, DC. The econom ic
squeeze that began on the farm in the tw enties, brought on by overproduction, got w orse
in the thirties, and FD R vowed to lift country folk out o f their m iserable conditions. The
Rural Electrification Act o f 1936 created the Rural Electrification A dm inistration (REA)
and promised to ease the suffering on A m erican farm s by extending the high line out into
the countryside. The aim w as to allow the people there the same quality o f life afforded
to those in the cities. As the federal governm ent prom ised to preserve local control, the
effect o f hooking farms up to the centralized grid had the opposite effect.
President Roosevelt tapped form er Tennessee Valley A uthority head M orris
Cooke to head the newly formed REA. C ooke quickly learned the prohibitive financial
cost o f extending electric power, known as th e high line, to the countryside. W isconsin
Pow er and Light assessed the cost o f setting up electricity wires at $1,405 per mile, and

Ibid., 99.
Ibid., 90-9.
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utility boss Samuel Insull figured a range betw een $800 and $2,400 per mile.^^ C ooke’s
R EA encouraged farm ers to form cooperatives, apply for federal loans, and string the
wires themselves.^* Co-ops proved effective in hooking rural Am erica up to centralized
power, but cheap electricity also transform ed the Am erican farm. W ith grid-pow ered
tools, “electricity helped make much o f the farm population superfluous.”^^
The REA unwittingly brought big business to the farm and sounded the death
knell for wind energy. FD R had hoped that extending pow er to farm ers w ould save the
independent family farm. Even as farm er-led cooperatives provided some sem blance o f
local control, the centralized grid fell under the direction o f a powerful federal agency
that w as unwilling to adopt variations to its them e o f supplying electricity to country
folks. Wind advocates appealed to adm inistrative and legislative officials for som e role
for wind energy within the REA to no effect.'*® Savior o f the late nineteenth century
homesteaders, the windmill fell out o f favor in the 1930s.
Wind energy could not com pete w ith fossil fuels in the Great Depression. The
windmill created by Charles Brush generated electricity in direct current (DC) form,
w hich required either imm ediate use or an efficient storage system. Utilities could not
distribute DC electricity more than a few m iles w ithout losing potency, so rather than
build dams or power plants in the center o f tow n, utilities started generating alternating
current (AC) electricity and sending it over insulated wires to customers. Until Samuel

Ibid., 108-9.
Ibid., 113. Tlie REA received legislative blessing in 1936 by Congress when it signed tlie Rural
Electrification Act; a sticking point for utilities was tlie danger o f the REA acting without congressional
assent, tlius potentially falling into dangerous constitutional waters.
David Nye, Electrij^ing Am erica, 328.
Robert Righter describes tlie plight o f wind advocate R.F. Weiiiig and Itis testimony before Congress in
1945. Weinig pushed for an amendment to legislation amending REA tliat would allow for individually
operated energy plants. To Congress, though, windmills belonged to the liistoiy books. See Righter, Wind
Energy in America, 121-5.
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Insull consolidated power plants into large, capital-intensive corporations in the 1910s,
cities had several power plants that supplied pow er to a small num ber o f custom ers. The
centralized grid was well established in A m erican cities after 1910, and by W orld W ar II,
electricity had transformed the Am erican f a r m / '
W ind advocates tried to create m achines that generated alternating current. In
1944, on G randpa’s Knob, Vermont, Palm er Putnam tried to provide the answer. Putnam
addressed two, interrelated issues: converting w ind energy into AC and doing so
affordably. W ith its huge size, the Sm ith-Putnam wind turbine looked like a descendant
o f the Brush windmill, itself the product o f a unique partnering effort between academ ia
and private interests, was an enorm ous machine. Its diam eter stretched 175 feet; even at
16 tons, the rotor weighed a fraction o f a single blade.'*^ Putnam operated on the
economy o f scale principle that had previously directed utility companies, like Samuel
Insull’s General Electric. For Putnam, Insull, and others, the object was to find a w ay to
generate electricity cheaply, which usually m eant m aking it in large quantities. The idea
worked for Insull, but not for Putnam. W hile the Smith-Putnam managed to operate for
about sixteen months, it could not live up to its fiscal promise.'*^ A blade cam e loose in
early 1945, tumbling into the Vermont woods. The wind plant already cost its financial
backers one million dollars, and the bill for fixing such a mammoth problem was
$300,000 and exposed a weakness o f relying on the economy o f scale theory. The
project had failed, but it did set a precedent.

Nye, Electrifying America, 382. The reluctance to build power plants in urban areas probably had more
to do with transportation issues than healtlr, allliough tlrat’s only an educated guess (tlie power plant near
my hometown lay right on tlie rail line).
Darrell M. Dodge, “Illustrated History o f Wind Energy,” 4.
“Economy o f scale” refers to large-scale projects with inputs o f capital large enough to bring the
consumer cost o f such teclmology down.
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For wind energy to compete with other fuels, advocates had to draw upon a
fam iliar characteristic, reliability. Technologically, engineers had to solve the problem o f
generating AC electricity, which requires rigid speed regulation. The wind blow s at
different speeds, but alternating current generators need a steady energy input. F or all its
shortcomings, the Smith-Putnam turbine m anaged to break through this engineering
barrier. Federal Pow er Com mission officer Percy Thom as thought he could im prove
Putnam ’s design. Thomas proposed linking w indm ills to hydro plants to ensure steady
fuel input; when the breezes stopped blowing, w ater would take over the job o f feeding
the grid. W hen the dams w eren’t generating electricity, they would store w ater until it
w as needed. The American W est was best suited for such a relationship, Thom as
thought, because o f its abundant wind and lim ited w ater supply .'*'* Federal funding for
research and developm ent took a different turn in the post-W orld W ar II years, however,
as success with atomic weapons spurred scientists and engineers to apply nuclear pow er
m ore peacefully.
The story was different in Europe, w here tenacious Danish farm ers did their best
to offset the oppressive German regim e during W W II. Tapping into knowledge gained
over several centuries, common people turned to wind pow er when Nazi adm inistrators
cut citizen access to the centralized grid, building over 90 electricity-generating
t u r b i n e s . F o s s i l fuel remained sparse in the im m ediate postw ar years, but by the 1973
O PEC oil embargo, Denmark had em braced the global market, importing over ninety
percent o f its energy.'*^ In the early seventies, the nation’s long history o f using wind
energy helped the nation counter fuel shortages. Engineers developed the three-bladed

Rigliter. Wind Energy in America, 139. Despite its merit, policymakers liave yet to implement tlie idea.
Ibid., 317, note 33; Gipe, Wind Energy Conies o f A ge, 53.
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windmill based on medium-sized turbines designed in the 1950s, known as G edser m ills;
the new look quickly becam e the flagship o f the Danish windm ill fleet. The m odest size
converted wind into electricity efficiently, and repairs costs rem ained affordable. The
Danish governm ent also spurred private investm ent by offering energy production
incentives. The approach differed greatly from that in the US, where most federal
investm ent financed huge research and developm ent projects. Denm ark funded a paltry
ten percent o f that amount on R&D in the sam e period . D e s p i t e its small size and tight
budget, Denmark could brag o f ow ning over h a lf o f the w orld’s w ind m arket share by
19924 *

In the 1940s, American political leaders urged scientists to think big. The fate o f
the world depended on which nation could unlock the atomic door first. After the bomb
ended the war, the federal governm ent poured billions o f dollars into peaceful uses for
nuclear power. Atomic pow er promised to provide so much energy so cheaply that “‘it
w ouldn’t pay to m eter it.’”'*^ As Congress w aited patiently for nuclear pow er to com e o f
age, the federal governm ent financed another big dream. President K ennedy challenged
scientists and engineers to land an A m erican on the moon by 1970, a fantastic goal in
1961, yet the huge financial investm ent paid o ff in 1969. The lesson for Am erican policy
m akers became clear. Given big enough dream s, with enough cash to chase them , and
Am ericans could accomplish anything. Such was the logic in W ashington when the oil
em bargo rocked the nation in 1973.
In response to the OPEC embargo and ensuing energy crisis, the United States

4^ Gipe, Wind Energy Comes o f Age, 51.
4" Ibid., 72.
Ibid., 73.
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rejuvenated its stagnant wind energy program . Federally-funded partnerships enlisted the
collaboration o f aerospace and defense industries in a sudden surge o f research and
development. Almost imm ediately the w ell-established contractors set about spending
exorbitant amounts o f money on risky designs. The logic that drove com panies like
Boeing and M cDonnell Douglas w as to adhere to the econom ies o f scale principle: build
big machines that could generate huge am ounts o f pow er and profit. Unlike D anish
designers, who relied upon proven modest success, Am erican researchers scrapped
earlier, proven designs in favor o f larger projects. At Sandia National L aboratory in N ew
M exico, the Alcoa Corporation tried to replicate the French vertical-axis, D arrieus-type
wind turbine. Designers hoped the prototype, w hich resem bled a giant egg-beater, would
m ake an immediate impact. The best that the well-funded m odern Darrieus could
m anage was operation as a w ater-pum ping m achine at the federal research facility in
Bushland, T e x a s . O t h e r projects had sim ilar ambitions. Unfortunately, they also had
sim ilar results.
The highly publicized M OD (m odification) program sought to impact Am erican
wind technology immediately. Begun in 1975, these first generation large turbine, tw obladed windmills m ade legendary perform ances. NA SA designed and built the M O D-0
(zero) machine, which was rated at 100 kW h - enough energy to pow er about 27 homes.
Engineers sited the million dollar M O D-0 m achine near Sandusky, Ohio, where it
operated for a mere thirty hours in 1976.^* T hree years later, federal contractors started
another project in Boone, North Carolina. A lthough the MOD-1 used none o f the

David Lilientlial, first head of the Atomic Energy Commission, quoted in Righter, Wind Energy in
Am erica, 144.
^ Gipe, Wind Energy Comes o f Age, 85, 171. The project received $28 million from 1974 to 1985.
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valuable data gathered from the earlier M O D project, problem s did not have a chance to
surface. Noisy blades raised concerns o f nearby residents who eventually shut the project

down.^^
By the time M OD-2 appeared, the A m erican wind energy program had achieved
little success. Despite discouraging data, project m anagers pushed forward with a sim ilar
design on a grander scale in what they hoped w ould be a breakthrough. In 1982, N A SA
and the Departm ent o f Energy sank m illions into turbines twice the size o f the M O D-1,
with a capacity o f 2.5 megawatts.^^ The B ureau o f Reclam ation sponsored a plan to
bring tw o M OD-2 machines to M edicine B ow , W yoming. Once in place, the turbines
almost immediately ran into problems. A fter running a m ere eighteen m onths, one
windmill developed a fatal problem when a vital mechanical part, the main bearing,
burned out. After the Bureau received a repair bill for $1.5 million, it decided to scrap
the windmill, dumping it to a junkyard for $13,000. The other M OD-2 rem ained in
operation for over four years. A bolt eventually came loose, burning up the generator,
and the Bureau was forced to dump the turbine to a local man for $20,000.^^*
For wind energy experts, the federal investm ents o f the 1970s and 1980s leads to
very different conclusions. For National R enew able Energy Laboratory (NREL) wind
technology development m anager Jam es T hresher, all the failures o f the period merely
reflect a growing period for American wind t e c h n o l o g y . R e s e a r c h and developm ent

Ray Reece, The Sun Betrayed: A Report on the C orporate Seizure o f U.S. Solar Energy D evelopm ent
(Boston: South End Press, 1979), 87.
Dodge, “Illustrated History o f Wind Power,” 6 and Gipe, Wind Energy Comes o f Age, 103-4. Gipe
reports tliat tlie noise problem made MOD 1 the first wind project to generate national attention.
” Gipe, Wind Energy Comes o f Age, 104.
Rigliter, Wind Energy in Am erica, 175-8. The piu-chaser o f the larger turbine eventually got it running
again; in 1994, one of the two blades came loose, sailing a hundred feet above the 250 foot tower.
” Gipe, Wind Energy Comes o f Age, 70.
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critic Ray Reece argues that the corporate influence stunted m eaningful progress.
The MOD projects illustrate the problem s with Am erican w ind energy technology
in the 1970s and 1980s. Fam iliar com panies suddenly appeared as wind experts. General
Electric built the 2 megawatt (M W ) M O D -1 m achine that failed in Boone, N orth
Carolina. Boeing got the contract to design and build the enorm ous 2.5 M W M O D -2
windmills, one o f which famously failed at M edicine Bow, W yoming. United
Technologies Corporation subsidiary, H am ilton Standard, bears responsibility for the
other W yoming failure. The respective com panies earned m ost o f the sixty m illion
dollars that taxpayers paid for the M O D -2 program . Yet for all the tim e and m oney put
into the wind program, American com panies continued to lag behind their European
counterparts. W hile Boeing, United Technologies, and General Electric all benefited
from federal investment during the energy crisis, none o f these big com panies m ade
Am erica the leader in wind technology. Paul G ipe puts a cynical spin on the Am erican
wind energy experience through the m id-eighties, arguing that Am erican policym akers
focused on research and developm ent when they should have tried m arket incentives.
As the United States poured m illions into research and developm ent after the
energy crises o f the seventies, other nations sought to rebound from the shock o f limits.
Across the Atlantic, the Danish governm ent turned to native expertise to offset
D enm ark’s woeful dependence on foreign oil. A t the time o f the OPEC embargo,
farm ing accounted for most o f this Indiana-sized country’s industry, a factor that w ould
im pact D enm ark’s rise to prominence in wind technology. Danes had a long tradition o f
using wind energy. Poul LeCour designed an electricity-generating windm ill, and the

Reece, The Sun Betrayed^ 87-8.
Gipe, Wind Energy Comes o f Age, 92.
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w orld’s first wind pow er plant came on line by 1920.^* Danish farm ers turned to the
breezes during W orld W ar II by constructing w indm ills based on L eC our’s m achines.
In the postwar years, two leaders em erged from Europe. German scientist U lrich
H utter relied on the m ost modern equipm ent available to pow er the largest turbines he
could design. Mutter’s huge, two-bladed m achines topped 100 feet in diam eter. The
G erm an’s success would lead countless other engineers into a futile chase to replicate his
success h alf a century later.^^ In Denm ark, Johannes Juul created a revolutionary design.
Stressing a common-sense, empirical approach, Juul first experim ented with tw o- then
four-bladed windmills. Ultim ately concluding that three blades would w ork best, Juul
built an inexpensive prototype. Juul built the G edser mill, forerunner o f virtually every
successful, three-bladed design in use today. U nlike those nations that sank m illions into
high-tech research, Juul and his com patriots enlisted a bottom -up approach that
emphasized durability and modesty.
The partnership between D enm ark’s governm ent and industry also explains
Danish success. Danish agriculture provided a vital m arket for wind energy technology
in the late 1970s. Operating through cooperatives, farm ers banded together to raise the
necessary capital for generating wind electricity. By the m id-nineties over a quarter o f a
m illion Danes owned som e interest in a windmill co-op.*’® The central governm ent
played an important role, too, by providing capital subsidies and perform ance incentives.
The landmark Windmill Law requires D anish utilities to purchase electricity from

Ibid., 53.
Ibid., 77-80. Wlien NASA started its work on the wind twbines in the 1970s, they purchased Mutter’s
blueprints. Tlie success o f the MOD program indicates Mutter’s complexity and genius: Mutter’s twobladed macliine ran for 12 years for a total o f 4,200 hours, far longer than most o f the MOD turbines.
^ Ibid., 59.
59
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windm ills at eighty-five percent o f the price that consum ers pay.^' In this way, the
Danish governm ent provides an incentive based on energy output, rather than enticing
consum ers to purchase wind-powered equipm ent. Denm ark also provides grants and
loans tied to projects undertaken in other countries. The Danish International
Developm ent Agency allows generous payback periods for purchasing D anish equipm ent
o r the cost o f setting up Danish-owned m anufacturing facilities. D enm ark’s relationship
with India proves the success o f the program . The export assistance regulations sparked
interest in India during the 1990s, while sim ultaneously keeping D enm ark’s position as a
leader in the international wind industry.*^^

American Responses to Crisis
In the US, California took the lead as the biggest prom oter o f wind energy
technology. G overnor Jerry Brown created th e O ffice o f A ppropriate Technology (O A T)
in 1976. W orking with the California E nergy Com m ission (CEC), itself established as a
result o f the OPEC oil embargo, OAT set th e stage for wind energy’s boom in the
1980s.^^ Using funds from the M ello Act o f 1978, a California law m andating
investm ent in wind energy, the CEC set about m apping the state’s wind potential. W hile
other states provided tax incentives sim ilar to California’s, none allocated m oney to
provide data for potential wind sites.^'*
The state also enticed investment by w orking with federal legislation. The

Louise Guey-Lee, "Wind Energy Developments: Incentives in Selected Countries” (Washington: Energy
Information Administration, 1999, from website w w w .eia.gov), 6.
“ Ibid., 6-7. India quickly became the "developing” nation with the most wind capacity in tlie world and
ranks fourtli among all nations, behind Germany, the US, and Deiunark.
CEC was formed in 1974 as a result of pressure from the anti-nuclear power wing o f tire California
legislature. See Williams, Energy and the Making o f M odern California, 311, 322-4.
^ Righter, Wind Energy in America, 204-7.
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National Energy Tax Act o f 1978, one o f five laws in the landm ark N ational E nergy Act,
allowed investors to write o ff one quarter o f a wind system ’s cost.®^ California allow ed
another twenty-five percent for non-residential system s, clearly hoping to spur
investm ent in large-scale wind pow er plants. Taken together, state and federal tax breaks
allowed investors to write o ff h alf a wind system ’s cost. All the encouragem ent led to a
transform ation o f California’s landscape. B y the m id-eighties, over tw elve thousand
w indm ills graced California’s golden hillsides, generating over 900 M W o f electricity.
At the height o f the wind rush, Danish turbines flourished; in 1985 over half the
windmills installed in the United States cam e from D anish companies.^^ C alifornia’s
leadership allowed the state to lead the nation in w ind energy production, despite it being
only the seventeenth best state in term s o f w ind potential .
Despite its trem endous resources, the US has fum bled its advantages away. In
1997, Germany wrested the lead from America: the Germ ans had installed a generating
capacity o f over six thousand MW, while the US stood at about h alf that.^^ B y O ctober
14, 2002, Germany had cem ented its role as w orld leader with over 10,500 M W installed
c a p a c i t y . T h e US governm ent released a study in 1998 that shows the breezes that blow
across the nation could provide 10,777 billion kW h o f electricity every year, far
surpassing the capabilities in Denm ark and Germany. In the sam e year o f the report, the

The National Energy Act, Printed at the Request o f the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
(Waslungton, DC; Govenunent Printing Office, January 1979), 540-7.
“ Righter, Wind Energy in Am erica, 215.
Ibid., 218. Tlie CEC reported in 1993 that 43% o f the turbines in Califoniia were Danish. See Gipe,
Wind Energy Comes o f A ge, 36.
^ Cluistine Real de Azua, “The Future o f Wind Energy,” 14 Tulane Environmental Law Journal, 485
(2001), 507.
® Ibid., 506.
“Gennan Wind Market up 35 pct/yr,” Reuters N ew s Service, October 14, 2002, from tlie website
www.planetark.org. Wliile Gennany holds the global lead, Deiunark provides most o f the hardware; tliat
explains my emphasis on the latter nation in tliis chapter.
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US consumed 3,629 billion kWh o f e l e c t r i c i t y W i t h all o f this potential, w hy has the
country not pursued cheap, w ind-generated pow er? Since President C arter’s 1978
National Energy Act, three characteristics have em erged that help explain A m erica’s
reluctance to embrace wind energy; resistance from utilities; environm entalist opposition
based on aesthetics and avian m ortality; and allegations that wind energy prohibits
econom ic stability.
The most significant act o f the five-part National Energy Act also caused the most
controversy. The Public Utility R egulatory P olicies Act (PU RPA ) includes a provision
that requires utilities to purchase pow er generated from an independent, “qualifying”
facilities (QF).^^ Congress intended to break th e stranglehold that utilities had over
energy by allowing diverse sources to contribute to the nation’s energy supply. The
legislature also knew it had to figure out how much these qualifying facilities could
charge utilities, which fought PU RPA regulations strenuously. Political com prom ise
eventually produced a workable solution. T he Federal Energy Regulatory Com m ission
(FERC) established the way utilities interconnected with independent producers as well
as advise state regulatory com m issions on the rates that QFs could charge utilities, known
as “avoided cost,” the rates equated to the am ount a utility w ould have paid for energy
produced elsewhere.^^ Utilities fought these provisions, arguing that such high costs
would m ake basic energy unaffordable. W hen pow er companies w ere not instigating
legal action, they were cheating alternative energy producers.

” Cluistine Real de Azua, “The Future o f Wind Energy,” 493.
The National Energy Act, Printed at the Request o f tlie Coninultee on Energy and Natural Resources
(Waslungton, DC; Govenunent Printing Office, January 1979), 304 (Public Law 95-617, Title II,
§210(aX2)). A “qualifying facility” falls luider several categories, the most important for independent
alternative energy is a “‘small power production facility:’” one in tlie original act could not surpass 80
megawatts but now exceeds that amount. The largest tmbines in operation today are rated at 1,65 MW.
Ibid., 305.
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Delay tactics worked for utilities. T he Suprem e Court upheld tw o separate
challenges to PURPA by the tim e the R eagan adm inistration had com e to pow er, w hile
m any investors withheld m uch-needed investm ent c a p i t a l . W i t h R eagan’s pro-utility
regulators heading FERC, oversight o f P U R P A ’s m ost progressive provision loosened
considerably, but President C arter’s last significant energy contribution, the C rude Oil
W indfall Profits Tax Act o f 1980, boosted residential and business energy tax credits and
extended those tax breaks through 1985.^^ R eag an ’s successor, George H.W . Bush,
provided a huge boost to wind energy in the Energy Policy Act o f 1992 (EPACT). The
production tax credit (PTC), extended through 2003, allows qualifying projects to take
1.5^/kW h tax credit.^^ In some cases utilities used PU RPA and the PTC to prevent wind
energy from coming on-line. In 1996, Southern California Edison convinced FERC that
the state didn’t need any m ore energy production, thus voiding contracts with w ind
energy providers.^^ Ironically, blackouts caused by insufficient energy supply plagued
the state five years later.
Utility opposition to renewable energy sources probably d idn’t come as a surprise
to most in the alternative energy industry, but wind advocates did find opposition from
what seemed a staunch ally. Citing concerns for aesthetic dim inishm ent and for undue
bird deaths, some environm entalists have challenged the spread o f wind pow er plants.
On Cape Cod, M assachusetts, the issue has grow n into a national debate. Cape W ind
Associates has proposed a $700 million project intended to develop an offshore wind

FERC V. M ississippi was decided in 1982; the Am erican P aper Institute v. Am erican Electric Power
Service Corporation decision came a year later.
“Legislation Affecting the Renewable Energy Marketplace,” from website
www.eia.doe.gov/cneafysolar.renewables/page/legislation/impact.litml, last visited October 6, 2003.
Ibid.
77
Cluistine de Azua, “The Future of Wind Energy,” 510.
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pow er plant three miles offshore, but opposition from R obert F. Kennedy, Jr., W alter
Cronkite, and David M cCullough has slowed the project. Along with the A lliance to
Protect Nantucket Sound and Save O ur Sound, Kennedy and his supporters appeal to
aesthetic sensibilities. Just as people are not allowed to build oil derricks in Y ellow stone
National Park, so those same energy interests should not be perm itted to sully C ape Cod
with futuristic visual pollution.’*
W ind advocates have confronted “not in my backyard” (NIM BY) argum ents
before. A decade ago, a similar struggle emerged in the desert o f Southern California.
Irked by turbines that generated noise and visual pollution. Palm Springs m ayor Sonny
B ono led an anti-wind cam paign in 1989.’^ A year later, encouraged by public opinion
polls favoring wind energy, Bono switched his position. Less publicized, but perhaps
m ore persuasive. M ayor Bono pointed to the enorm ous financial benefits o f having the
wind industry in Palm Springs.*® The fiscal argum ent has yet to convince Cape Cod
residents, but planning for the project continues.
The average windmill today stands nearly 250 feet high with blades that span
nearly 150 feet in diameter.** Grouped together, these m am m oth m achines deter birds
and other flying creatures from passing by unharm ed, a point often m ade by anti-wind
advocates. Referred to as “Cuisinarts o f the sky,” w indm ills certainly seem a m enacing
presence to we featherless humans, yet appearances can deceive. A report by the
National W ind Coordinating Com m ittee (NW CC) indicates that wind generation

Kennedy wrote an op-ed piece in the New York Times tliis past August; Cronkite appeared in a TV ad
opposing tlie project, and McCullough provided the voice in a radio spot.
Some o f these turbines were left over from the boom years of the eighties; many did not work.
Righter, Wind Energy in America, 227-34. Paul Gipe thought Bono should be praised for raising wind
energy as an issue, wliich Gipe thinks invariably helps.
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facilities kill between 10,000-40,000 birds every year, a seem ingly significant num ber.
The study also analyzes the results o f other investigations that calculate avian m ortality
rates from vehicles, airplanes, buildings and houses, as well as other bird killers.
Researchers disagree about exact numbers, but the range o f deaths caused by non
windmill structures far exceeds that o f birds killed by turbines. As far as danger to avian
species go, bird feeders cause more deaths than windmills; the NW CC cites a study that
found an average death rate o f 0.85 per house in wintertim e. M ost species in the study
w ere “passerines,” or perching songbirds, com m only seen at bird f e e d e r s . I n
comparison to other electricity-generating sources, wind pow er rem ains safer. A study in
Citrus County, Florida revealed that tw o sm okestacks killed about 500 birds per year
betw een 1982 and 1986.*^ However, the wind energy com m unity rem ains concerned
about avian mortality, especially in the A ltam ont Pass area in N orthern California, where
several endangered California condors roam the skies. A ltam ont's wind turbines kill
m ore raptors, about 250 per year, than anyw here else.*“*
Until wind energy technology becam e a profitable venture in the mid- to late1990s, a major criticism o f wind pow er centered on its unprofitability. In February, 2003
N orthw est Economic Associates wrapped up its study o f the wind energy industry .

The

group reported three case studies that offer som e insight on the econom ic im pact that

*' National Wind Coordinating Commit lee, “Avian/Wind Turbine Interaction: A Short Summary o f
Research Results and Remaining Questions,” from the website www.nationalwind.org, last visited
September 25, 2003.
National Wind Coordinating Committee, Avian Collisions with Wind Turbines: A Summary o f Existing
Studies and Comparisons o f Avian Collision M ortality in the United States, 9. From tlie website
www.nationalwind.org, last visited September 15, 2003.
Ibid., 9.
Ibid., 12-3.
Northwest Economic Associates, Assessing the Economic Developm ent Impacts o f Wind Power, prepared
for the National Wind Coordinating Committee, February 12, 2003, Located at website
www.nationalwind.org.
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recent wind development has had on the local com m unities. In M innesota, O regon, and
Texas the wind industry invested m illions o f dollars in projects designed to provide gridboosting electricity from the breezes. For M orrow and Um atilla Counties, O regon,
located in the northeastern part o f the state, th e project represented a boost to the
economy. Four people found jobs building th e thirty-eight turbines, and six m ore stayed
on with the company, Florida Pow er & Light, as m aintenance w orkers or operators. For
the tw o Oregon counties, the FPL project d id n ’t represent a major boost to the econom y,
but the installation and operation o f the new w ind park did help fill the counties’ tax
coffers by nearly $243,000.®*’
The story played out differently on th e w indsw ept plains o f M innesota and Texas.
In Lincoln County, MN, the new wind plant created thirty-nine jobs, putting over a
m illion dollars into w orkers’ pockets. The county benefited, too, gathering over
$600,000 in both 2000 and 2001. For the farm ers who feared watching their way o f life
slip away, the windmills provided a w elcom e cash infusion. Local landow ners netted a
total o f more than h alf a million dollars from the project.®^ N ear Guadalupe N ational
Park, at Delaware M ountain, Texas, thirty-six people found w ork building, operating, and
m aintaining forty new windmills. The form er mineral and oil county once had a, with a
per capita average income at fifty-five percent o f the statewide norm, yet wind farms
there allowed locals to find work.®®
In the dry country o f W est Texas, w ind energy contributes more than jobs and
income. By generating electricity from the breezes, a local power company provides
local people with energy without using the local com m unity’s most precious resource:

Ibid., ES-3-4.
Ibid., ES-2-3.
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water. Unlike fossil fuel power plants that u se thousands o f gallons per day keeping
boilers from overheating, wind energy requires only the breezes and som e m echanical
know-how. Historian Robert R ighter thinks this fact might help push w ind energy over
the hump in the trans-M ississippi W est, w here w ater has grow n increasingly scarce in the
last few years.
B y 2004, wind energy reem erged on the G reat Plains. The perspective differs
from the view taken by Pawnee leader Yellow -B ird, but certain characteristics endure.
Once a spiritual guide for grateful hunters, w ind now has a new appeal. U sing grants
from the Vermont-based NativeEnergy, the R osebud Sioux Tribe in South D akota
launched a major wind project in 2003. W ith a generating capacity o f 10 M W , the
“Rosebud Sioux Tribe St. Francis Wind Farm ” generates enough electricity for nearly
tw o hundred homes annually.^^ The project replaces earth-warm ing gases like carbon
dioxide and sulphur generated when burning fossil fuels with no em issions and dozens o f
new jobs. By reinvesting in the wind, the R osebud Sioux also pay hom age to a lasting
legacy o f the Great Plains.

90

Ibid., ES-4-5.
Interview with Robert Righter, September 26, 2003; notes in author’s possession.
Http://www.nativeenergy.coin/wind-farms.html, last visited May 11, 2004,
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Chapter 5

Ready fo r Prime Time? VoteSolaris Role in America's Energy Transition

In the 1970s policy m akers faced tough questions about the constant state o f
energy crisis in the United States. For answ ers, pundits alluded to m etaphorical bridges.
Using fossil fuels wisely today, the logic ran, w e can buy tim e for technologies that w ill
solve our economic and environm ental energy problem s. Solar expert Denis Hayes said
that “(o)il and natural gas are our principal m eans o f bridging today with tomorrow, and
we are burning our bridges.” ' “Soft energy” advocate A m ory Lovins asked w hether w e
had the tim e to pursue fossil and renewable sources contemporaneously. “Some people
think we can use oil and gas to bridge to a coal and fission econom y, then use that later, if
we wish, to bridge to sim ilarly costly technologies in the hazy future.” For Lovins, the
future could not wait. “W hat if the bridge w e are on now is the last one?”^
In an effort to m ake the difficult transition from fossils to renewables go m ore
smoothly, the Solar Energy Research Institute (forerunner o f the National Renewable
Energy Lab) published several informational guides. Am ong them was a piece by
attorney Sharon Stanton W hite, a m unicipal bond expert who practiced law in San
Francisco. W hite’s contribution was part o f S E R I’s “Legal Reconnaissance Papers,” a
series o f publications designed to aid the com m ercialization o f alternative energy
technologies. Published in 1979, W hite’s m anual, “M unicipal Bond Financing o f Solar

' Ray Reece, The Sun Betrayed: A Report on the Corporate Seizure o f U.S. Solar Energy Development
(Boston: South End Press, 1979), 192.
^ Amory B. Lovins, “Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 55, no.l (October
1976), 65-96, 96.
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Energy Facilities,” states that the “long-term outlook for the future prices and supplies o f
our traditional energy sources has forced us to begin to consider other potential energy
sources.”^ W hite detailed how revenue bonds could finance city renew able energy
projects. Distinguished from taxpayer-supported financing, paym ent for revenue bonds
came from the “users or beneficiaries o f th e im provem ent, rather than the taxpayer.”'*
At the time her study was published, the United States was in the m idst o f an
energy crisis. Gasoline filling stations had no fuel, the nuclear reactor core at Three M ile
Island nearly experienced meltdown, and natural gas and home heating oil prices hit alltim e highs. Two years before. President C arter announced the “moral equivalent o f w ar”
on energy problems, them selves influenced by spiraling inflation, increased consum er
prices, and huge national trade deficits.^ G iven the context o f the times, the “hazy future”
Amory Lovins referred to seems understandable, yet the late 1970s also held prom ise for
solar energy. Am erica’s first and only celebration o f “Sun Day” occurred in 1978, the
same year that saw passage o f legislation th at would shape the alternative energy
community for decades. The federal budget that year included an allocation o f over five
hundred million dollars for, among other things, dem onstration projects designed to
inform and excite the public about solar energy technology.^ With several years o f
congressional backing and a vocal solar advocate in the W hite House, the nation’s solar
energy prospects appeared all but assured.
This chapter explains what happened to the alternative energy dream s o f the

^ Sharon Stanton
Municipal Bond Financing o f Solar Energy Facilities (Golden, CO; Solar Energy
Research Institute, December 1979), 1.
" Ibid., 12.
* Cranford D. Goodwin, ed.. Energy Policy in Perspective: Today's Problems, Yesterday’s Solutions
(Waslungton, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981), 556, and Martin V. Melosi, Coping with Abundance:
Energy and Environment in Industrial Am erica (N ew York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 292.
^ Reece, The Sun Betrayed, 197.
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1970s. Beginning with an overview o f federal policy since the seventies, I argue that
expectations for solar and wind technology rem ained out o f balance with actual
capabilities. Through the 1980s and early 1990s, alternative energy developm ent lagged
in the United States because it could not com pete with conventional fossil fuels. B y the
late nineties, solar and wind energy gained n ew attention. Im proved technology,
continued governm ent incentives, and a grow ing m arket all helped transform public
opinion about solar and w ind energy.
In the next section, I analyze an energy crisis within a m ore recent context. The
California electricity crisis o f 2000-01 brought energy issues back into the national
debate. W hile the global m arket, deregulation, and im proved technology helped alleviate
the energy problems o f the 1970s and 1980s, new predicam ents emerged. F or
Californians, supply-side econom ics induced state policy m akers to deregulate the
electricity market w ith disastrous results. The rolling blackouts during the sum m ers o f
2000 and 2001 presented an opportunity for solar and wind energy advocates. San
Francisco’s VoteSolar Initiative proposed a city-wide $100 million revenue bond
initiative that financed alternative energy projects for municipal buildings.
VoteSolar’s success had an impact on energy policy across the country. In the
final section, I analyze the success o f the V oteSolar Initiative and w hat such
achievem ents have m eant to energy policy throughout the US. B y dem onstrating that the
technology finally balances the expectations, the solar and wind industry has finally
shown that alternative energy can have a positive impact in the United States.
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American Alternative Energy Policy Overvietv
Even before the watershed 1973 O PEC oil em bargo, energy held the attention o f
national policy makers. President Richard N ixon faced the difficult task o f balancing
various concerns. Regulation o f fossil fuels, grow ing concerns over econom ic policy,
and popular environmental reform s all reflected the haphazard nature o f A m erica’s
energy strategy. The three major fossil resources each had different regulations
administered by various agencies. N uclear energy had its own governm ent overseers,
and alternative energy technologies had program s in a variety o f governm ent bodies. The
Clean Air Act o f 1970 and the Environm ental Protection Agency, form ed in the sam e
year, signaled a serious federal effort to control industrial pollution. W ith pressure from
the W atergate break-in mounting and threats o f em bargo com ing from the M iddle East,
N ixon announced an ambitious program designed to free the US from its overdependence
on foreign energy sources. “Project Independence” called on the nation “to meet
Am erica’s own energy needs from A m erica’s own energy resources” by 1980.^ A key
part o f N ixon’s plan was stream lining federal energy policy.
Project Independence appeared amid an era when energy policy was anything but
cohesive, even within specific industries. B y 1970 the natural gas industry w as in
disarray. The 1938 Natural Gas Act continued to place federal regulators in control over
gas that traveled across state boundaries, yet for gas that remained in-state, a different set
o f rules applied.* The effect o f federal regulation was to shield gas consum ers from the
m arket forces, unlike state rules. Gas com panies had little incentive to sell gas across

^ Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, Executive E nergy Documents, Printed
at tlie Request o f Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, (Washington. Govenunent Printing Office, July 1978), 86.
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state lines, leading to a serious shortage by the early seventies.
The oil industry likewise suffered from incohesive federal regulation. The US
began the M andatory Oil Import Program (M O IP ) in 1959 as a protectionary m easure
designed to bring the high cost o f dom estic oil into balance with cheaper foreign
petroleum.^ Regulators limited the am ount o f im ports, which forced consum ers to pay
m ore for oil in general.

Prior to the em bargo. President Nixon planned to m odify M O IP

by increasing import quotas over time. In 1970, the US used petroleum for nearly h a lf o f
its total energy consumption, and the high dom estic prices led to inflation. N ixon’s
controlled incoming petroleum as a way to ease the US into global m arket realities and to
counter inflation, but the quota system had the opposite effect. “ Cheap oil continued to
flood the market, leading Nixon to im pose his Econom ic Stabilization Program , a fourphase policy that added to federal regulatory inconsistency. In the program ’s fourth
phase, instituted in 1973, the governm ent se t tw o different prices for oil, one for “old”
and a lower price for “new.” Producers had little incentive to produce new petroleum ,
even though a cold w inter saw demand for hom e heating oil rise dramatically.*^
As the federal energy policy cam e to a virtual halt during the W atergate crisis,
Am erican energy consumption did not change dramatically. Between 1972 and 1973,
national use rose four percent; the next year, consum ption fell just tw o percent.*^ Even
though the OPEC embargo ended in the spring o f 1974, Am ericans feared that cheap

* In 1954, tlte Phillips Petroleum Company v. Wisconsin decision by the Supreme Court held tliat federal
regulators in fact liad authority to set prices on gas that entered “interstate commerce,” or traveling across
state lines. See M elosi, Coping with Abundance, 262-4 and Goodwin, Energy Policy in Perspective, 261-5.
®M elosi, Coping with Abundance, 260.
Some experts argue tliat tliis policy led to the rise in inflation that occurred in the late sixties and into tlie
seventies.
" M elosi, Coping with Abundance, 283.
Ibid., 284.
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im ported oil w as a thing o f the past. The crisis atm osphere served as a catalyst for
stream lining federal policy adm inistrative bodies as well as for boosting alternative
energy research and development budgets.
One effect o f the 1973 OPEC oil em bargo w as to spur an interest in alternative
energy. W hen solar energy began attracting attention from W ashington, no single agency
w as in charge o f implementing policy, several were. N ixon first charged the National
Science Foundation with developing solar technology, a task the N SF undertook until late
1973. Nixon then placed the Atom ic E nergy C om m ission’s D ixie Ray in charge o f the
solar budget. Ray likened solar energy to a “ flea on the back o f the nuclear elephant,”
which alienated many in the research and developm ent community. She quickly fell out
o f favor and handed control over to the new ly created Solar Energy Task Force.
President Ford attempted to consolidate alternative energy policy further still when he
established both the Energy Research and D evelopm ent Administration (ERDA, 1975)
and the Solar Energy Research Institute (SERI, 1975). These agencies eventually folded
into President C arter’s Departm ent o f Energy, created in 1978.*^
In terms o f legislation and funding, the post-Nixon era made significant progress
even w ithout relying on the ambitious Project Independence.*^ The 93^** Congress, which
served from 1973-4, passed seven bills related to solar energy.'^ Four years later.
Congress worked with A m erica’s first (and only) pro-solar president, Jimmy Carter, to

Department o f Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Energy Consumption by Sector, 19492002^ Annual Energy Review 2002, accessed at website w w w .eia.doe.gov.
Donald Beattie, ed.. H istory and Overx’iew o f Solar H eat Technology, (Cambridge, MA; Tlie MIT Press,
1996), 31-4.
Ibid., 55-9, 97-100.
Ibid., 138.
Beattie, H istory and (Overview, 45.
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produce 15 related to the solar industry.** O n M ay 3, 1978, the nation celebrated Sun
D ay Dem onstration projects flooded the W ashington Mall, and President C arter
promised to make solar energy “a cornerstone o f this nation’s energy policy.” *^
Certainly, the 1970s stands out as a banner decade for federal funding o f solar energy.
Throughout the decade, policym akers assum ed that simply pouring money into research
and developm ent projects would som ehow change the way Am ericans would get their
energy. The public m ade the same m istake.
Amid the whirlwind o f agencies, th e path to a solar society was hard to find. The
hodge-podge nature o f adm inistering R& D m oney echoes the unclear goals associated
w ith such projects. W hile we can look back to the C arter years with a degree o f
sentimentality, the record shows that a lot o f money produced little in the w ay o f cheap
technology. As governm ent insider Donald B eattie points out, though, solar energy met a
hostile crow d o f bureaucrats almost from the start. Many foresaw the difficulties o f
implementing an unready technology into an enthusiastic marketplace.^” In fact, m ost o f
the ftmding eventually w ent to larger corporations that already had relationships with
other sectors o f the governm ent, particularly the Defense Departm ent. A rthur Allen
reports that some fam iliar names received som e early funding; General Electric w on a
$2.8 million award, and M artin M arietta got $3.5 in the mid-seventies. In a move
rem iniscent o f the auto industry’s post-W W II chicanery, oil com panies lined up to buy
patents on solar panels in order to rem ove a threat.^’ Because the R&D funding was

Ronald W. Larson and Ronald E. West, eds.. Implementation ofS oiar Thermal Technology (Cambridge,
MA: Tlie MIT Press, 1996), 96.
Quoted in Ray Reece, The Sun Betrayed: A R eport on the Corporate Seizure o f U.S. Solar Energy
D evelopm ent (fiosioiv. South End Press, 1979), 195.
Ibid., 1-2.
Artliur Allen, “Prodigal Sun," M other Jones, Jime/July 2000.
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never tied to market applications, the ideas th at cam e from the effort never im pacted the
Am erican energy situation.
Solar and wind technology could not deliver on the prom ises made in the late
seventies and early eighties by policym akers. In 1978, Congress passed the Solar
Photovoltaic Energy, Research, D evelopm ent and D em onstration Act that com m itted
$1.2 billion over ten years to help m ake photovoltaics more efficient and com petitive
with fossil f u e l s . T h e sam e year, the federal governm ent began a photovoltaic
commercialization program that installed PV units on federal facilities, and in 1980, the
Crude Oil Profit Windfall Tax increased tax credits for residential PV applications to
forty percent and extending the credits to the end o f 1985.^^ By 1984, the price per watt
o f PV energy fell to less than ten dollars, and efficiency rates increased to nearly ten
p e r c e n t.A lth o u g h solar w ater heaters experienced a boom in the 1980s, the eighty
thousand units delivered and installed in C alifornia between 1980 and 1981 had serious
p r o b le m s .C o m p a n ie s with no expertise in solar technology suddenly appeared, and
unsuspecting consumers fell prey to charlatans. The once positive public im age o f solar
energy suffered due to the criticisms o f scams.

The wind energy industry also benefited

from state (particularly California) and federal legislation, and by 1985, California
installed nearly one thousand megawatts.^^ Unfortunately, the technology designed to
reap the benefits o f the wind also experienced problems, and in 1988 wind energy

Tlie monetary figure is translated to 2002 dollars.
^ Energy Infonnation Administration, Department o f Energy, "Photovoltaic M ilestones,” last modified
March 7, 2003, accessed at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaiysolar.renewables/renewable energy.ammal/backgmd/cliapl li.htm.
Ibid.
James C. Williams, Energy and the M aking o f M odern California, (Akron: University o f Akron Press,
1997), 337.
Ibid., 336.
^’Robert Righter, Wind Energy in America: A ///.story (Norman: University o f Oklalioma Press, 1996), 215.
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companies removed a significant num ber o f windmills.^* W hile som e new turbines
replaced the faulty models, the public im age o f wind energy suffered.
The second category that explains th e failed policies o f the 1970s revolves around
tax incentives, A prominent part o f President C arter’s declaration o f the “m oral
equivalent o f war” was the Energy Tax Act o f 1978, One o f the five pillars that
supported the pathbreaking National E nergy Act, the ETA allowed taxpayers to w rite o ff
up to 50% o f the cost o f a solar or wind equipm ent purchase.

Aside from the accurate

criticism that such a tax policy mainly benefited the wealthy,^” the incentives fall under
scrutiny for their goals. Rather than increase national production o f solar energy, the tax
breaks instead rewarded consumption. E xpert D onald Beattie astutely points out that the
credits “created more jobs for door-to-door salesmen than factory j o b s . W h i l e he
deem s C arter’s presidency largely as a m issed opportunity, Beattie figures that ten years
o f federal support yielded a total savings o f 1.2 billion barrels o f oil.^^ The m arket fell
out from under the solar industry in 1986. Sales o f solar w ater heaters, the m ost widely
adopted technology, fell by ninety percent th e year after the credits expired.^^
The true test for alternative energy cam e during the free market era o f the 1990s.
Renewable energy producers managed to use PU RPA to gain access to the grid, and the
1992 Energy Policy Act (EPACT) allowed even m ore alternative energy producers to
contribute to energy market. The costs for solar system s reflect their staying power; the

Energy Information Administration, Department o f Energy, "Wind Power M ilestones,” last modified
January 7, 2004, accessed at http:/Avwvv.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar.reiiewables/page/wind/wind.htinl.
^ United States Senate, The Notional Energy Act, Printed at the request of the Conunittee on Energy and
Natural Resources (Wasliinglon: Govenunent Printing Office, January 1979), Publication 96-1, 521.
^ Larson, Implementation, 89.
Beattie, H istory and 0\>er\>iew, 232.
Ibid , 169.
Larson, Implementation, 128,
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price o f solar energy has dropped seventy-one percent in price since 1980/^ Still the free
m arket limits individual solar system s to people in developing countries, w here the costs
o f constructing huge power plants rem ain prohibitive. The entrenched nature o f fossil
and nuclear power effectively squelched any enthusiasm for solar or wind energy in the
US.

T h e California Electricity Crisis a n d th e VoteSolar Initiative
The direct inspiration for Prop B cam e in 1996, when California G overnor Pete
W ilson signed Assembly Bill (AB) 1890 into law. Also called “The Electric Utility
Industry Restructuring Act,” AB 1890 sought to open the electricity m arket for
competition by reorganizing the way the governm ent regulated the utility industry in
California. Prior to AB 1890, the California Public Utilities Com m ission (CPU C)
regulated electricity supply by dictating the am ount that pow er companies could generate,
transm it, and distribute; CPUC also determ ined retail prices amenable to both producers
and c o n s u m e r s . T o balance demand, the California Electricity Com m ission helped plan
resource consumption and pushed consum er conservation efforts. The balance o f these
and other regulatory bodies produced reliability, which was the hallm ark o f Am erican
pow er generation for a half century.
The push towards deregulation cam e increm entally after the energy crises o f the
1970s. In the seven previous decades, Am erican policym akers linked econom ic growth

Tlie Center for a New American Dream, “April 2002 Profile: David Hochschild,” arcliived at website
www.newdreain.org/bulletiii/liochscliild.html.
I use power companies and utilities interchangeably tliroughout tliis text to mean distributors who deliver
electricity to customers; I use the term “power producer” to describe entities that make electricity.
See Cliristopher Weare, The California Electricity Crisis: Causes and Policy Options (San Francisco:
Public Policy Institute of California, 2003), 19.
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with energy consum ption, which was thought to require consistent governm ent
o v e r s i g h t . F r e e market advocates continued to chafe under what they saw as
unnecessary regulations in the seventies, but law m akers did widen the scope o f Am erican
pow er suppliers. W hile the National Energy A ct o f 1978 is awash with oversight, the law
did attempt to expand the circle o f electricity generators to include those that used
alternative form s o f energy.^* Later A m erican policy widened the scope still further with
the Energy Policy Act o f 1992, which allow ed exem pt w holesale generators access to the
electricity grid.^^ Opening the m arket to independent (or, non-utility) pow er suppliers
had its intended effect in California, where by the m id-nineties, non-utilities supplied
almost a quarter o f the state’s energy needs.'*® The m arket was opening to renew able
energy sources, but uneven incentive policies and resistance to alternatives by utilities,
which still controlled over h alf the state’s pow er plants, kept solar and wind energy on
the fringes.'"
W hile legislative efforts pointed C alifornia’s electricity ship downstream , high
prices acted as a powerful current that sw ept the state tow ards deregulation. Despite
C alifornia’s exem plary conservation efforts, which m ade the state efficient econom ically
and environmentally, electricity consum ers paid higher prices than any neighboring

See Richard Rudolph and Scott Ridley. Pow er Struggle: The Hundred-Year War over E lectricity (New
York: Harper & Row, 1986) who argue tliat the tension between public and private interests led to
compromises tliat included government oversight; and M elosi, Coping with Abundance.
^ Tlie Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) forced utilities to buy electricity from qualifying
facilities.
See CliriStine Real de Azua, “The Futiu’e o f Wind Energy,” 14 Tulane Environmental Law Journal 485
(2001), 497-507, who points out that the wind industry may not have survived the nineties without EPACT.
^ California Energy Commission. “Total California Electricity Generation” (from website
http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity, last visited October 13, 2003).
Weare, The California Electricity Crisis, 8-10.
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state.'*^ Free market advocates claimed vertical integration w as the culprit: utilities
owned power plants that generated electricity, the transm ission lines that criss-crossed the
state, and the ability to distribute the pow er to consum ers. Despite this stability, prices
clim bed ever higher.
Pressure on the state’s law m akers finally succeeded in creating change. W hen
Governor W ilson signed AB 1890 in late Septem ber 1996, many around the state thought
the time had finally come for a fair, free m arket that would produce cheap pow er for all.
The legislation called for a brief period o f oversight, to allow the three m ajor utilities
tim e to adjust, followed by com petition based on the free m arket. Utilities gave up
control over the transm ission lines they ow ned to ensure fair competition; the
Independent System Operator, a centralized state agency, would ensure equal access to
the grid from all producers. The Pow er Exchange served as the open m arket for
electricity, where generators would sell pow er to distributors acting on the orders o f
presumably informed consumers. The hope w as that com petition am ong different pow er
producers would drive prices downward.'*^ T he reality was that no one in 1996 could
foresee all that would befall California in 2000 and 2001.
The restructuring law operated w ithout a hitch for its first three years.
Regulations continued to protect distributing utilities and their custom ers by capping
wholesale and retail prices, while electricity supplies seem ed ample enough to keep up
w ith demand. Once the market opened, California would experience a harsh reality o f

Ibid., 7-8. The Department o f Energy’s Distributed Energy Resources (DER) website figures tliat in
1996, California ranked tenth in the states with the liighest electricity prices. See
www.eere.energy.gov/der. Cliris Weare points out that Californians need only 0.22 kWli for every dollar
earned, wliile tlie national average is 0.40 kWli/ dollar; Weare also notes that residents use only 6,400 kWli
per resident per year; the national average is 11,900.
James C. Williams, "Strictly Business: Notes on Deregulating Electricity,” Technology and Culture vol.
42.3, 2001, 626-30.
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the electricity industry. D uring tim es o f increased demand, supplies don’t alw ays keep
up, no m atter how much money pow er producers could make. Slow lag tim es exist
between state approval for power plants and actual energy production, and the hostile
approach that the pow er industry took tow ard renewables continued. About the tim e AB
1890 becam e law, a leading utility. Southern C alifornia Edison (SCB), convinced a court
that the state had ample pow er supplies, thus voiding long-term supply contracts with a
wind energy producer.'*'* Just as full deregulation w as to kick in, three major
developments caused California’s electricity dem and to reach untenable levels. First, the
state imported much o f its electricity from neighboring states, but drought again struck
the region during the w inter o f 1999-2000 reducing the capacity o f vital hydroelectric
dams. The W est also experienced a population boom , which translated into a spike in
demand for power outside California, and m any states that had previously exported
pow er instead re-directed electricity supplies to meet the needs o f their own burgeoning
population.'*^ Finally, most o f C alifornia’s pow er plants ran on natural gas, but a nation
wide shortage o f the fuel prevented supplies from getting to generators.'*^
California entered the deregulation w ilderness just as howls for electricity
reverberated throughout the West. AB 1890 contributed to the energy crisis in tw o major
ways. First, the law forced utilities to purchase electricity on the open market. The idea
was to allow consumers to choose their electricity providers; law m akers hoped that the
com petition to provide inexpensive (even renew able) power would keep costs low. This

Azua, “The Future o f Wind Energy,” 510. SCE convinced FERC that the low bids from independent
producers exceeded the utility’s avoided costs, a violation o f PURPA. Azua’s conclusion seems
appropriate: “Legislation tliat was intended to encourage the use of renewable energy was, ironically, being
used to throttle...renewables.”
Weare, The California Electricity Crisis, 19-23. Enough time liad passed since utilities trimmed tlieir
energy conservation programs to add to the demand, as well.
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m arket approach worked effectively for the first couple years o f its existence, but in
2000, wholesale prices unexpectedly skyrocketed by 270% over the previous year.'*’
Utility restructuring not only forced utilities to operate in this volatile setting, the
wholesale market itself cam e under siege by the pow er generating industry. Som e energy
experts argue that companies willfully w ithheld electricity by taking plants off-line by
shutting them down for maintenance at critical times.'** The shortage often w orked to the
advantage o f producing com panies because the higher prices benefited all sellers, even
those that owned relatively few plants. P ow er generators defend the plant shut-dow ns by
pointing to the unusually high demand o f th e preceding winter, which w as drier and
warm er than was typical.'*^
Faulty oversight also contributed to energy shortages. An inherent benefit o f AB
1890, deregulation, ironically caused confusion am ong the governm ent agencies charged
with implementing and overseeing the law. The agency responsible for reducing
demand, the California Energy Com m ission, saw m any o f its innovative energy-saving
program s fade into the background as other state and federal regulators allowed utilities
to slash their conservation budgets. The U nion o f Concerned Scientists reports that the
halted programs translated into an increased dem and o f nearly 1,800 m egaw atts (M W ) o f
pow er at a time when supplies becam e s c a r c e . T h e California Public Utilities

Ibid., 28-32. In addition, natural gas prices rose thanks to an explosion at an El Paso Co. pipeline in late
summer 2000 tliat disrupted supplies by 15% going into the winter.
Energy Infonnation Administration, "The Califoniia Electricity Crisis; Subsequent Events - California’s
Energy Crisis” (from the website www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/eIectricity/california/subsequentevents.htinI, last
accessed October 16, 2003).
P.L. Joskow, California's Electricity Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute o f Tecluiology,
2001) and P.L. Joskow and E. Kalui, Identifying the Exercise o f M arket Power: Refining the Estim ates
(Cambridge, MA, 2001).
Weare, The California Electricity Crisis, 33-4.
Union o f Concerned Scientists, "California Energy Crisis: Causes and Solutions,” from tlie website
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/renewable_cnergy/page.cfm?pagelD=68, last visited July 28, 2003.
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Com mission, in charge o f ensuring that utilities com peted for pow er among various
suppliers, also forced power companies to buy electricity on the w holesale m arket, rather
than allow long-term contracts. The CPUC incorrectly assum ed that supplies w ould
remain constant through deregulation’s first few years and that projects slated to com e
online in 2002 and after would help meet dem and concerns.^* U nfortunately for
consum ers and utilities, ensuring fair com petition overrode concerns for potential
demand increases; the Com m ission’s adherence to its long-term contract preclusion
forced utilities into an unfam iliar and highly volatile market.
W hile regulators failed to anticipate the m ajor problem s o f demand spikes,
utilities bear some responsibility for the crisis, too. During the sum m er o f 2000, pow er
com panies utilized only half o f the available long-term supply c o n t r a c t s . A B 1890
charged the Federal Energy Regulatory C om m ission with overseeing the wholesale
marketplace. FERC officials had long supported a free m arket setting, and hesitated to
act quickly when wholesale prices skyrocketed. Had FERC capped wholesale prices in
the crisis’s early days, California’s current financial outlook may not look so bleak.^'*
F E R C ’s reluctance to interfere with the open m arket has certain philosophical merit, but
in reality, market manipulation was ram pant. As prices soared ever higher, generating
com panies like Enron raked in huge profits. One report notes that the scandal-ridden
corporation made over $20 million in a single day on several occasions.
Governm ent agencies and private com panies bear some responsibility for

** Weare, The California Electricity Crisis, 38-9. Supplies actually were stable from 1998-2000.
CPUC figured tliat allowing long-term contracts would contravene the point o f AB 1890, which was
competition.
Weare, The California Electricity Crisis, 44.
Ibid., 45-6.
Richard A. Oppel, Jr., "Report Voices Suspicion on Energy Crisis,” August 14, 2002 from a Reuters
N ew s Service report disseminated by www.planetark.org on August 15, 2002.
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exacerbating a crisis situation, but California law m akers did nothing to salvage this
difficult situation. Crisis expert Jam es Sw eeney argues that G overnor Gray D avis had an
opportunity to respond to certain m arket flaws, yet Davis instead blamed the problem on
market manipulation and unresponsive federal r e g u l a t o r s . T o an extent, D avis w as
right. State lawmakers had no authority to cap w holesale prices; AB 1890 left w holesale
m arket regulation to FERC, a federal agency. Y et the state legislature placed enorm ous
pressure on utilities by capping the rates they could charge retail customers. By forcing
distributors to buy pow er on the wildly fluctuating w holesale market and capping the
amount end-users had to pay, lawmakers forced utilities to operate at a potential loss if
wholesale prices exceeded retail limits.^^ W hen the crisis reached full-blown, rolling
blackout status, the state intervened to becom e a participant in the electricity m arket.
Davis authorized expensive, long-term contracts that put the state on the road to its
current financial crisis. In the midst o f an econom ic downturn, California m ust now
figure out how to finance its $42 billion contractual obligations.^®
N ot all o f the repercussions from the rolling blackouts were negative. In San
Francisco, a nonprofit organization, VoteSolar, turned the electricity crisis into an
opportunity. Solar technology would form the centerpiece o f the group’s agenda, which
was to organize a ballot measure designed to m ake San Francisco a leading consum er o f
solar energy. Proposition B, a $100 million dollar bond initiative, went from idea to the
ballot box in a m atter o f ten months. The success o f the vote would spill over into sim ilar

^ James L. Sweeney, The California Electricity C risis (Stanford, CA; Hoover Institution Press, 2002).
Sweeney defends utilities, wliich he says were placed in a bind by being forced to buy electricity on tlie
wholesale market and sell tliat power on a retail level at a loss: D avis’s position, tliat generators willfully
witlilield supplies, lias gained merit since several lawsuits have revealed a level o f trutli to the former
governor’s assertion.
Weare, The California Electricity Crisis, 38-40.
Ibid., 55.
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efforts organized elsewhere. At the heart o f the V oteSolar Initiative lay a dedicated
group o f advocates who took advantage o f an opportunity to implement the latest solar
technology through democratic means. V oteS olar’s response to the electricity crisis
began with the campaign to pass Proposition B, and the Initiative’s w ork continues to
im pact communities around the country. H ere I cover V oteSolar’s cam paign for Prop B
in three phases; the movement to get the initiative on the ballot; the actual cam paign; and
m omentum into other work.
David Hochschild came up with th e idea for VoteSolar while he was part o f San
Francisco’s parks department. As an expert on the city’s parks bond process, H ochschild
had an intimate knowledge about how this form o f financing operated, H ochschild ran
the numbers and discovered that a bond initiative could pay for a massive overhaul o f
San Francisco’s electricity infrastructure. D ifficulties lay ahead for the new group, but
VoteSolar figured it could achieve its goal to place an initiative on the ballot in ten short
m onths by dealing with two realities. First, the group learned that a adding a new
transmission line to the city’s sole line w ould cost $100 million. Such a project would
still leave San Francisco at the mercy o f a distant, volatile m a r k e t . B y using “fog maps”
created by the San Francisco Public U tilities Com m ission, VoteSolar made an im portant
discovery. Despite its foggy reputation, San Francisco receives a lot o f sunshine.^® The
eastern part o f the city actually gets about ninety percent o f the solar radiation as the sun
drenched Central Valley.^' This potential translated into a major selling point: people

At least one power plant existed near to San Francisco, called Hunter’s Point Power Plant, but the city
got tlie majority o f its electricity from elsewhere. In periods o f high demand, customers who sat closer to
sources tend to get power first, hence San Francisco was at the mercy o f the market.
Tlie fog map is available on the internet at www.soIarcat.com/sfsolar/main.htin.
Kendra Mayfield, ‘“ Fog City’ Catches a Few Rays,” W ired magazine, January 7, 2003 from the website
www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,57046,00.hlm l. See also Karina Garbesi and Emily
Bartholomew, “The Potential for Solar Electricity Generation in San Francisco; A Report to the
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love solar power. As Hochschild said, “(w )e could position solar energy as a w indow o f
opportunity to build San Francisco’s energy independence in a way that fights global
warm ing rather than w orsens it.”^^
Proposition B cam e together as a bond initiative quickly. That such a m easure
took place at all reveals an anom alous quality about San Francisco; w hereas m ost cities
issue city-im provement bonds through an internal process at city hall, San Francisco
requires voter approval for such im provem ents. Getting such an initiative onto the ballot
can occur in one o f three ways in San Francisco: the m ayor make the proposal; advocates
can gather the requisite num ber o f signatures in support; or the Board o f Supervisors can
approve a measure.^^ For VoteSolar, the idea for solar pow er had a strong advocate in
M ark Leno, a member o f the Board o f Supervisors. Leno encouraged Hochschild to
prove the fiscal soundness o f the project and eventually introduced the measure to the
Board
VoteSolar again proved up to the challenge. By requesting a $100 million, the
group promised to deliver solar energy that could pay for itself. Yet electricity gathered
from rooftop photovoltaic (PV) panels rem ained an expensive alternative: San Francisco
paid between 5.50-90 per kilowatt hour (kW h) o f natural gas-generated power in 2001,
compared to 180/kWh for solar.*’'* In term s o f the costs for installed capacity, solar panels
cost about $5.50 per watt, a num ber that continues to put PV panels out o f reach for most

Environmental Law and Justice Clinic o f Golden Gate University Law School,” June 1, 2001, from website
www.califbmiasolarcenter.org/pdls/SFPV.pdf.
“ David Hoclischild interview with the Center for a N ew American Dream,
www.newdream.org/bulletin/liochschild.html, last visited October 20, 2003.
David Hochschild interview with author, Jime 17, 2003. Notes in autlior’s possession. Tlie requisite
number can be either 10,000 signatures or 5% of voters participating in the most previous election.
^ Jane Kay, ”SF Could be Leader on Solar Energy: Props. B and H being backed by businesses and
environmentalists alike,” San Francisco Chronicle, Saturday October 27, 2001, found at newspaper
arcliives at www.sfgate.com.
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c o n s u m e rs .U n d e te rre d , VoteSolar struck upon the idea o f “bundling” solar energy
with cheaper wind pow er and cost-effective energy efficiency m easures; this process
yields tw o key benefits. First, cities have the ability to raise the am ount o f m oney needed
to make such investments. Next, tying solar electricity to other econom ically viable, if
less sexy, alternatives brings the overall cost o f the technology down.^^ The budget
analysis figures presented to the B oard in m id-July assum ed a very conservative 20 year
payback period.®^
W hile the Board o f Supervisors approved the bond initiative for the ballot, the
campaign for Prop B still had a long way to go. Still VoteSolar had a lot going for it.
Rolling blackouts hit California hard that sum m er, m aking energy a front burner issue
with voters. The crisis proved critical for raising awareness, but the key to the
cam paign’s success was its ability to offer a viable alternative. Although a mere one
hundred days stood between the B oard’s approval o f the bond initiative and the election,
VoteSolar managed to rally a diverse group o f San Franciscans to its cause. Opposite
ends o f the political spectrum endorsed the proposal, prom pting H ochschild to wonder
“where else you would find the Cham ber o f Com m erce agreeing with the San Francisco
L abor Council?”^* Help cam e in other ways, too; V oteSolar’s Charlene Garland points to
the 200 volunteers who hung signs, knocked on doors, and manned the phone banks,
which coincidentally helped raise $100,000 for the effort. One volunteer, a well-known

San Francisco Board of Supervisors, "Proposed Solar Bond Initiative: Illustrative Bundle o f Projects:
$100 Million Revenue Financing,” 1. Hochschild tliinks this number must fall to about $1.50/watt for solar
to compete witlt fossils.
^ Hochschild interview, June 17, 2tX)3.
“Proposed Solar Bond Initiative,” 1. The proposal sets aside money in an interest-bearing account
calculated to cover the costs o f debt service tlirough the course o f the bond’s repayment.
®Ibid.
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graphie designer, even came up with the cam paign’s image.
N ot everyone embraced V oteSolar’ s m essage. Hochschild took his m essage to
the Republican County Central Com m ittee, a group o f 16 m em bers charged with charting
the course taken by the Bay Area GOP. D ressed in his most conservative suit, the
V oteSolar founder headed o ff to argue his case before the committee. Stressing the fiscal
soundness o f the bond, Hochschild m anaged to persuade four members that his idea w as
a good one, a decent showing given the frosty audience.^® Later, Hochschild took his
message to television. In a debate shown on public access TV, Hochschild sparred with
form er B oard Supervisor John Bartis, w hose argum ent centered on the general fiscal risks
he believed inherent in bond initiatives. W hile television exposure helped V oteSolar’s
cause, it didn’t compare to what followed. Sensing that their message would resonate
with the public, VoteSolar’s opponents funded an advertisem ent arguing against the
initiative. The ad backfired. San Franciscans reacted with resounding support for the
measure. Hochschild figures the response to the single opposition ad translated into forty
to fifty pro-Prop B ads.’ *
W hile the solar message added a certain allure to Prop B, the cam paign itself
consisted o f four key components. First, the issues that resonated with voters tended to
center on air quality. Polling data revealed that people in the Bay Area attached m ore
im portance to local air quality than greenhouse gas emissions generally.” VoteSolar
tailored its “Clean Air, Clean Energy” slogan accordingly. Next, the energy crisis raised
voter awareness. Rather than join the pundits that decried the policy blunders, V oteSolar

® Interview with Charlene Garland, February 14, 2003. Notes in author’s possession.
’“ Hochschild interview, June 17, 2003,
” Ibid.
Ibid.
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could point to a positive solution. The energy independence them e carried force, as well.
Hochschild points out that a single transm ission line serves the entire city; to build
another one would cost $100 million.^^ V oteSolar offered an energy source that didn’t
pollute or require a complicated system o f pow er lines.^'*
The fourth and perhaps the m ost innovative approach taken by the Prop B
campaign was the idea o f “bundling.” W hile the cost o f solar panels had fallen since the
last solar era o f the 1970s, PV systems rem ain out o f reach for most people. Even big
cities like San Francisco can’t afford to go solar all by itself. The bundling idea finds a
w ay around such a dilem m a through large-scale bulk p u r c h a s e s . A n o t h e r key to
m aking a project like Prop B affordable is tying expensive solar pow er to other, cheaper
alternatives. Prop B allocates $30 m illion fo r wind energy, and a mere $2 million on
energy efficiency m e a s u r e s . I r o n i c a l l y , cheaper energy efficient technologies “have a
very short payback period and are key to m aking projects cost-effective,” according to
V oteSolar co-founder Adam Browning, who estim ates that Prop B will pay for itself in a
m ere six and a half years.
Novem ber 6, 2001 found San Franciscans keen on the idea o f going solar. A
whopping 73% o f the voters turned their hopes skyward and sent a message that
continues to resonate across the nation. The momentum from the victory has spurred
VoteSolar on to grander projects. The group, which changed its name to the VoteSolar
Initiative as o f M arch 2002, has set its sights on starting sim ilar bond projects in ten

Ibid. Hochschild referred to a study undertaken by the utility Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), which is
available at its website, www.pge com.
Hochschild also noted the disadvantages o f nuclear power.
VoteSolar often refers to the “economies o f scale” theory, wlrich holds that large purchases would drive
up demand, tlms lowering costs o f supplies via competition.
’ San Francisco Board of Supervisors, “Solar Bond Illustrative Bundle o f Projects: Project Assumptions,”
July 17, 2001 from website www.votesolar.org.
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Am erican cities over the next two y ears/^ B y m ost accounts, things are going well. A
bond initiative has gathered momentum in O akland and San Diego, while oth er cities
m ay soon join the list. New York and H aw ai i are also considering statew ide solar bond
projects, a coup for the Initiative’s public im age and a testament to the group’s ability to
mend fences. The tw o governors pushing fo r solar bonds are both Republicans.
Solar and W ind E nergy in A m e ric a
It is clear to us tlmt tlie leaderslup for promoting renewable
energy is not going to come from the Wlute House or Congress.
Tlie action really is at the local level

The VoteSolar Initiative splashed onto the energy scene with an electrifying
m essage that generated enthusiastic support. Prop B presented a fresh approach to a
stagnating problem, but solar energy is nothing new in the US. Since the O PEC embargo
in 1973, the federal governm ent has poured billions into solar research and developm ent
projects. Tax incentives have cost the US even more. The efforts have not averted
A m erica’s taste for fossil fuels, and solar continues to play a limited role in the Am erican
energy supply.
Thirty years ago, enthusiasm for solar energy swept across the United States.
Everyone from politicians to off-the-grid hippies basked in the warm glow o f the sun’s
potential. Time managed to temper hopes and leave the people with several issues to
ponder. Uneven federal support for solar and wind energy ultim ately deterred growth,
but many still see a role for W ashington. Solar advocate T or Allen thinks W ashington
can provide leadership in the way o f nationw ide interconnection and net m etering rules,

” Quote from Kendra Mayfield, ‘“ Fog C ily’ Catches a Few Rays.”
Tlie VoteSolar Initiative, "The VoteSolar Initiative; A Clean Energy Movement Led by Cities,” original
publication in author’s possession.
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which would allow more people to profit from independent energy production.*® As for
funding, Allen likes V oteSolar’s approach. “T he m ore local control the better.”**
H ow ever the experts choose to view the past 30 years, one thing is certain. The
m omentum created by the VoteSolar Initiative gives us reason to hope. For me, th a t’s a
welcom e change.

David Hochschild, quoted in Dean E. Murphy, “For Solar Power, Foggy City Maps Its Bright Spots,”
N ew York Times, 24 November 2002, Section A, page 18.
Net metering refers to a two-way system o f measuring electricity flow, which would track contributions
to tlie grid; today most meters simply track the amoiuit o f electricity taken from the grid.
*' Email message from Tor Allen, July 10, 2003; original in auUior’s possession.
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C onclusion

In 1998, the US Departm ent o f E nergy celebrated a landm ark occasion by doing
w hat federal agencies have a knack for doing. It published a study. Entitled “The 25‘*’
Anniversary o f the 1973 Oil Embargo; E nergy Trends Since the First M ajor Energy
C risis,” the Energy Information A dm inistration (EIA) presented evidence o f how
Am erican energy consum ption and production reacted to w hat rem ains the m ost
significant energy challenge to date. L ittle d ata supports the argum ent that US energy
policy changed significantly since the OPEC em bargo, yet hidden among the charts and
graphs lay two important pieces o f inform ation.
The publication reveals that there rem ains a difference betw een national wants
and national needs. First, Am erican consum ption o f OPEC petroleum fell by twenty-five
percent between 1973 and 1985, show ing that the U nited States can survive, even thrive,
w ithout oil from the Persian G ulf region. * In the twelve years after the first energy crisis,
the nation raised domestic resource production, cut its dependence on foreign sources,
and vastly improved energy efficiency.^ Such evidence points to A m erica’s ability to
adapt to the realities o f resource scarcity, although the changes hardly signal a complete
shift aw ay from what are now traditional energy sources.
The study also shows that Am ericans can easily fall back into old patterns. US
petroleum consumption peaked in 1978 at nearly nineteen m illion barrels o f oil per day.

' Department o f Energy, Energy Information Administration, “The 25“' Anniversary o f the 1973 Oil
Embargo; Energy Trends Since the First Major Energy Crisis,” (Washington DC: US Dept o f Energy,
1998), 2, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov.
^ Ibid., 1-2.
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Five years later, the nation trim m ed about four m illion barrels from its consum ption
(even as the population grew at a steady rate) by building m ore efficient cars, by heating
hom es with natural gas instead o f oil, and through general energy conservation m easures.
As the global market and dom estic production filled Am erican dem and for oil, though,
the nation began consum ing at pre-1978 levels.^ The binge continued through the
twenty-fifth anniversary, so much so that by July 2002, the U S consumed forty percent
more energy than it had since 1970.'*
According to the National Energy A ct o f 1978, the Departm ent o f Energy m ust
produce an annual energy review. Four years after its assessm ent o f federal policies
since the OPEC embargo, the EIA published an overview that included detailed data not
included in the twenty-five year review. A ccording to several figures, much had changed
since the trying days o f the 1970s, but for the better.^ The rate at which Am ericans
consumed energy per dollar o f the gross dom estic product fell significantly. In 1970,
Am ericans spent nearly nineteen dollars (in 1996 term s) per every thousand B tu ’s
consumed, while in 2002, that num ber neared ten dollars.^ O ther indicators show that
A m erica’s fossil consum ption has increased to over eighty quadrillion B tu ’s, up from ju st
near seventy quadrillion in 1978.^ Another im portant figure show s that energy
consumption per person approached the all time high in 1978 and 1979, when energy use
per person stood at 360 million B tu’s; in 2002, that figure approached 338 m illion B tu ’s.*
Lost among the evidence that the US continues to consum e fossil energy at a

^ Ibid., 4.
Anders Hove, /t B rief Guide to US Energy Policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT, July 2002), 2,
* Whetlier tliis rosy picture relates to tlie different administrations remains to be seen.
®Department o f Energy, Energy Information Administration, /InmW Energy Review 2002, Figure 3,
“Energy Use per Dollar of Gross Domestic Product,” .wii.
’ Ibid, Figure 4, “Energy Consumption by Source,” xvii.
®Ibid., Figure 2, “Energy Consumption per Person,” .wii.
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rapacious rate stands encouraging figures for alternative energy. The A m erican W ind
Energy Association reports that global installations o f wind energy generating capacity
grew by twenty-eight percent in 2002.^ Shipm ents o f photovoltaic cells have also risen in
recent years as prices have fallen. In 1982, total shipm ents o f PV cells w as nearly seven
thousand kilowatts, while in 2001, that num ber rose to nearly 98,000 kilowatts.
G roups like the VoteSolar Initiative should take pride in their accom plishm ents.
Thanks to pressure from alternative energy advocates, over a dozen states have adopted
renewable energy portfolio standards (RPS), which set statutory requirem ents for the
amount o f alternative energy a state must use by a set date.** Several cities have also
committed to solar and wind energy. A ccording to V oteSolar’s David H ochschild, San
Diego has agreed to get 35 M W o f pow er from photovoltaics by 2013, while the city has
agreed to give PV projects accelerated perm itting and inspections.*^
As these and other efforts dem onstrate, hum anity can change its view o f sunshine
and the breezes. Even within the past thirty years, the shape and function o f solar and
wind technology has gone from loud disappointm ent to quiet success. Past experiences
have a tendency to mute grand proclam ations o f an energy future powered by the tw o
renewable resources, yet optim ists can take heart. If the VoteSolar Initiative is any
indication, technology, econom ics, and policies all hint at a brighter future for solar and
wind energy.

®American Wind Energy Association, “Global Wind Energy Market Report,” published at www.awea.org,
last visited October 15, 2003.
'“ Department o f Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Photovoltaic Cell & Module Shipments by
Type, Trade, and Prices, 1982-2001,” available at http://www.eia.doe.gov, last visited May 27, 2004.
" See www.irecusa.org for a complete list.
David Hochschild presentation to the Solar Forum, Anaheim, CA, November 20, 2003; notes in author’s
possession.
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